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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the interrelation between scientism and imperialism, as it 
plays out in three milestone travelogues written on China in the 17th and 18th centuries; 
namely, the travelogues of Johan Nieuhof (1669), Lord George Macartney (1797), and 
Andreas Everard van braam Houckgeest (1798). Understanding the lasting significance of 
these texts, I argue, requires placing them – and by extension the embassies which 
originated them – in context of the burgeoning scientific ideology of their era. To do this, I 
will first introduce my key texts, and argue for why I believe they can be considered sites 
of inquiry into the impact of scientific ideology upon Western European conceptions of 
China. Then I will discuss in more detail my theoretical framework, its derivation, my 
exegetical methodology, and my justifications for making such an analysis of Nieuhof, 
Macartney, and Houckgeest. Then, to set the stage for the close readings to come, I will 
consider the comparative levels of scientific and technological sophistication in Western 
Europe and China during the long 18th century, as well as the current state of this 
academic discourse itself, by reviewing various essential works on the subject. In my 
second chapter, I will perform my analysis of Nieuhof's travelogue. In my third, I will 
overview a selection of texts by Sir William Temple, who will be considered as an 
ideological foil to Nieuhof. In chapters four and five, I will analyse the travelogues of Lord 
George Macartney and A.E. van Braam Houckgeest respectively, extending to them the 
methodology already applied to Nieuhof. Then in chapter six, I will briefly set aside my 
diplomats to address historian of the book Benjamin Schmidt's critique of author-focused 
exegeses of premodern Dutch travel literature – a critique which, in calling into question 
the legitimacy of analyses like my own, demands address. I will overview my exegeses 
and suggest avenues for future research in chapter seven. And finally, in my epilogue, I 
will conclude my thesis by briefly sketching an example of how the relationship between 
early modern scientism and imperialism continued to develop into the 19 th century.
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The Sceptre and the Sextant: Imperialism and Scientism in the
Travelogues of Johan Nieuhof, Lord George Macartney, and A.E. van
Braam Houckgeest
Chapter One: The premodern diplomatic travelogue (and three in particular)
In the 17th and 18th centuries, a small but influential body of travelogues arose 
from Europe's diplomatic intercourse with what was then the largest and wealthiest polity 
on earth: China. Beginning from the assumption that the popularity these texts enjoyed in 
their respective heydays speaks to their relevance as barometers of premodern European 
attitudes, towards China in particular, I have chosen three of the best-known for close 
reading. Specifically, the travelogues of Johann Nieuhof, Lord George Macartney, and A. 
E. van Braam Houckgeest. With Nieuhof's travelogue first finding publication in the mid-
17th century, and Macartney's and Houckgeest's finding the same at the end of the 18th, 
these accounts span a significant stretch of European history; a period which covers the, 
as it is popularly known, scientific revolution, against which I believe they must be read. In 
addition to these, I shall also more briefly consider the work of one Sir William Temple, a 
rough contemporary of Nieuhof's, whose views on both China and the burgeoning field of 
“natural philosophy” form a useful contrast to the ideological lineage represented by the 
former authors.1 
I will make my exegesis as follows: first, I will introduce my key texts, and argue for 
why I believe that can be considered sites of inquiry into the impact of scientific ideology 
upon Western European conceptions of China. Most of this first section of my introduction 
will deal with administrative functions: providing context for the chapters to follow, 
introducing terms, and establishing the most direct scholastic antecedents to my own 
research. In my next section, “Sceptres and Sextants,” I will discuss in more detail my 
theoretical framework, its derivation, my exegetical methodology (i.e. thematic and 
1. A bit of conceptual anatomy: I will note here that, for the purposes of this thesis, and to avoid the tedium of
repetition, I will be using the words “travelogue,” “travel book,” “account,” “work,” and etc. interchangeably to 
refer to the sum total of paratexts, main text, and accompanying illustrations that comprised the final 
commodified form of the publications specified (and will note exact editions as this becomes pertinent). I will,
however, reserve the word “text” to refer specifically to the non-paratextual written content of these 
travelogues, and further specify the word “journal” to refer to only the dated, journal-entry portions of texts. 
These distinctions will become important in later chapters.
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semantic scientism), and my justifications for making such an analysis of Nieuhof, 
Macartney, and Houckgeest. Next, in “Premodern Techne, East and West,” I will consider 
the comparative levels of scientific and technological sophistication in Western Europe and
China during the long 18th century. To do this, I will review essential existent scholarship 
on the topic, in the process situating my own thesis in relation to this body of research. In 
my second chapter, I will perform my analysis of Nieuhof's travelogue. In my third, I will 
overview a selection of texts by Sir William Temple, who will be considered as an 
ideological foil most obviously to Nieuhof, but ultimately to Macartney and Houckgeest as 
well. In chapters four and five, I will analyse the travelogues of Lord George Macartney 
and A.E. van Braam Houckgeest respectively, extending to them the methodology already 
applied to Nieuhof. Then in chapter six, I will set aside my diplomats to address historian 
of the book Benjamin Schmidt's critique of author-focused exegeses of premodern Dutch 
travel literature. I will overview my exegeses and suggest avenues for future research in 
chapter seven. And finally, in my epilogue, I will conclude my thesis by briefly sketching an 
example of how the relationship between early modern scientism and imperialism 
continued to develop into the 19th century.
Although otherwise divers, the three works I have chosen to close read here share 
a number of striking similarities. Similarities which, I submit, speak to the far-reaching 
ramifications of the increasing institutionalization of science in premodern Western 
Europe, and subsequently, increasing importance of scientific ideology to the Western 
European cultural imaginary. As Michael Adas has argued in his Machines as the Measure
of Men (2014): 
From the very first decades of overseas expansion in the fifteenth century, 
European explorers and missionaries displayed great interest in the ships, tools, 
weapons, and engineering techniques of the societies they encountered. They 
often compared these with their own, and increasingly regarded technological 
and scientific accomplishments as significant measures of the overall level of 
development attained by non-Western cultures. By the mid-eighteenth century, 
scientific and technological gauges were playing a major and at times dominant 
role in European thinking about such civilizations as India and China... (3)
Adas' monograph is not concerned with only the premodern period, but his capacious 
research spans it, and his overarching argument forms perhaps the most foundational 
premise of the current thesis. Certainly, his analysis rings true of Nieuhof, Macartney, and 
Houckgeest, all of whom are uniformly painstaking in their attention to the presumed state 
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of Chinese scientific understanding, as well as to various Chinese technologies. Their 
relative interest in various expressions of the latter differs somewhat, as we shall see in 
their respective chapters, but besides those that Adas lists, I would also add agriculture, 
sericulture, and ceramic production as three (albeit non-exhaustive) examples of 
technological fields that receive minute, repeated scrutiny in all three diplomats' works. 
Moreover, wherever awe at Chinese ingenuity is present, attempted appropriation can 
usually be expected. These works' explicit preoccupation with Chinese science and 
technology – which I designate “thematic scientism,” and will discuss in greater depth in 
the next section – points, I believe, to certain common ideological assumptions shared 
amongst the travelogues. It also confirms Adas' argument that the premodern period can 
be characterised by a disposition towards foreign cultures increasingly defined by the 
terms and valorisation of rationalistic Western science; one whose perhaps unexpected 
role in Sino-European relations modern scholarship is only beginning to recover. 
But moreover, it is not only these works' thematic focus on Chinese technology that 
suggests a shared ideological basis, but also their similar stylistic qualities. Qualities such 
as a self-conscious regard for the objectivity and precision of their observations; a 
(perhaps consequent) reliance on measurements and taxonomical lists; and a compulsive 
need to not merely describe, but explain Chinese culture – and, quite prominently, its 
techne2 – in terms of underlying causal principles. These stylistic convergences I include 
under the heading “semantic scientism”; and although semantic scientism is not flatly 
equivalent to thematic scientism, it is derived from the same originating ideology, and 
frequently deployed simultaneous to it. To my knowledge, this semantic scientism has not 
been previously considered by any scholars of premodern travel writing, and it is here 
particularly that I hope to make an original methodological contribution to my topic. 
By unpacking the texts of Nieuhof, Temple, Macartney and Houckgeest in relation to
scientism, both thematically and semantically, I hope to shed light on the role that 
premodern European scientism had, and no doubt continues to have, in shaping Western 
European conceptions of China. Indeed, what ultimately makes our diplomats' invocations 
of scientific endeavour and deployments of scientific language scientistic rather than 
scientific is that disinterested inquiry into Chinese culture was never their embassies' 
2. More conceptual taxonomy: while I do, strictly speaking, acknowledge a distinction between techne and 
technology – where “techne” refers to the sum of a culturally-embedded, living body of knowledge on, say, a 
field of manufacture (like Chinese ceramic-making), and “technology” refers to a specific instantiation of a 
techne (like Southeastern China's famous Dragon kilns), by and large, the academic inflections of this 
distinction will not be important to my exegesis. For more information on Dragon kilns, see Kerr and Wood 
(347-351).
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primary goal. Access to Chinese goods, through either the negotiation of relaxed trade 
restrictions, or as the end result of technological appropriation, was. All other goals were 
prioritized behind this. But science mobilized to – or conducted in the shadow of – such an
agenda is not mere science. I leave aside the question of whether “pure” science exists in 
any case; but it will certainly not be found in the travelogues under study here.
This means that I will of necessity be considering the relationship between 
scientism and imperialism. Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest were all imperial agents; 
all belonged to embassies officially tasked with recording their travels in China and 
encounters with the Chinese – not for the sake of charming anecdotes, but as works of 
imperial reconnaissance and appropriation. It is true that the ideological impetus behind 
each of their embassies might be argued to be more precisely described as mercantilist, 
given the predominantly economic goals of the embassies and various trading company 
associations of the diplomats. Nonetheless, Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest each 
executed their diplomatic functions under the aegis of a sponsoring government that felt 
compelled to pay considerable lip service to the extra-economic motivations for their 
dispatches. To account for this, it seems more appropriate to speak of “imperialism” than 
to reduce their embassies to economic terms alone. Incidentally, this is also why I will, 
moving forward, feel free to use the term “imperialism” in reference to my Dutch authors, 
who technically acted on behalf of a Republic. The governmental architecture of the 17 th 
and 18th century Dutch may have been novel, but their engagements with the non-
European world, compared against their British brethren, were not.
Meeting the boys: Nieuhof, Macartney, Houckgeest (and Temple)
Which leads us to the books at hand. In order of their English-language publication: 
Johan Nieuhof's An Embassy from the East India Company of the United Provinces, to the
Grand Tartar Cham, Emperor of China, etc. (1669); Lord George Macartney's An Embassy
to China, Being the Journal Kept by Lord George Macartney during his Embassy to the 
Emperor Chi'en-lung, 1793-1794 (1797); and Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest's
An Authentic Account of the Embassy of the Dutch East India Company to the Court of the
Emperor of China, In the Years 1794 and 1795 (1798), were all productions of 
ambassadorial missions to China during the lengthy Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Not an 
ambassador himself, Nieuhof served rather as secretary to Peter de Goyer and Jacob de 
Keyzer during their 1655 embassy to China. He was charged by the administrators of the 
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journey, the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie), or Dutch East India Company, 
with writing the embassy's official account (Dawn Odell, Soul of Transactions, 224). The 
task of actually publishing this manuscript, however, Nieuhof delegated to his brother, 
Hendrick, who sold it circa 1664 to Dutch publishing magnate Jacob van Meurs (Benjamin 
Schmidt, 24). Spurred by a confident Dutch Republic's mercantile pretensions during the 
flowering of its Golden Age, de Goyer and de Keyzer's mission intended to secure trading 
concessions for the Dutch from a Qing government that at that time favoured the 
Portuguese. They failed at this (although the Shunzhi Emperor kindly invited the Dutch 
back again in eight years' time), but Nieuhof, at least, managed to benefit from the 
publication of his embassy's adventures. As Dawn Odell's (2001) research has discussed, 
Nieuhof's work, especially notable for its detailed illustrations3, was subsequently 
published by the VOC as propaganda portraying the monopoly as a “masterful mercantile 
force in Asia” (Soul of Transactions, 242); one as skilled in amassing knowledge about far-
off peoples as trade goods from them, and therefore a vital cultural institution. Nieuhof's 
travelogue was first published in 1665, in Dutch (in which language its formidable full title 
is fondly abbreviated to Het Gezantschap; in English, “The Embassy”), and the crisp, 
realistic pictures of China and the Chinese that accompanied it became the direct visual 
inspiration of much subsequent chinoiserie.4 The book was an immediate success, 
establishing Nieuhof in Europe as an authority on Chinese culture. Successive editions 
were published in French, German, Latin, and lastly English. But Nieuhof's travelogue 
impacted more than just European aesthetics; as one of the earliest accounts of China to 
achieve significant circulation in Europe, it helped to define premodern Western 
conceptions of China generally. More concretely, it also helped establish the reputation of 
original publisher Jacob van Meurs, to whom the Dutch Republic granted sole publishing 
rights, in three languages, for 15 years (Sun, 5). Its popularity inadvertently initiated a 
tradition of Dutch dominance in the production of geography and natural history books 
that, as Benjamin Schmidt (2015) has detailed at length, would span generations. As a 
book of such well-documented historical importance, Nieuhof's travelogue makes an 
essential entry to the premodern cannon of European Sinological writings. 
Lord George Macartney's name will, of course, be familiar as belonging to King 
3. I will be discussing one of these in depth: the van Meurs frontispiece that was also used in Ogilby's 
English language translation of Nieuhof. For a more thorough assay of the imagery in Nieuhof's text, I defer 
to Dawn Odell, “Soul of Transactions”; Benjamin Schmidt, Inventing Exoticism; and Jing Sun's “The Illusion 
of Verisimilitude: Johan Nieuhof's Images of China.”
4. See Edwin J. Van Kley, Asia in the Making of Europe.
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George III's ambassador – that ambassador – whose refusal to kowtow before the 
Qianlong Emperor provoked such a furore amongst British commentators that it continues 
to dominate Sino-British scholarship to this day.5 Peter J. Kitson (2013), in fact, in his 
Forging Romantic China, deems Macartney's meeting with Qianlong as in no uncertain 
terms “the primal scene of the encounter with China in the British imagination” (204). 
Kitson's monograph traces the evolution of the Chinese trope through its various 
incarnations in British letters, plays, drawings, and domestic goods, to underscore its 
overall ambivalence in the 18th century British imagination, before tentatively concluding 
that “co-operation and negotiation between the two empires seemed viable options 
throughout the period in the mind of most Britons” (240). And although Kitson's case is 
persuasively argued from a wide-ranging evidential base, he is right to avoid summing too-
definite a British opinion of China during this period. For, as we shall see, Macartney's 
reading of the Qing's level of scientific achievement relative to Britain's leads him to depict 
China in his travelogue, if not without exception, as backward, stubborn, and intellectually 
stagnant. A characterization that, by helping to undermine British confidence in the 
possibility of co-operation with the Chinese, seems to ominously anticipate the Opium 
Wars. 
The great irony in Macartney's frequently unflattering depictions of the Chinese, of 
course, lies in the fact that they, with barely contained jealousy, belie China's great 
importance to the British as a trade partner. This importance is well illustrated by 
Macartney's ambitious list of official embassy objectives. Maxine Berg, analysing the 
Macartney embassy's cargo of gifts for the Qianlong Emperor, summarizes these:  
[F]irst, to reduce the constraints under which trade was carried on in Canton, and
to open up other ports for trade nearer to the production districts of Britain’s key 
imports – silk and tea; second, to get exports from China on cheaper terms, and 
to have duties on imports and exports taken off or at least reduced; third to have 
English trade put on at least the same footing as that with Portugal; and fourth, to
increase imports into China from Great Britain. (10)
Berg makes an important point, one that in fact applies to all three of the embassies under
discussion: even by Nieuhof's time, Chinese goods were familiar to and well-loved by 
European consumers, and comprised several items that, in terms of quality at their price 
point, simply could not be obtained elsewhere. As early as the 17th century, with the 
introduction of the various East India companies, Berg explains:
5. e.g. Henrietta Harrison's “Chinese and British Diplomatic Gifts in the Macartney Embassy of 1793.”  
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These goods – cottons, especially muslins and printed calicoes, silks, porcelain, 
ornamental brass and ironware, lacquer and paper goods, fans, objects in ivory 
and mother of pearl became highly desirable in Europe. These were special 
luxuries for Europeans – they were not the ancient or Persian luxuries of 
corruption and vice, the gold and rubies of the Indies. They were luxuries 
associated with a civilized way of life, appealing especially to the middling 
classes. 
The special feature that distinguished Asian manufacture was world class 
production of fine but affordable consumer ware, marked by diversity, taste and 
fashion, and produced and traded throughout Asia on a scale not previously 
encountered in Europe. These Asiatic goods boast all the qualities that European
historians have previously argued were created first in world history in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century industrial revolutions in Britain and France.  
(4)
Centuries before industrial mass production revolutionized Europe, the Chinese had 
already established their prowess in both the production of a wide variety of superior 
consumer goods – what Berg calls “transformative luxuries” for their impact upon 
European tastes and accessibility to aspirational middle-class consumers – and in the 
global distribution of the same.6 It will not be surprising, then, that Macartney's mission 
was from the outset intended as an act of technological espionage; even aside from its tea
stores, China was envied for its manufacturing techne. And indeed, whether he won 
Britain any trade concessions or not, Royal Society president and grey-eminence-at-large 
Joseph Banks had made it clear that Macartney was not to come home from China empty-
handed. In private correspondence to Lord Macartney in 1792, Banks directs him to bring 
back, for the sake of Mother Britannia, everything possible of Chinese methods of 
producing silk, porcelain, and tea.7 Which is to say: give a man a silk, and he'll dress well 
for a night; teach a man to spin (specifically, with Chinese proficiency), and he'll dress a 
nation. In Joseph Banks' own words: 
[A] few practical men admitted among [the Chinese] would in a few years acquire
a mass of information for which if placed in the industrious and active hands of 
English manufacturers the whole revenue of the Chinese empire would not be 
thought sufficient equivalent. (qtd in Berg, 13)
Without understanding how highly the obtention of Chinese manufacturing knowledge was
6. See also Jacqueline Van Gent's concise overview of this theme (305). 
7. As discussed in: Berg (13); Drayton (92-93); Kitson (138); Hillemann (36-37).
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prioritized by Macartney (and those, Banks in particular, who managed his embassy from 
afar), it cannot be possible to properly contextualise his mission, or travelogue, at all. And 
yet, this was only part of a larger pan-British impulse. Kitson, echoing Adas, puts it plainly: 
“British understandings of Chinese scientific and technological proficiency were vital to 
their overall estimation of the Qing empire” (126) – a dynamic epitomized by Macartney's 
travelogue.
Andreas Everard van Braam Houckgeest, like Nieuhof, did not lead the embassy 
whose journey he was tasked with recording, despite having conceived of the mission in 
the first place. The idea had come to him, the story goes, after hearing of Macartney's 
recent failure to curry favour with the Qing court. Sensing opportunity in Macartney's 
disgrace, Houckgeest suggested that a VOC embassy be sent to China under pretences 
of celebrating the 60th year of Qianlong's reign, a plan which Batavia's ever-expedient 
commissioners-general found agreeable (J. J. L. Duyvendak, 7-9). And though 
Houckgeest brought to the embassy considerable experience, having worked as a 
Supercargo in Canton on behalf of the VOC from 1758-1773, and as head of the Dutch 
factory in Canton since 1790, its controllers nevertheless appointed seasoned diplomat, 
scholar, and fellow VOC man Isaac Titsingh to head the 1794 mission. This was a bit 
ironic, since, as Ellen Xiangyu Cai (2011) observes, Titsingh was not himself fully in favour
of the mission, grumbling that “other countries such as Spain, Portugal and France were 
not sending such embassies” (7). (“However,” she amusedly continues, “since the 
governor of Canton had already reported the intended dispatch of the Dutch embassy to 
the court, he had no choice but to carry it out” [7]). Houckgeest was instead designated 
“Second in the Embassy” (Houckgeest, vol. I, xi), and assigned the task of producing its 
formal account, which he famously embellished with illustrations by his own hand. 
Houckgeest wrote his journal in Dutch, and it was subsequently translated into French by 
M.L.E. Saint-Méry (an intriguing character in his own right, who I shall treat in greater 
depth in my chapter on Houckgeest) – which edition, after being pirated, made its way, 
eventually, in a fashion, into English. Like Nieuhof and Macartney before him, Houckgeest 
is consistently concerned with minute observation of China, its people, and their 
technologies. And like his predecessors, Houckgeest seems motivated by a desire to write
the Chinese that strikes one as insistently concerned with his own objectivity, honesty, and
the use of scientific principles to, as it were, translate China from an unknown to a known 
quantity. 
In addition to these three primary diplomats, I shall also examine, in the supporting 
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role of ideological foil – most pointedly to his contemporary Nieuhof, but finally to the lot – 
some of the works of a fourth noted diplomat, Sir William Temple. Temple is of course 
renowned to this day as one of premodern Britain's great polymaths: a sterling prose 
stylist, who helped define the English essay form; a politician of several appointments, 
who famously negotiated the Triple Alliance of 1668, and arranged the marriage of William
of Orange to Mary of England; a renowned garden designer; and, despite his never having
travelled East himself, his nation's foremost scholar on China during his day.8 As a 
consequence most obviously of this latter point, his inclusion in the current work finds 
justification by establishing between himself and Nieuhof a symmetry between 17th 
century British and Dutch Sinological sources that mirrors my pairing of Macartney and 
Houckgeest in the late 18th century. But moreover, and more importantly, Temple 
conceived very differently of the terms and usefulness of natural philosophy than did 
Nieuhof. The two, in fact, are nearly polar opposites on the topic, with Temple, in hindsight,
representing a line of thought so sceptical of natural philosophy that it makes an ideal 
counterpoint to Nieuhof's budding scientism. Indeed, Temple is, in this regard, a veritable 
Anti-hof, whose ruminations on China and natural philosophy throw the contours of 
Nieuhof's thought, by contrast, into their greatest clarity – not only in themselves, but as 
early expressions of a Western ideological revolution whose legacy would lead to the 
travelogues of Macartney and Houckgeest. 
 Of course, the scrupulously detailed descriptions of China and the Chinese in the 
writings under study can and should be understood as, in part, a logical response to the 
Qing Empire's notoriously strict border control policies prior to the Opium Wars. Leonard 
Blussé (2013), referring specifically to the early Dutch-published travel literature that 
popularized the genre, captures the fundamental appeal of such works to European 
audiences: “What made [travelogues about China] so interesting is that they all were 
based on eyewitness accounts of the interior of the widely known but little explored 
empires of China and Japan by servants of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)” (14).9 
Any diplomatic mission to the economic heart of the Orient – whose lust for silver, by the 
mid-16th century, drove a global trade network that would go on to facilitate centuries of 
8. See Blue, “China and Western social thought in the modern period” (64). Wybe Kuitert gives a good gloss 
of Temple's retirement from politics, and goes quite into depth on his Surrey estate, Moor Park (168).
9. See also Odell (142); Rubiés and Ollé (296); Nieuhof (158). Also, compare Houckgeest, who is shocked 
by the lack of circulation even within China: “[t]here are very few Chinese who have a general knowledge of 
the whole Empire, or who are acquainted with the customs of the provinces they do not inhabit,” (vol. II, 
188).
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European empire building10 – that failed to return, among other things, reams of minute 
observation of the native lands and people – was inconceivable. It would have, in fact, 
been considered a scandalous waste; the waste of a rare opportunity to augment the 
limited first-hand knowledge available about one of the world's most antique and pre-
eminent civilizations.11 
And as Yue Zhuang and Andrea Riemenschnitter (2017) observe, premodern China
was literally globally pre-eminent in nearly all cultural arenas: 
China in these centuries [circa 1500-1800] was widely viewed by contemporary 
European nations as a world power that was enjoying great stability and 
prosperity. When the Portuguese explorers reached India in 1498, China (Ming 
dynasty [1368-1644]) was already the centre of the long established African-
Asian trading system. By standard criteria such as size, population, agriculture, 
commerce, wealth, sophistication, technology, military might, cuisine, learning, 
literature and the fine arts, the Ming dynasty presided over the greatest nation in
the world. The Qing state (1644-1911)... was an unprecedented multi-ethnic and
multicultural empire consisting of not only the heartland of China, but also 
eastern Turkestan, Mongolia and Tibet. With its successful consolidation policy, 
the Qing restored order and prosperity interrupted by the dynastic transition. In 
its heyday it achieved a level of material productivity far beyond that of any 
earlier Chinese dynasty. (3)
That China might so enchant the European reader during the premodern period, then, is 
not difficult to understand. However, prior to the mid-17th century, word of China's 
achievements had made their way to back Europe largely due to the literary efforts of the 
Jesuits, like Matteo Ricci, who had long dominated this arena of knowledge. But theirs 
were not unproblematic missives, because they were not unproblematic messengers. 
Their missionary ambitions predisposed them, it was suspected, to view both their 
potential converts and themselves through a lens brightly. A suspicion which, Ulrike 
Hillemann (2009) summarizes, led the Catholic-wary British to regard their works with 
growing distrust over the 18th century12 – so helping to create a demand for more impartial
information on China. 
But even aside from wariness of missionary accounts, travel writing throughout the 
premodern era came increasingly to be seen as a valid mode of, as we would call it today, 
ethnographic study because of its empiricism. Adas writes:
10. See especially Flynn and Giráldez; Markley (11); Deng (116-118); and Berg above.
11. Kitson gives an excellent discussion of this in chapter five of his monograph, which stresses the 
importance of traders and scientists to the accumulation of British knowledge of China (126).  
12. Hilleman (16-17); see also, Adas (70); Blue (61). Houckgeest is quite explicit about how dependent the 
missionaries are on the favour of their Qing imperial “protectors,” (vol. I, 243).
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The influence of scientific thinking on the writers who shaped European attitudes 
towards non-Western cultures in the eighteenth century was manifested in a 
variety of ways. The accounts of overseas travelers took on an added importance
as one form of the empirical evidence that eighteenth-century thinkers were 
convinced would enable them to undertake the 'scientific' study of human 
societies. (75)
But as Odell has explored in her “Clothing, Customs, and Mercantilism” (2002) the 
beginning of this trend towards scientifically inflected depictions of non-Western cultures 
can in fact be detected even earlier, in the “proto-ethnographic depictions of non-
Europeans” characteristic of 17th century Dutch travel literature, such as Nieuhof's An 
Embassy from the East India Company (141-142). Given these factors – broad curiosity 
about a grand, powerful, and much-rumoured empire; growing scepticism towards 
missionary accounts of this empire; and the rise of “scientific” interest in non-Westerners 
generally – ethnographical observation had, by Macartney and Houckgeest's day in the 
late-18th century, become established as one of the most essential functions of any 
diplomatic envoy to China. 
That said, observation even for ethnography's sake does not alone account for the 
ideological convergences in these travelogues, and their commentary, considered at face 
value, is only half the point. At least as far as concerns the present thesis, which does not 
attempt a comprehensive account of the European “idea of China” (as if such a monolith 
ever truly existed), but aims rather to examine the shared literary qualities of three 
landmark travelogues. Specifically, in order to highlight among these the development of a 
particular conceptual relationship that appears to undergird them all: that between 
scientism and imperialism. A relationship which emerging research suggests has been far 
more influential upon the overall tenor of Europe's relationship with China than has 
previously been acknowledged. Kitson, for instance, devotes a chapter in his monograph 
to the Macartney embassy and its role in the 18th century exchange of scientific ideas 
between Europe and China. Confirming the earlier work of Kapil Raj (2007), he argues 
that modern science as an institution never was a distinctly Western, or even Western-
born phenomenon, but arose from “a complex historical process of [intercultural] collisions,
negotiations, and compromises” (133). This process he illustrates with reference to the 
exchange of botanical knowledge and specimens procured by the Macartney embassy 
during their time in China.
Treating the same theme more exhaustively – and one of the best examples of 
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research on science and imperialism to date, directly anticipating my own – is Richard 
Drayton's Nature's Government (2005). Drayton's monograph explores the history of 
Britain's Kew gardens, finding it all of: a mascot for contemporary cultural values; a 
scientific hub of global importance; an influential player in the development and 
deployment of British agronomic policy; and a case study of the utility of scientists and 
scientific ideology generally as instruments of Western imperial power. Indeed, Drayton's 
portrayal of botany and empire as bedfellows is so grounded in historical detail that by his 
conclusion their partnership seems nearly foregone. But one thing which Kitson's and 
Drayton's shared emphasis on the concrete dimensions of their projects – the men, the 
places, the plants – leaves relatively neglected, is an in-depth account of the ideological 
affinities between scientific and imperialist thought, at the level of thought. At the level of 
text. A lacuna which this study's literary tack seeks to address.
Certainly then, Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest's texts can be considered 
historically significant at least as first-hand documents of European encounter with China 
during an era when such encounters were rare, and dependent upon Qing permission.13 
The relative paucity, within Europe, of intimate documentation of China made such 
accounts not only interesting to the public at large, but quite influential in contributing to 
the (albeit non-homogeneous) cluster of associations comprising the concept of China in 
the European cultural imaginary. As Zhuang and Riemenschnitter point out, 
“representations of other cultures are never simply descriptive, but involve locating the 
other cultures within the symbolic frameworks of the observing culture” (8). It is my 
contention that these travelogues present, over a century apart, three telling glimpses into 
the European psyche during a period of enormous intellectual tumult, into which context 
their distinct but not disconnected encounters with China must be placed. 
I refer, of course, to the scientific revolution, which we may for our purposes 
consider as the ideological shift beginning with Copernicus' challenge to reigning 
Ecclesiastical mythos in De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, and snowballing thence to
the works of Galileo, Bacon, Newton – a list still unfurling today. And a shift that, as Adas' 
monograph has made clear, would radically reshape not only how Europeans understood 
their relation to the natural world, but also, and consequently, to other peoples.
The Scientific Revolution, so-called
13. For instance, Henry Kent's discussion of Houckgeest (166).
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It might go without saying that the scientific revolution was not a single watershed 
event, or even series of events, but rather a process. A process encompassing scattered 
epiphanies and breakthroughs over generations, whose interlinkages and cumulative 
contribution towards the establishment of what is today called the Western scientific 
tradition has often only been discernible in hindsight. But it will also be noted that even 
considered processionally, the scientific revolution did not develop uniformly across 
Europe. In her “Early Modern Intellectual Life: Humanism, Religion, and Science in 
Seventeenth Century England” (1991), Barbara Shapiro explains: “English science... 
focused to a far greater extent on empirical investigation and experiment and was more 
probabilistic and utilitarian than its continental counterparts” (46). The probabilistic, 
empirically-oriented nature of British science found ideological support, Shapiro argues, in 
a humanist tradition that, while largely unrelated, emphasized similar values. If indirectly, 
humanism thus helped to facilitate both the development and the intellectual legitimacy of 
Britain's scientific institutions over time. A more finely detailed comparison of continental 
and British science would be considerably outside my current remit, but recognizing the 
scientific revolution's indebtedness to various other ideologies (often regional) with which it
was contemporary, is well in line with my project to identify the consonance between 
scientism and imperialism in the works of our roving Western diplomats. And without 
arguing for the equivalence of Dutch and British scientific traditions – or for that matter, 
imperial traditions – we can perhaps begin to piece together something of the Western 
European mindset, and indeed the extent to which such an object can be considered 
historically to exist at all, by examining the similarities in thought between the travelogues 
under study.14 After all, the existence of regional and temporal variations in ideology 
certainly do not preclude the existence of inter-regional and -temporal similarities in the 
same; these too must be mapped.
Incidentally, it might be mentioned here that as, unsurprisingly, few farmhands had 
the opportunity or ability to read the latest scientific titles, it was the well-educated upper 
classes that first and most dramatically registered the scientific revolution's ideological 
effects (Adas, 9). Just the classes that Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest, in their 
diplomatic capacities, very literally represented, and for whom their texts may be 
14. Regarding the historical entanglement of British and Dutch scientific traditions, see Lisa Jardine's Going 
Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory. For a sustained comparison of British and Dutch 
imperialism, with especial regards to mercantile policies and differing approaches to colonisation, see P. 
O'Brien's “Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise and Decline of the Dutch and British Economies 1585-
1815.” 
21
considered to speak. And though their travelogues alone do not constitute anything near a 
complete fossil record of the evolution of scientism's influence upon European 
conceptualizations of China, they do represent three essential examples of that lineage. 
One last introductory formality: at risk of redundancy, I shall point out that the puffy 
“Europes” and “Chinas” that I have and will go on from here to discuss, are not intended 
as proper anthropological categories, but as references to the ideas embedded in my 
primary texts. It is not the veracity of our ambassadors' observations, but the ideological 
premises that inform them that interests me – their lack of objectivity is precisely the point. 
And arguably, it'd have to be, for if, as Simon Schama points out in his landmark critique of
Dutch Golden Age artefacts, even landscape paintings make poor photographs (10) – then
what hope do we have of finding “unmediated naturalism” (10) in a travelogue? What one 
does find is more interesting than naturalism in any case. Because as we will see, 
Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest all mark an explicit distinction between European 
and Chinese peoples, and in each case this distinction is heavily predicated upon the 
perceived differences between Chinese and European science and techne. 
Sceptres and Sextants: Relating Imperial Power and Scientism
Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to 
human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The 
man of science knows things to the extent that he can make them. Their “in-
itself ” becomes “for him.” In their transformation the essence of things is 
revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. This identity 
constitutes the unity of nature. (Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, 6) 
One of the first and still most thorough theorisations of scientific ideology as such 
was Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, first published in 
1944. In this defining expression of Frankfurt School criticism, Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that the science of the Enlightenment – which continues to loom over the modern 
era, both in its own right and through the industrialism and subsequent consumerism 
which it enabled – is essentially “mythological.” And mythologies, they explain, are never 
merely schematic, but strategies of domination rooted, like all forms of power, in 
apprehension, categorization, superordination: the establishment of hierarchies. Reducing 
the universe to a set of “calculable” (4) laws exercised over a single dispersed substance, 
scientific ideology promises man the power that comes from knowing. Anything known, 
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after all, can be anticipated – and therefore manipulated. And therefore controlled. Thus 
does a conceptual hierarchy become concrete. They make this latter point explicitly: “In 
thought, human beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a 
way that it can be mastered” (31). Science was not after all about knowledge for its own 
sake, but for the sake of the will-to-power. Like magic and religion before it, the “science” 
that arose from the Enlightenment was a method by which man could rule all things – 
including his own tribe. “What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to 
dominate wholly both it and human beings. Nothing else counts” (2).
Definitions: semantic and thematic scientism
Moving forward (and for that matter backward), I shall use the word “scientism,” in 
the general sense, to refer to this “mythological” function of science as a strategy of 
domination, whether of human or nonhuman subjects – that is, science as ideology. I shall 
also use it to refer to that valorisation of science as an institution – e.g. its presumed 
objectivity, its presumed nobility of intent – that obscures its ideological qualities. And while
I recognize that Adorno and Horkheimer themselves would probably not bother to 
distinguish between what I am calling scientism and scientific ideology generally, I find that
doing so allows for an easier discussion of those textual habits I am interested in 
analysing: it is much easier to speak of “semantic scientism” than “the semantics of 
scientific ideology.” 
This, of course, begs the question: what exactly are the textual habits I am 
interested in analysing? I have described, by way of Adorno and Horkheimer, what I 
believe scientism at its most fundamental to be; but how can we discern it, an ideology, in 
text? What are its signatures? Firstly, I will be looking for the language of scientism, or 
what I have described above as semantic scientism: habits of description that derive from 
the scientific method, and imply its authority and truthfulness. For example, common to all 
of Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest, is a tendency to the production of taxonomical 
lists: classificatory inventories of phenomena, such as a landscape's natural resources, 
that serve to conceptualize it in exacting terms. We will find quantification extremely 
common in all three works as well: the translation of objects and phenomena into 
measurable, universal units. And finally, mimicking science's aim at empirically deriving 
transcendent principles, we will also be very interested in the extrapolation of universal 
patterns from specific instances – as when, for instance, our writers comment on an 
23
essentialised Chinese character or constitution. This kind of language presents its object 
as nothing so much as a scientific specimen, conceptually delimited and contained by a 
Western epistemological system that has already been presumed fully capable of 
understanding and judging its worth; a fundamentally Eurocentric position. My analysis of 
semantic scientism, then, will centre on the way scientistic language is applied to either 
Chinese people and culture, or material China itself (including its nonhuman milieu), and 
how those applications might serve imperialist aims by supporting or smokescreening 
imperialism's Eurocentric conceits. 
Stylistic habits aside, I will also of course be concerned with what I have called 
thematic scientism, which encompasses any explicit assessments of Chinese science or 
technology – for example, comparisons between European and Chinese techne, or 
commentary on the state of Chinese scientific learning generally – which we shall also find
in abundance throughout the travelogues. This category is most distinct from semantic 
scientism in that it is more straightforward; it is not stylistic, but topical. But ultimately, both 
thematic and semantic scientism are expressions of the same underlying ideological 
ground, and differentiating strictly between them rather than exploring them as 
expressions of that ground will not generally be my goal. However, I do differentiate 
between them here to point out that as of this writing, I am not aware of any previous 
inquiries into scientism's semantic aspects.
Britain's cinchona scheme: a case study
  
My emphasis of scientism as a strategy of dominance is not meant to imply that 
scientism alone is somehow responsible for imperialism. But it certainly could, and did, 
reinforce it. And to best illustrate the symbiosis between these similarly totalising 
ideologies at the conceptual level, it seems appropriate, with Adorno and Horkheimer still 
fresh in mind, to consider a historical example of Drayton's that, while unrelated to the 
following travelogues directly, nevertheless illustrates the scientism-imperialism 
relationship in action at the broad, institutional level of operation at which it has hitherto 
been studied. Drayton relates how France and Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries 
increasingly utilized men of science as imperial agents, whose discoveries of spices and 
medicines unknown to the West were used to justify imperial acquisition of the lands in 
which these new latent commodities grew. Indeed, “the natural scientist, as he named the 
natural riches of new territories, and mapped the uses of the world's things, was allied with
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[the imperialist's] moral project.... to reorder the uses of resources and labour” with 
regards to an efficiency and “best use of nature” that it was science's ongoing project to 
discern and help direct (Drayton, 232). 
The cynical tale of Britain's cinchona scheme illustrates this dynamic with 
nauseating clarity. British foray into the mass cultivation of cinchona trees, whose bark 
yields quinine, potent febrifuge and treatment for malaria, began with high economic 
hopes in 1860. In that year, Kew Gardens received a grant from the royal treasury to 
develop shelters for the nursing of seedlings that were intended later to be transferred to 
Indian commercial plantations (Drayton, 209). By the 1890's, however, these hopes had (if
you'll pardon the pun) all but withered: the kind of cinchona the British had managed to 
propagate simply could not compete with the quality of the Dutch cinchona that dominated
the market, and never turned a profit. But British cinchona was not devoid medicinal value,
and in 1876, George King, Superintendent of the Calcutta Botanic Garden, oversaw a 
successful initiative to dispense it via post widely and cheaply to the Indian populace 
(each packet cost only 5 pice – one English farthing) (231).15  Subsequently, the history of 
British cinchona cultivation was pointedly revised, and, happy luck, new, altruistic motives 
were discerned in the clarity of hindsight to have underlain the project all along. So 
declared noted civil servant Clement Markham, who was instrumental in obtaining the 
cinchona for the British in the first place (231). Commercial failure, refigured, became 
public health success; not merely an act of noblesse oblige by the enlightened British 
towards their Indian subjects, but a defining one: exemplary of the kind of progressive end 
that validated imperial means (231). 
By countless historical examples like the one above, Drayton charts how empire in 
the West variously deployed scientific methodology and ideology in the roughly premodern
period in pursuit of its economic and colonial goals – giving form, time and again, to 
Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis in the process. By identifying potential commodities, 
potential markets, and potential extra-economic justifications for colonial expansion, 
Britain's scientists had by the late 19th century become invaluable agents of empire. This 
much is incontestable, as Drayton's analysis makes clear. But there is a more granular 
level at which the interrelation of scientistic and imperialistic thought can be observed, and
it is that to which I shall turn in my close readings of Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest.
15. Nonetheless, Drayton writes that “The truth, unfortunately, was that even that crude and diluted source of
quinine was, at 5 pice, too dear for most Indians to use regularly” (231).
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But is it actually scientism?
Perhaps the most obvious complaint that could be made against my methodology is
that, after all, a number is a number is a number – and perhaps nothing else. The Book of 
Exodus too is obsessed with measurements. Who hasn't been astounded by the speed 
with which the word “cubit” can, through repetition, flatten into complete atonal 
meaninglessness, even in the course of a single page? Does this mean that the Old 
Testament writers too were incipient scientists? But perhaps they were. The ideological 
and historical convergences between scientism, which developed in a European and 
therefore Christian context, and various other historically influential ideologies that 
preceded it, has, and for good reason, attracted much scholarly attention. Joseph 
Needham, outlining the inputs Christianity made to the development of Western science, 
explains in The Grand Titration (1969):
Without doubt one of the oldest notions in Western civilization was that just as 
earthly imperial law-givers enacted codes of positive law to be obeyed by men, 
so also the celestial and supreme rational Creator Deity had laid down a series 
of laws which must be obeyed by minerals, crystals, plants, animals and the 
stars in their courses. There can be little doubt that this idea was intimately 
bound up with the development of modern science at the Renaissance in the 
West. (The Grand Titration, 35-36)
Needham, rather after his fashion, is painting in quite broad strokes here, and in service of
his goal to differentiate European and Chinese views of nature – but his picture is not 
inaccurate insofar as it goes. We will consider his research more closely in the next 
section of my introduction, but his argument makes a useful overview of the historical 
interrelation of science and Christianity in the West. This interrelation is also the focus of 
Eric Jorink's work on Golden Age Dutch conceptions of nature as the second Book of 
Creation. In his monograph Reading the Book of Nature in the Dutch Golden Age (2010), 
Jorink explains how the study of natural philosophy in many 16-18th century religious 
circles amounted to a glorification of God's work, complementing even of necessity the 
study of the Bible itself. Jorink's research illustrates that modern dichotomizations of 
science and religion would hardly have been conceivable prior to the 18th century; a point 
worth mentioning in the context of the current thesis as an example of science's historical 
imbrication within a larger matrix of ideologies that structured Western thought in the 
premodern era. 
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But that is the extent of my speculation about Biblical authors; for it seems unlikely, 
in the end, that the motivation behind Exodus' obsessive quantifications of Tabernacle 
building materials is fully identical to, say, Macartney's motivations many centuries later in 
quantifying Chinese agricultural technologies – that, in other words, all instances of 
quantification are casually interchangeable. How then can we know that such habits in our
ambassadors are in fact expressions of scientism, and not something else? Without 
discounting the extent to which ideologies aside from scientism must have influenced all of
our diplomats, as we will presently see, Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest all invoke 
Science-with-a-big-S – Science the institution – as a justification for their missions 
overall.16 And each, in fact, stresses this point in no uncertain terms, name-checking 
science more than once as a primary motivation for their embassies generally, and their 
travelogues more specifically. It is a premise of this thesis that they should be taken at 
their words. 
Premodern techne, East and West
A properly contextualised critique of our diplomats' views of Chinese techne 
requires, to begin with, some familiarity with Europe and China's comparative premodern 
levels of technological development – it will be impossible, after all, to unpack the 
implications of their assessments without having some grounds for determining the 
accuracy, if any, of these assessments. But as it turns out, making such a comparison is 
no straightforward task. Given the size and diversity of these regions, any number of 
qualifications immediately arise. Which areas of Europe are to be included in the 
comparison? Which areas of China? Which kinds of technology? It would take several 
monographs to address this topic in any depth; but luckily, much incisive scholarship on 
the topic has been done already, from which a useful overview can be drawn.
Joseph Needham
 
And luckily, this scholarship has much progressed beyond the paradigm established
by Joseph Needham in The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West, 
wherein he (in)famously asked: “Why... did modern science, as opposed to ancient and 
medieval science (with all that modern science implied in terms of political dominance), 
16. Granted that Nieuhof does so in the vernacular of his day.
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develop only in the Western world?” (ii). Needham usefully defines “modern science” as 
“the application of mathematical hypotheses to Nature, the full understanding and use of 
the experimental method, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the 
geometrisation of space, and the acceptance of the mechanical model of reality” (15) – all 
qualities that indeed have come to be thought of as inextricable to the Western scientific 
tradition, and many of which will surface in our chosen travelogues. But Needham's 
dichotomization of European and Chinese mindsets is sometimes suspiciously reductive. 
The major difference he finds between the two is a Chinese tendency towards 
“organicism” – “in which every phenomenon was connected with every other according to 
hierarchal order” (21) – a holistic way of thinking that prevented the development of a 
Western-style, “mechanical view” of the world, and subsequently, the development of 
Western-style scientific theories. I find Needham's use of the word “hierarchal” mysterious 
here, as what Needham describes is no Christian great chain of being, but a “harmonious 
co-operation of all beings,” each being a “whole” incorporated within a larger “cosmic and 
organic pattern” (36). No transcendent laws prevail here, but each being, each whole, 
obeys only “the internal dictates of their own nature” (36). This sounds like no hierarchy I 
am familiar with; it sounds, in fact, like a romantic definition of anarchy. But regardless, 
Needham's characterization here, though appealingly clear-cut, seems in the last instance 
wishfully clear-cut, and like most grand theories, its totalising view of its subject tends to 
wash out much in the way of nuance. 
And not only in regards to China. Robert Finlay, in his thorough critique of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Needham's Science and Civilisation in China, the precursor 
to The Grand Titration, has scathingly observed: “[Needham's] depiction of European 
history amounts to little more than a mechanical application of Marxist clichés that were 
outdated before the first volume of Science and Civilisation appeared.” Finlay has plenty to
say about Needham's depiction of Chinese history as well, remarking that Needham: 
[D]evoted his life to revealing the stunning accomplishments of China, its steady,
uninterrupted progress in science and technology through the centuries; but... 
his account ignores social, political, and economic contexts. The reader of 
Science and Civilisation has little sense of the circumstances of the 
achievements being described; they appear to take place in an airless 
environment, isolated and impassive. (300) 
Needham's analyses of Chinese technological breakthroughs suffer from their lack of 
social context; decontextualised, Needham is able to string them together according to a 
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story of his own making.
Another, and I think more persuasive, basis that Needham gives for the differing 
paths of Chinese and European scientific and technological development lies in Chinese 
imperial bureaucracy; specifically, its patronage of or failure to patronize different fields.17 
He gives, for instance, astronomy and hydraulics engineering as two examples of 
“orthodox sciences” that were developed by the state; the former as essential to plotting 
the seasonal rhythms that must necessarily organize agrarian society, and the latter as 
derived from the typically Chinese concern for water management (e.g. irrigation, flood 
control, conservation). And indeed we shall later find, in our reading of Macartney, a similar
observation (if differently intoned) made of the dependence of Chinese science upon state 
sponsorship. Half a century after The Grand Titration's publication, and despite significant 
changes in the field of Sino-European historiography, much of Needham's thought remains
compelling. He is undoubtedly an innovative theorist, and his familiarity with both Eastern 
and Western scientific history remains impressive. But in hindsight, his project rather 
suffers from a prioritization of Western thought models that, in direct contradiction to his 
cautions otherwise, seems to interpret “modern Western science” teleologically. 
This is, after all, the implication of the work's very premise. As he puts it:
We dare not trespass here upon the great debate concerning subjectivity in 
formulations of scientific law, but the question does arise whether the 
recognition of statistical regularities and their mathematical expression could 
have been reached by any other road than that which Western science actually 
travelled. (37)
Needham's metaphor figures “statistical regularities and their mathematical expression” as
the proper final destination of scientific inquiry; in context, his passage suggests relief that 
Western science has taken the road it has. But further, and further to the goals of this 
thesis, I find it impossible not to trespass upon that “great debate” he mentions with such 
trepidation; it is exactly science's pretensions to noble objectivity that make it such an 
effective cover for imperial goings-on, and that have made scientists so invaluable to 
Western empire. Overall, Needham's work strikes me as an albeit well-intentioned 
example of what Ming Dong Gu (2013) has called “sinologism”: that “ideological 
dominance of Western intellectual habits vis-à vis China” that arises from the Western 
intellectual project to “incorporate China into the Western-centered global world system” 
17. See especially his discussion of imperial workshops (24-25), and more general treatment of imperial 
patronage of the sciences (30-32).
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(2). Sinologism, that is, is the attempt by Western epistemologists to account for Chinese 
cultural achievements (and presumed failures to achieve) by explaining them within a 
narrative that presupposes the dominance of Western epistemology. And that is exactly 
what Needham, despite himself, seems to do.18 
Roger Hart
 
And with all due respect to Needham, his deficiencies make an excellent segue to 
Roger Hart, who takes them as inspiration for his “Beyond Science and Civilization: A 
Post-Needham Critique” (1999). In it, Hart takes the ideological framework that he finds to 
underlie Western approaches to Chinese scientific history as his subject. He is especially 
interested in how even Needham's fiercest detractors so often end up collapsing back into 
the very conceptual West/China divide that they had meant to discredit. He notes the long 
history of such dichotomization in Western thought: 
For some writers fundamental differences were linguistic: alphabetic versus 
ideographic scripts, the existence versus non existence of the copula, 
scientific versus poetic, theoretic versus practical, or abstract versus concrete;
these traits were then linked to the development of rigorous scientific language
or efficient bureaucracies (Goody 1986; Gernet 1985). In some accounts, the 
fundamental difference was capitalism, which itself ushered in modernity. In 
yet other accounts the key was religion: Max Weber improbably connected the
differences he alleged to have discovered between Protestantism and 
Chinese religions to capitalism (Weber [1922] 195 1). For others, the 
fundamental differences were philosophic: conceptions of natural law, causal 
versus correlative thinking, the ordering of time and space, demonstrative 
logic versus consensus (e.g., Needham 1951; Bodde 1959; Bodde 1979); 
China, one translator of Chinese philosophy proclaimed, lacked philosophy 
altogether (Dubs 1929). For others, the fundamental difference was political – 
democracy versus Oriental despotism (Wittfogel 1957). This list represents but
a fraction of claims for the key features distinguishing the West from the Rest; 
the search continues to this day (Huntington 1996). (91; I have left Hart's 
citations intact to demonstrate his scope.)
Hart's overall complaint is that the term science itself is in fact impossible to define in the 
transhistorical, transcultural way that Needhamian comparative analyses prerequire if they
are to “avoid the charge of simply circularly invoking the particular sciences in one or 
several localities (e.g., ancient Greece, early modern Europe) as [science's] essential 
18. Although, interestingly, I must note that Gu does not seem to share this opinion, mentioning Needham 
approvingly as a harsh critic of Wittfogel's assertion that Chinese government was essentially despotic (8).
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defining forms” (92). Hart points out that Needham attempts to circumvent the issue of 
posing “a radical difference between civilizations East and West” not by erasing the divide 
between them, but by temporalizing it. “Needham insisted on preserving the uniqueness of
modern Western science by claiming the premodern world – including China and Greece –
'must be thought of as a whole'; the radical break for Needham was the boundary between
the modern and the primitive” (97-98). And yet, such a moving of goal posts ultimately not 
only preserves the West/China divide, but does so in a way that continues to valorise 
Western over Chinese contributions to the history of science. 
From Needham, Hart winds his way through the arguments and issues Needham's 
research spurred, as these have rippled down through intellectual history. One conclusion 
he comes to that I find particularly relevant to this thesis is that modern, postcolonially 
inflected discussions of Western science have “too often been tempted to critique the 
West in its entirety by equating it with science portrayed now not as universal and 
liberating but instead as hegemonic, normalizing, and disciplinary” (107). Hart's caution 
against essentialising “the West” on the basis of a presumedly homogeneous scientific 
culture (or monolithic culture of any kind) is well taken. But I question his implicit objection 
to the notion that science has, especially in colonial settings, in fact not been hegemonic, 
normalizing, and disciplinary; and this not despite, but because it has for so long been 
idealized as universal and liberating. Perhaps we could distinguish here between the 
scientific method strictly speaking, and that numinous cluster of golden associations (such 
as the privileged access to universal and liberating truths) that has grown up around it, 
and consequently made scientific men, institutions, and – yes – rhetoric so vital historically
as instruments of imperial power. And in fact Hart's own suggestions for future research 
seem to trend in the direction of this distinction. He theorises:
A... direction for research [that] begins by recognizing the enormous historical 
efficacy of imagined communities and the claims made about science and 
civilizations, studying them as the ideologies of the historical protagonists and 
thus the object of analysis rather than as explanatory categories in which 
history itself is to be framed. (109)
By identifying the ways that science has been invoked as a rhetorical tool to reinforce 
imperialist ideologies and further imperialist goals – and how scientism in its own right as 
an ideology of control so well aligns with imperialism's most fundamental attitudes – this 
thesis seems to answer Hart's call that “claims made about science and civilizations” be 
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considered in terms of their usefulness to “historical protagonists,” rather than as self-
evident truths.
Kenneth Pomeranz
Kenneth Pomeranz' The Great Divergence (2000), which compares Britain and the 
Chinese Yangzi-region on several fronts, is indispensable in opening out Needham's topic 
to include the impact of colonialism upon Western science and technology. Pomeranz 
contends that “European science, technology, and philosophical inclinations alone do not 
seem an adequate explanation” (68) for Britain's origination of the Industrial Revolution. 
Rather, the reason that Britain, and not China (or for that matter Eastern Europe or Japan)
was the site of the industrial revolution, was largely owing to a series of happy accidents. 
In particular, being dealt a good hand in terms of both native resources, such as coal, and 
later, colonial resources, such as extensive lumber and cropland. Both of these resource 
sites, Pomeranz explains, must be taken into careful consideration. After all, the 
premodern Chinese too had knowledge of coal, sizeable deposits of the stuff (particularly 
in northern provinces like Shanxi), and were quite sophisticated in myriad other areas of 
resource extraction, refinement, and utilization. That they therefore could have developed 
coal power on a scale comparable to Industrial Britain is not implausible. British deposits, 
however, were geologically situated so as to be more accessible; and significantly, the 
premodern British were more at leisure to develop them because their colonial land 
holdings obviated the need to divert labour and energy into techne aimed at squeezing 
ever greater yields – of food, fiber, lumber – from limited tracts of native cropland 
(Pomeranz 63-68). 
As another example of the extent to which Britain's industrialization was contingent 
upon colonial resources, Pomeranz notes that “had the New World not provided enormous
amounts of textile fibers, European precocity in mechanizing spinning and weaving might 
seem more like interesting curiosities” (46) today than important technological 
breakthroughs. He summarizes the situation this way:
Without both coal and colonies, neither one would have been nearly as 
significant; and without the relaxation of resource constraints they allowed, 
other European innovations alone would not have created a new world where 
having finite land did not prevent indefinitely sustained per capita growth. (68) 
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For current purposes, what is most important about Pomeranz' work is its sustained 
refutation of the notion that China was either demonstrably technologically inferior to 
Europe prior to the late 18th century, or that, when it did relinquish its status as one of the 
world's most technologically advanced cultures, this was because of some inherent flaw in
the Chinese character. The idea that the Qing dynasty was a time of scientific and 
technological stagnation deserves reconsideration; evidentially ill-supported, it implies a 
troubling retrojection of teleological plot lines upon the past. A point which Pomeranz 
confronts directly: 
Histories of technology often imagine one breakthrough creating a 'bottleneck' 
that concentrates efforts on a specific problem and so leads to another 
breakthrough, as when advances in weaving created incentives to speed up 
spinning. But such bottlenecks are just as often addressed by allocating more 
resources, without any change in technique, and the longer that process of 
reallocation of resources continues, the less incentive remains to find a 
technological solution. (55)
In other words, technological innovation is not a given where intensification of manufacture
(i.e. the increased application of existing modes of manufacture) is an option. In fact, 
Pomeranz observes, the opposite was more often the case in both China and Europe prior
to the Industrial Revolution. Ultimately, as Robert Markley (2006) has glossed of 
Pomeranz' research, Pomeranz amply demonstrates that in terms of diet, life expectancy, 
freeness of local labour markets, wage differentials between men and women, and even 
how closely their economies align with Adam Smith's definition of a neoclassical economy 
– by any of these measures, China either equals or soundly trumps Europe until the late 
1700s (Markley, 12). “[T]he very criteria that have been used to champion English 
exceptionalism actually show that in many ways the heavily populated coastal provinces of
China equaled or surpassed the 'advanced' economies of Northwestern Europe” (Markley, 
12).
Robert Markley
But Markley himself has more to contribute to the history of Sino-European relations
than summaries of other scholars' work. Taking Pomeranz' argument for the sophistication 
of Chinese manufacturing technologies as a cornerstone for his own critique of 
Eurocentricity, Markley, in The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730 (2006), 
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explores how a far-ranging assortment of premodern literature set the stage for modern 
Eurocentric readings of Sino-European history. One of the central pillars of Markley's 
project is to undermine the notion that the Chinese, specifically the Qing, were culturally or
scientifically stagnant, and that therefore their subjection to the British after the Opium 
Wars was ineluctable. “Not only is the senescence of the late Qing dynasty used to justify 
these views of China's failure” Markley explains, “but the very analytical vocabularies of a 
progressivist historiography reinforce an overall narrative of western Europe's economic 
dominance in the early modern period” (Markley, 6). More explicitly than Pomeranz, 
Markley is concerned with the ways in which modern academic tropes – e.g. “the 
senescence of the late Qing dynasty” – encourage Eurocentric readings of history. Arriving
at the same conclusion as Pomeranz by way of a very different set of data, Markley points 
out that:
Europe enjoyed no decisive technological advantages over Japan or China 
before 1800 – a fact noted by almost all European merchants and missionaries 
who visited these countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
marveled at the variety, quality, and low price of Chinese and Japanese goods. 
(Markley, 13)
By examining the words of Sinophiles, Sinologists, as well as various authors – such as 
John Milton and Daniel Defoe, whose feelings towards China were more ambiguous, and 
knowledge of it more dubious – Markley is able to foreground the extent to which the East 
figures in English literary discourse as an astoundingly malleable signifier. As a presence 
in premodern English literature, China is sometimes an idealized scholastic nation-state; 
sometimes a foil for English protestant morality; and often, on account of its vastness and 
wealth, an object of intertwined mercantilist greed and fear. Unveiling England's 
conceptual China as in fact several Chinas, each tinged by the anxieties of the day, 
Markley's work points towards my own interest in scientism's affect upon European 
conceptions of that great and shadowy empire looming in the East.
Gregory Blue
Like Markley's monograph, Gregory Blue's “China and Western social thought in the
modern period” (1999) has emphasized the extent to which Western discourse about 
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China has itself a history which begs socio-historical contextualization.19 But whereas 
Markley takes fluctuating academic trends in the study of Sino-European relations as the 
starting point for his work, Blue approaches a related topic – in his words, “Western 
intellectual culture,” which, if not identical to academe, at least subsumes it – as the focus 
of his research. “The different phases in the development of [Western] ideas about China,”
Blue argues, “were linked to broader trends in ideology, political goals, and capitalist 
economic priorities” (57) in ways which were not always immediately clear. Of the 
premodern period specifically, he writes: 
[F]rom 1600 to 1750, the invocation of China by European writers often involved
a belief that Chinese history and civilization, like those of ancient Egypt, might 
hold certain lessons that could be appreciated and applied for the enhancement
of Western culture. In the period from about 1750 until the years between the 
two world wars, another consensus was increasingly consolidated based on an 
assumption among social thinkers that Western civilization (as this was 
variously construed) dated back to ancient Greece and that this alone could be 
considered as “universally” valid. (Blue, 71)
Two things stand out about Blue's assertion. The first is his acknowledgement that 
Westerners' understandings of their relation to China have historically been plastic, and 
beholden to various political influences; the second, that many Western thinkers prior to 
the mid-18th century admitted the relative comparability of European and Chinese cultures 
overall – but that where they did identify greater sophistication on one side, often assigned
it to the Chinese. They did not, of course, always do this without reservation, and some 
resisted it altogether. Blue says of Francis Bacon that “Bacon would seem to have known 
that many of the most important discoveries and inventions that he thought made modern 
Europe more learned than antiquity had originated in China,” but that he nevertheless 
characterised China as a “'curious, ignorant, fearful, foolish nation'” (60). If nothing else, 
this insight indicates both the extent to which Europe understood its indebtedness to 
Chinese cultural and technological innovations, and also the anxiety this debt aroused. 
Blue's aim here, and throughout his chapter, is to identify the various ideological influences
that have borne upon the conceptions of China adhered to by Western intellectuals (in 
Bacon's case, “the mercantile aspirations”  [60] of his native country); a point also made, in
their own ways, by both Pomeranz and Markley. And as Blue himself states flatly at one 
19 For a more general discussion of how China has historically been viewed through a Capitalistic lens, see 
also Blue and Timothy Brook's introduction to China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological
Knowledge, from which book the named essay is taken. 
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point, rather anticipating my own interests:
In the long run, the great expansion of Western European productive and 
scientific forces in the Industrial Revolution provided strong reinforcement to 
ideas of European superiority. The comparative speed of European progress in 
the eighteenth century was so remarkable that it led one writer to exclaim quite 
accurately: “The peoples of the Orient were formerly quite superior to our 
Western peoples, in all the arts of the mind and of the hand. But how we have 
made up for lost time!” ...It was perhaps hardly surprising that China, a country 
not yet subordinated to colonial domination, became the object of heavy 
ideological onslaught as India was being brought under Western control 
politically and militarily. (73)
Thus can we add Blue, too, to the scholarly chorus stressing the importance of perceived 
scientific achievement to European self-regard in the long 18 th century.
Francesca Bray
Francesca Bray's “Towards a critical history of non-Western technology” (1999) 
offers a valuable analysis of Chinese technological history that foregrounds the viewpoint 
of the Chinese themselves. Challenging Eurocentric historiographies by attempting to 
recover the significance these technologies had to their native culture and era – sans any 
tinting by modern, capitalist colours – Bray seeks to reconstitute what she calls “the local 
meanings of technological systems” (166). Her central claim is that “[a]rguing back from 
the telos of Western modernity straitjackets our understanding of what technology is and 
what roles it serves in different societies,” because such arguments lead to both 
Eurocentricity and a valorisation of capitalist economic standards. Consequently, “it 
becomes difficult to imagine alternative trajectories of technical development, trajectories 
that might have emphasized other criteria than engineering sophistication, scale 
economies, or increased output” (163). For while roughly premodern Chinese agri- and 
sericulture were not fields characterised by large leaps in technological innovation, 
“significant changes occurred in the volume of output and organization of production” 
(167) in these fields during the Ming and Qing dynasties – a situation whose logic requires
a rethinking of technology's cultural importance beyond merely capitalistic terms. 
To do just this, Bray draws from Lewis Mumford's postulation that technologies 
produce, besides items, and perhaps even more importantly, social identities. Bray asserts
that Chinese agri- and sericultural techne was understood within Chinese culture as 
36
essential to the production of, above all else, morally upright women and men; specifically 
by way of the concept of nangeng nuzhi, or “men till, women weave” (169). As a 
representative example of this dynamic, Bray explains of the relation between womanhood
and sericulture:
Learning textile skills inculcated the fundamental female values of diligence, 
frugality, order, and self-discipline that characterised good wives and mothers. 
In early China little girls of gentle birth were taught to spin and weave from the 
age of eight or nine, when their brothers started learning to read and to carry 
arms. (196)
Agriculture and sericulture were considered not only to produce vital material outputs, but 
also to be literally essential to the production of gender, in part by maintaining an 
idealized, traditional complementarity between husbands and wives. A complementarity 
that it was the special responsibility of imperial policymakers to uphold, as marriages were 
seen as the foundation of an orderly society (195). 
The various, generally Confucian-inflected power dynamics – as between genders; 
between the ruling elite and the masses – that Bray discusses are too nuanced to do full 
justice here without straying from my interest in comparing Chinese and Western techne. 
But it is nonetheless worth noting a few key points about her analysis. Firstly, Bray makes 
clear that Chinese agri- and sericultural technologies, far from being stagnant during the 
Ming and Qing eras, were in fact merely yoked to a non-European set of ideologies, one 
deeply concerned with the role of technology in maintaining gender roles considered 
fundamental to society's well being. Secondly, Bray's work deftly illustrates, not despite but
because of the specificity of her analysis, how inextricable a culture's techne is from the 
contemporary ideologies that give it its value and guide its development. By portraying 
Chinese techne as adapted to the prevailing concerns of its culture, Bray is able to provide
a native rationale for a period of Chinese technological development that cannot be 
accounted for by Eurocentric, capitalist historiographies of technology. Moreover, Bray's 
research underscores the importance of non-scientific ideology per se as an impetus for 
technological development, by giving a specific example of this dynamic. For while this 
thesis examines the influences of scientism upon European conceptions of China, it is 
premised upon the idea, which Bray clearly delineates, that technologies both native and 
foreign are never experienced or valued except through inherited ideological frameworks.
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Michael Adas
And finally, we come to Michael Adas' Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, 
Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (1998), which takes as its theme the 
profound effects of scientific ideology upon European attitudes towards non-Europeans. 
Adas' research, which covers the 16th through 19th centuries, surveys a variety of 
nonfictional and fictional texts as evidence of the growing importance of scientific and 
technological achievement to European notions of civilization during this period. As 
achievement in these areas became increasingly central to Western Europe's sense of 
self, the perceived primitive or degenerate states of the same in Africa, India, and China, 
became increasingly a basis for white supremacism, derogation of non-European cultures 
generally – and, unsurprisingly, the retroactive minimization of the roles of non-Europeans 
in Europe's own scientific and technological evolution (15; 193). Adas summarizes the 
development of this ethnocentric narrative:
[Pre-industrial] European travellers, even educated ones, shared with peoples 
overseas a sense of the helplessness of humans in the face of nature's 
awesome power. This attitude contrasts sharply with the Europeans' belief, 
embraced centuries later when the process of industrialization was under way, 
that the degree to which a society has mastered its environment reflects the 
extent to which it has ascended from savagery to civilization. (24)
 
Incidentally, this assertion is especially fascinating in light of Pomeranz' aforementioned 
work on the comparability of Western European and Chinese technologies for most of the 
premodern era, as it suggests that the West's ideological obsession with mastering the 
natural world, not only by studying it, but in practice by turning it efficiently to human ends, 
might well be considered a historical prerequisite to industrialization. That perhaps 
scientism, understood in the Adornan sense as the predominant and domination-focused 
mythos of the Enlightenment, was the ideological reagent that alchemized Britain's 
superior hand of natural resources into a technological revolution. I will be careful to note, 
however, that this speculation is not one of Adas' own claims. 
As Adas himself explains his thesis, the empirical basis of Western science and 
technology was taken as proof “that European modes of thought and social organization 
corresponded much more closely to the underlying realities of the universe than did those 
of any other people or society” (6) –  a conviction whose affect upon world history would 
be dramatic. Drawing from commentary encompassing both leading philosophes like 
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Leibniz and Voltaire, and the myriad travel journals of lesser-known but contemporarily 
influential figures like Captain George Anson, Adas scrupulously builds his case for the 
assertion that “[t]he European colonizers' sense of their pre-eminence in inventiveness 
and organization and their vastly superior understanding of the workings of nature, not 
merely the conqueror's prerogative, justified their monopolization of leadership and 
managerial roles in colonized societies” (205). So much hangs in a dependent clause: 
before the spread of European imperialism, empires had existed, but until the premodern 
era, imperial domination of colonized subalterns was justified by recourse to either naked 
“conqueror's prerogative,” or, more commonly, a Christianized version of this (Adas, 6-7). 
With the rise of science in the 18th century, however, the European's unique insights into 
the underlying “workings of nature,” as much as or even moreso than his good Christian 
faith, attested his racial superiority, and therefore his position at the top of the colonial 
hierarchy. (Although this is certainly not to say that Christian justifications for the workings 
of empire were ever abandoned; they were simply joined by yet another proof of European
superiority). And indeed, Adas explains that during the 19th century, the conflation of 
Western scientific mastery and moral prerogative became an imperialist trope, with 
imperial apologists arguing that “without Western science and technology there was no 
hope of improving the condition of the impoverished masses of China and India or of 
civilizing the 'savages' of Africa” (204). We have in fact met this trope already, in Drayton's 
anecdote about the a posteriori justifications given by the British state in unloading 
backlogged cheap cinchona on its Indian subjects.
Adas' monograph, like Drayton's, has provided essential groundwork for this thesis, 
and I am particularly indebted to his regular turns towards China. But moreover, moving 
forward I would also borrow his caution that, when speaking of “'European views and 
responses,” we are “referring collectively to the ideas and arguments of those members of 
the 'articulate classes' of western Europe who concerned themselves with issues relating 
to European involvement overseas,” (9). It is too easy, in discussions of intercultural 
phenomena – as Hart, too, has persuasively argued – to reify vast regions into 
homogeneous, beige, ahistorical hiveminds. The great appeal of Adas' work is his canvass
of the various lettered Western Europeans who were involved in international affairs 
between the 16th and 19th centuries; a breadth of survey that justifies, and even calls for, 
the minuteness of the current study.
Robert Drayton
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Before making summaries, it will also be worth revisiting here two scholars I have 
discussed previously, Richard Drayton and Peter J. Kitson, as both of these theorists' 
works too underscore the motif that I have attempted to trace throughout this chapter: that,
as China and Europe were developmentally comparable in almost every measurable 
respect during the premodern era, therefore subsequent conceptions of China as 
scientifically or technologically (or otherwise) stagnant during this time must be scrutinized 
for bias. Indeed, every scholar examined so far has arrived at some version of the claim 
that Eurocentricity lies at the heart of this narrative. Drayton's especial contribution on this 
front, in Nature's Government, is to illustrate the anxious ambivalence of late 18th century 
British attitudes towards Chinese science and technology. For, despite Britain's pose of 
clear technological superiority at this point, in fact the desire to appropriate Chinese 
agricultural, sericultural, and other technologies was a deliberate, closely-considered, and 
central goal of the Macartney embassy.20 The irony here is difficult to miss: the British 
considered themselves so advanced in terms of general scientific understanding, that they
presumed to be able to make best use even of technologies yet-unknown to them – and 
seemed to consider this, in fact, their prerogative. Joseph Banks' letters on the matter 
alone make this amply clear; to say nothing of Macartney's own words. But in broader 
terms, Drayton, echoing Adas, articulates that intersection of scientism and imperialism 
that it is the project of this thesis to examine at the textual level. As he puts it:
It may seem perverse, indeed an oxymoron, to conjecture an imperialism of the 
Enlightenment. Yet benevolent and emancipatory hopes... easily lent their 
sanction to coercive projects. British 'improvers' moved, at home and abroad, in
the faith that they ultimately knew better than those on the ground. Their 
confidence depended, in part, on the assumption that they possessed a more 
profound understanding of how Nature worked.... The Scientific Revolution, by 
which we mean the rise of an increasingly mathematical and mechanistic 
approach to the world, appeared to offer Europeans new and special modes of 
reason. (90) 
In Drayton's view, this “mathematical and mechanistic approach to the world” spawned a 
belief that possessing knowledge of the transcendent laws which governed nature also 
granted – and perhaps even obliged – the application of such knowledge to the governing 
of peoples. Discussing the rationale for the institution of reforms leading to the metric 
20. Besides Drayton, for detailed discussion of this topic, see Maxine Berg's “Macartney’s Things. Were 
They Useful? Knowledge and the Trade to China in the Eighteenth Century”; and Peter J. Kitson, Forging 
Romantic China, chapter five.
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system in Jacobin France – the, as it were, internalization of scientific principles and 
methods (such as quantification) as political architecture – he is frank: “progress 
depended on the application of the Order of Nature to human society” (90). This is 
scientism in action; science deployed in the Adornan sense, as an imperial tool to order 
and subjugate, which, by a clever circularity of reasoning, justifies itself by recourse to 
itself. That is, by recourse to its derivation from a body of knowledge presumed to be all of:
objective, universal in scope, and necessary to the forward march of civilization. And 
therefore beyond reproach. This tendency of scientistic thought is what we shall find 
budding in Nieuhof, scorned in Temple, and openly blooming in Macartney and 
Houckgeest. By giving the sheen of civilizing progress to imperial sprawl, scientism 
validated imperial aggressions. And indeed, to demand of him a last example, Drayton 
describes how, in Georgian Britain:
The faith that information was necessary for efficient government created new 
opportunities for men of science... For the concern of gentlemen like Banks or 
[Arthur] Young to expand the Crown's efficiency was answered by the desire of 
statesmen and civil servants to become (or appear to be) agents of progress. 
(91)
Science by the late premodern had attained connotations of enlightened progress and 
social cache, and enjoyed a firm alliance to the ruling status quo throughout Western 
Europe.21 And for that reason, British empire appropriated scientific assumptions, scientific
methods, and actual scientists – the whole project buttressed by an unshakeable faith in 
the inherent goodness of science itself – as vital tools for the spread and maintenance of 
its power, both at home and abroad.
Peter J. Kitson
    
Kitson's approach to “problematizing” stale Sino-European historiography is most 
similar to, and openly inspired by, Markley's (8). Forging Romantic China centers on a 
number of texts from the British Romantic period that Kitson tentatively identifies as 
constituting a “Romantic Sinology.” This term he employs to underscore the influence of 
works by writers spanning Thomas Percy, William Jones, and, of course, Lord Macartney, 
21. Further to this topic: Lisa Jardine's Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory offers several 
case studies of just this dynamic, tracing with great dexterity the movements of scientific men and ideas 
amongst the 17th and 18th century aristocratic Western circles where these associations were largely formed.
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in both shaping contemporary British conceptions of China and anticipating academic 
Sinology in the strict sense. Perhaps most germanely, Kitson explains that this body of 
texts “[claimed] validation by a personal knowledge of China... through participation in the 
Macartney and Amherst embassies, the British East India trade company at Canton,” or 
missionary work (13). Gesturing in the direction of my own research, Kitson finds 
Romantic Sinology characterised by an “insistence” on “first-hand encounter... conducted 
according to empirical and scientific assumptions” (14), by which it “sought to substitute... 
chinoiserie fantasy with another, 'real' China that was both knowable and substantial, but 
increasingly the locus of illegitimacy and stagnation, capable of being understood and 
controlled” (15). Although the relationship between these “scientific assumptions” and the 
notion that China could be “understood and controlled” is not the main focus of Kitson's 
work, it is telling nonetheless that he identifies, and almost takes as a given, the 
importance of what I have called scientism in shaping British attitudes towards China. 
Western Europe has always seen in China an image half comprised of its own anxiety – it 
still does. Kitson's work foregrounds this dynamic, in great socio-historical detail, and so 
doing emphasizes the ideological basis of Eurocentric conceptions of China whose 
factuality modern scholarship increasingly challenges. 
Summation
So where does this leave us? A diverse array of scholars, having approached the 
same general theme from a divers array of angles, have all arrived at a similar conclusion: 
that the widely circulated notion that premodern China, and particularly the Qing dynasty, 
was technologically stagnant, even obsolescent – is simply not supported by the facts. 
Even Needham's analysis, as problematic as it is, acknowledges this. Pomeranz' direct 
comparisons of premodern Western European and Yangzi-region Chinese manufacturing 
and agricultural technologies finds neither side clearly superior until Britain's ability to 
exploit both native and colonial resources set the stage for the Industrial Revolution. 
Bray's work approaches the topic of Chinese techne from a Chinese perspective; rather 
than investigating why the Chinese did not develop their manufacturing along increasingly 
efficiency-oriented, Western European lines, she explores the intricate symbolism of 
agriculture and sericulture to the late-Ming and Qing Chinese, and finds there an active 
attempt to use such technologies to achieve the (non-capitalistic) ends of a stable, well 
ordered society. Markley, Kitson, and Blue, in their various assays of pre-modern English 
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literature, all accentuate the former plasticity of China in the Western imagination. So 
doing, they underscore the extent to which modern notions of Qing stagnation and 
decadence are an a posteriori creation. One whose prevalence Blue, especially, argues is 
the legacy of generations of Western intellectuals whose imbrication within European 
imperialist and proto-capitalist ideologies biased them towards conceptions of China that 
abetted imperialist goals. In his way, Hart rather extends Blue's general thesis to 
demonstrate how modern scholarship, even in its attempts to move past essentialising, 
Eurocentric notions of China and the West, continue to do so by allowing essentialising, 
Eurocentric notions to premise the way China's scientific history is studied at all. Adas' 
research lays bare the role that scientism, as an ideology of natural mastery, played in 
supporting the development of ethnocentric, racist cultural narratives throughout Western 
Europe – including, notably, the justification of colonisation. And finally, Drayton's work on 
the instrumentality of men of science to the spread of British empire offers a pertinent case
study, at the institutional level, of the amenability of scientism to imperialism.
And on that last note, it will behove me to make clear that this thesis does not seek 
to claim, as if for the first time, that scientism has historically been an invaluable 
ideological support to Western imperialism; because, as we have just seen, that argument 
has already been made by more than one researcher of markedly greater prominence 
than myself. Rather, my research begins from the understanding – hinted at by some of 
the scholars aforementioned, and stated outright by others – that scientism and 
imperialism's sordid history as bedfellows has already been well demonstrated on a broad 
scale: from the level of individual scientists (like Joseph Banks) to the movements of 
institutions (like Kew Gardens or the VOC). What has been less often studied is what the 
relationship between these ideologies looks like in the text itself. And it is to that arena that
I now head; by focusing my analysis there, I hope to throw a new ray upon the various and
subtle ways that in human thought, and subsequently, writing, scientism and imperialism 
have historically been intertwined.
Chapter Two: New Lands, New Measures, Nieuhof
Dutch engagement with the Chinese famously began with the Dutch navy's 
capture of two Portuguese vessels carrying Chinese porcelain, first in 1600 and
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again in 1602. The subsequent sale of these objects in Amsterdam marked the 
beginning of a Dutch taste for Chinese ceramics and a yearning for Chinese 
goods generally. The oft-quoted statistic, that by 1638 over three million pieces 
of Chinese porcelain had been shipped to the Netherlands, is just one of many 
indications that the Dutch were indeed avid consumers of Chinese exports. The
consumption of trade objects and the acquisition of less physical goods often 
walk hand in hand, and the Dutch were as eager for information about China's 
history, government, language and religion as they were for material products. 
(Odell; Clothing, Customs, and Mercantilism, 141)
The consumption of trade objects and the acquisition of less physical goods indeed walk 
hand in hand, as Dawn Odell (2002) describes in her work on the reciprocally 
ethnographic gazes of the premodern Dutch and Chinese, and how these gazes were 
reflected in the trade between the nations. In her article, Odell is careful to note that the 
cultural representations she is interested in – that is, the echoes of depictions such as we 
find both textually and pictorially in Nieuhof, which become later appropriated as 
chinoiserie – are not strictly speaking “scientific” works (i.e. knowledge obtained for 
knowledge's sake) but the result of “knowledge put in the service of mercantilism” (140). 
Ultimately, Odell claims that “distinctions between pictures of things, book illustrations for 
example, and pictures as or on things – decorated porcelain, wallpaper, and fabric – 
become blurred” (140-141). Although, as the quote above indicates, her focus is primarily 
visual, I heartily agree with Odell's assertion of the fundamental entanglement of the 
scientific with the mercantile – and therefore imperialistic – in premodern Dutch depictions 
of China, and find her concise analysis a useful introduction to the history and immediate 
context of Nieuhof's An Embassy from the East India Company. For Nieuhof's travelogue, 
as we shall presently see, explicitly identified itself as a scientific undertaking, which 
means that to properly contextualise its inscriptions and illustrations of the Chinese, we 
must try to decode the scientistic gestures that it made central to its narrative.
Martinio Martini
What Odell's summary does not touch upon is the riotous change in management 
that was taking place in Imperial China in the mid-17th century, just prior to Nieuhof's 
embassy. In 1653, sixteen years before Nieuhof's own publication, Jesuit Father Martinio 
Martini published his De Bello Tartarico Historia, a first-hand account of the recent Manchu
deposition of the Ming. As detailed in Van Kley's (1971) work on comparative premodern 
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and modern European responses to news about Chinese political events, Martini's 
dynasty-spanning account described:
[T]he history of hostility between the Chinese and the Tartars north of the Great 
Wall: the thirteenth-century Mongol Conquest and the resulting Yuan Dynasty, 
the Ming restoration of 1368, and the late Ming's growing difficulty with the 
Tartars. He also described the Manchu people, customs, government, and 
military techniques. He described the growth of Manchu power in the northeast 
and the Manchu rulers – Nurhachi, Abahai, and Dorgon. Then Martini analysed 
the internal problems of the late Ming Dynasty: oppressive taxation, corruption, 
and arbitrary eunuch power at court, and the personal weakness and avarice of
the Ch'ung-cheng emperor. Imperial greediness and mismanagement of public 
affairs, he explained, alienated Manchu chieftains as well as Chinese officials 
and subjects. (563-564)
Martini's book included much in the way of sordid detail as well, such as a description of 
the last Ming Emperor, Ch'ung-cheng's, final actions as Han rebel Li Tzu-ch'eng marched 
on the imperial palace in 1644. The scene unfolds like a Greek tragedy: “As Li's army, 
aided by traitors within the capital, entered Peking, the emperor, according to Martini, 
stabbed to death his young daughter, wrote a letter in his own blood accusing high officials
of treason, and then hanged himself with his garter from a plum tree in the palace garden” 
(Van Kley, 564). Li then declares himself the new emperor, but is not able to secure the 
support of the North's most powerful Han military commander, who betrays him by instead 
making a fateful pact with the Manchu to allow their armies free passage to Peking. And so
to Peking they marched.
Martini's book was a sensation, and much of its content eventually filtered, in the 
unattributed style of the day, into Dutch news periodicals such as the Hollandtsche 
Mercurius (Aug, 1654).22 By the time of Nieuhof's departure to China in 1655 as party of 
the De Goyer and De Keyzer embassy, not only had the rise of the Qing become, in great 
part due to Martini's book, well known to the West, but a previous Dutch embassy to 
China, headed by Zacharias Wagenaer, had already been dispatched in an attempt to 
negotiate open trade with the new Manchu rulers – and failed utterly.23 It was amidst this 
atmosphere of tension, excitement, and possibility that Nieuhof's embassy set sail for the 
East, the economic hopes of the Dutch Republic weighing heavily on their shoulders. The 
22. See Van Kley (563). It is also worth noting that Nieuhof himself was quite familiar with Martinio's story, 
and names Martinio in the early pages of his travelogue as the European responsible for first bringing news 
of the new Tartar rulers of China (20).
23. See Iris van der Knaap, “The story of the first Dutch embassy to the emperor of China: An analysis of the
different influences on the representation of China in Het Gezantschap (1665),” (54).
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journal, notes, and illustrations Nieuhof made while in China, which would later bring him 
such fame, he after his return to Holland entrusted to his brother Hendrik, who was tasked 
with making publication arrangements. Hendrik also contributed the dedication to the first 
Dutch edition of Johan's travelogue; little else, however, is known of the younger Nieuhof, 
and the full extent of his contributions to An Embassy from the East India Company 
remains speculative.24 
Van Meur's frontispiece
Nieuhof's travelogue opens in particularly grand fashion. Although the lavish visual 
accompaniment to Nieuhof's text is not the object of this study – nor need it be, as it has 
been extensively treated by others, and continues to dominate study of Nieuhof's 
travelogue generally – I can hardly discuss An Embassy from the East India Company 
without mentioning this aspect of the book at all. The travelogue's visual media were too 
prominent from even its earliest publications to simply pass over without comment.25 And 
perhaps the best known among these is the ornate frontispiece with which van Meurs 
opens his publication of the travelogue – and which John Ogilby used as well in his later 
English translation, whose 1673 second edition is the basis for my analysis (see fig. 1 in 
“Images”). Schmidt's analysis of the frontispiece as a generic trope and hallmark of 
premodern Dutch geographies certainly applies to Nieuhof's book, with its famous 
engraving of a young, statuesque “Grand Tartar Cham”:
The performance began at once with the engraved frontispiece, which, in the 
case of Dutch-made product – just as was the case with the preface – was 
well-nigh obligatory. The frontispiece established the aesthetic style for the 
volume; it offered a window onto the bookmaker’s slant on the material and his 
or her strategy of pictorial presentation. It also invited the viewer in. 
Handsomely engraved (or etched) and often signed by a known artist – not at 
all standard practice for book illustrations – the frontispiece characteristically 
depicted an allegorical figure associated with the region, or perhaps a more 
generic representation of History (Clio) or Geography. This central figure was 
typically surrounded by a mass of swirling artifacts, commercial products, 
ethnographic “types,” exotic flora and fauna – all meant to convey the richness 
of the region. The frontispiece, in other words, replicated in visual terms the 
24. See Sun (15-17; 25). 
25. This is in fact the focus of Jin Sun's “The Illusion of Verisimilitude: Johan Nieuhof’s Images of China”; but
see also Dawn Odell, “Clothing, Customs and Mercantilism: Dutch and Chinese Ethnographies in the 
Seventeenth Century,” and “Soul of Transactions: Illustration and Johan Nieuhof's Travels in China”; and 
Benjamin Schmidt's Inventing Exoticism: Geography, Globalism, and Europe's Early Modern World.
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textual hodgepodge housed within. (59)
To keep from wandering too far afield, I would like to concentrate my analysis on the effect
of the frontispiece specifically in relation to the title page – Ogilby's – that follows it. The 
frontispiece itself stands as an archetypal example of Schmidt's description: we find the 
Grand Tartar Cham enthroned, surrounded by a swarm of armed body guards and 
attendants, all handsomely arrayed. Beneath his feet helplessly “writhe” a few half naked 
prisoners, one of whom appears with his head in an Oriental pillory, and another of whom 
beseeches him. The unmoved Cham stares into the distance, one hand perched 
possessively atop a giant globe, his other arm akimbo, as if to challenge any comers. The 
symbolism is obvious. 
On one level, the scene here is mere spectacle, a blood-and-brocade seduction of 
the eye that, perhaps pandering to European expectations, combines a certain level of 
brutality with the exotic grandeur of the Cham's dress and retinue – and promises novelty 
and adventure in the narrative to come. It is striking even today; in premodern Europe it 
must have been dazzling, as one of the first widely-published images of China's new ruler 
(if very clearly not an unidealized one), and the more impressive for that. But I submit that, 
for all that it was more titillating an entry than the wall of text that follows it, it must be 
understood in connection to the subsequent title page. 
And the title page in question is, frankly, a visual cacophony (see fig. 2 in “Images”).
A waterfall of different typefaces in different sizes cascades down the page, announcing 
the work's full title, which attenuates finally to: “...Wherein The Cities, Towns, Villages, 
Ports, Rivers, &c in their Passages from Canton to Peking Are Ingeniously Describ'd by M 
John Nieuhoff, Steward to Ambassadors.” From its literal first pages, we find Nieuhof's 
travelogue presented as a thorough survey of China's manmade and natural features alike
– a full accounting of the region's human and nonhuman elements. That is, an 
encyclopedia. This encyclopedic scope, coming so soon after the impressive and 
theatrical frontispiece, reads like an assurance: the imposition of order upon a threatening 
Eastern Other (recently depicted in martial terms, remember; the Cham's retinue is a 
hedgehog-collective of bristling spears). One which, in this case, is quarantined off from 
the rest of the travelogue by a veritable textual palisade, and later, map. But the Grand 
Cham is no match for the wily Western European imagination; however fierce he may be 
on the battlefield, our imperial diplomat will (and over the course of his narrative, does) 
force him and his people to submit to the terms of Western conceptualization. His land will 
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be drawn up and quantified (and as mentioned, a map follows close by to do exactly that); 
his people typified and assessed against European standards of comportment; his natural 
resources located and speculated upon; and his useful techne – with any luck – 
appropriated. This is the promise of a title page which literally reduces an entire empire, a 
people, to the terms of a European narrative: a list of things “ingeniously describ'd” by a 
Dutchman. A phrase which implies in the first place that China could be described in 
Western terms – demystified, and translated into known units. And this, I will point out, is 
the only context into which the frontispiece can be put, since it contains no text of its own 
besides the abbreviated title.26 
Different editions of the travelogue might have produced very different effects with 
their own title pages, of course: but the point of my cursory reading of these two pages is 
not to pretend to exhaust their symbolic potential – much less that of the myriad other 
illustrations that complement Nieuhof's text – but rather to emphasize that none of the 
visual materials included in any edition of Nieuhof's travelogue would have been 
experienced by readers in isolation. The visuals in Nieuhof's book, although more 
immediate than the surrounding text, existed in a necessary relationship with that text. 
Outside of it, they would have been incomprehensible. Their role in context – and as 
context – was to bolster the apparent truthfulness of the text with various detailed 
illustrations that, whatever their origins, were meant to elaborate and reinforce the 
authority of the narrative. Dawn Odell explains in her “Soul of Transactions” (2001): “As 
the believability of travel books is more often called into question,” in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, “and the integrity of their authors, publishers and patrons more open 
to doubt, the illustrations within the books become correspondingly more lavish and 
abundant” (223). This indicates that although illustrations became an increasingly 
important aspect of travel books from the late 17th century on, nevertheless, their role was 
still essentially auxiliary. Odell ends her essay by declaring definitively that “[i]magery 
alone is not the 'soul of the transaction', for it is the play between text and image in 
Nieuhof's work that unites the depiction of a personal journey with the impartiality of a 
merchant traveller” (242).27 
26. And in the original Dutch version, the note that it was produced for van Meurs; Ogilby conveniently 
removes this. 
27. To clarify here, Odell contrasts the greater impartiality of merchants' accounts of China with the 
necessarily more “intimate” accounts of missionaries, whose end game of prosyletization led them to 
develop a familiarity with the Chinese that for merchants would have been superfluous. See Odell, “Soul of 
Transactions” (242).
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Imagery's role in travelogues was also, in ideological terms, essentially scientistic. 
Schmidt touches upon this aspect of travel books such as Nieuhof's with an especially 
vivid metaphor28:
Dutch geography, in its relentless recourse to pictures and forms of mimetic 
representation, provided a visual spectacle as well as a lesson in observation, 
and it resembled in this way both the popular spectacle of the anatomy theater 
and the graphic illustrations of the post-Vesalian anatomy book. It offered, in 
short, the chance for autopsia. (86) 
Schmidt is on the money here: the anatomy textbook's reduction of bodies to uniform, 
universalized pieces, like so many little cogs in a machine, indeed finds a parallel in 
the premodern travelogue's reduction of foreign peoples to uniform, universalized 
stereotypes. But whereas Schmidt detects this parallel only in the visual dimension of 
Nieuhof's travelogue (presumably because he has only looked for it there), I argue that
such scientistic reductions are as characteristic of the diplomat's text as the visual 
media that accompanied it. Considered as a finished object, Nieuhof's travelogue 
deserves attention for the self-consciously didactic, encyclopedic stance it takes 
towards its readers across its media. A stance characterised by the insistent 
deployment of both thematic and semantic scientism, both of which An Embassy from 
the East India Company evinces from its literal first pages.
Nieuhof's journal: of travellers and scholars
 And in fact, it does so – or rather, continues to do so – quite flamboyantly, once the 
journal itself commences. It is with considerable pomp, and not a little cheek, that Johan 
Nieuhof begins his travelogue neither by introducing the ambassadorial retinue of which 
he was a part, nor by addressing its diplomatic goals, but by celebrating travel itself as the 
highest mode of learning. This he does with a paean to history's greatest travellers – into 
which august company he squarely, self-consciously inserts himself. But perhaps 
unexpectedly, Nieuhof opens not on an anecdote about the Chinese, but rather the ancient
Lacedaemonians. Weighing their isolationist tendencies against the famously 
28. It will be noted, however, that Schmidt disagrees that travel book illustrations were less important than 
the text. On the contrary, his analysis emphasizes the importance of these illustrations so heavily that the 
titular author is reduced to the position of tool in the hands of an all-powerful publisher – an argument that I 
find overstated, for reasons we shall consider up close in chapter six.
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cosmopolitan “other Greeks and the Romans,” Nieuhof concludes in favour of the latter 
two on account of their worldliness – a trait he identifies as the basis of their various 
cultural achievements:
But [the Lacedaemonians'] severer ways and starch'd Formalities were, both by 
the other Greeks and the Romans, utterly exploded, who knowing better things, 
readily indulged License to Travel where they might improve their Wealth, 
Literature, or Observation. And also we find by their most ancient and accurate 
Writers, that they neither spared Cost, Study, nor Pains, to be replenished with 
remote and transmarine Imbellishments, both of Arts, Science, and Industry. (2)
On the one hand, this anecdote can be understood as perhaps an implicit bow to the study
of classical history, essential to any contemporary gentleman's education, and therefore to
Nieuhof's integrity as a commentator on world history and cultures. But it is also an 
argument for world travel as fundamental to the progress of human understanding – and, 
as Nieuhof's specific example emphasizes, to the development of the classical age's great
civilizations. Introductions, literarily as much as socially, are always symbolic: the twinning 
of empire and learning is the context into which Nieuhof places his work as a whole from 
its first sentence. It is the frame through which he intends us to view all that follows, and 
though that alone might justify him as an object for the current study, Nieuhof goes on to 
make his point plainer still.
He in fact takes great pains to do so. Following his indictment of the 
Lacedaemonians, Nieuhof turns his address to several semi-legendary figures: Emperor 
Trajan, King Mithridates, Tacitus, Democritus, Plato (1-2). All men whose various 
accomplishments, he explains, were facilitated by travel. Trajan, for instance, while 
engaged “in a Philosophical Inquisition concerning the Wonders of the Deep, and occult 
Nature of the Ocean,” ends up serendipitously storm-tossed all the way to India, where he 
can only sigh that he is too old to “penetrate” further, and discover more (2). Democritus is 
described as a pilgrim, 
[I]n quest of Science; who first addressed himself to the Aegyptian Priests, 
next to the Chaldeans, after to the Gymnosophists of India, from whose 
Magazines and... Fountains of Learning he returned rich, being freighted with 
a full Cargo both of Divine and Moral Principles. (2)
It may or may not be beside the point that figuring “Divine and Moral Principles” in 
mercantile terms seems almost cartoonishly Dutch in the context of the Dutch Republic's 
50
golden age; but it is certainly worth noting how tightly Nieuhof's metaphor conflates 
economic gain, divine imperative, and education (both moral and not) – a very full cargo, 
indeed. Nieuhof also seems to conflate “Science” with divine and moral learning; although,
after our previous discussion of Jorink and the Book of Nature, this will not be surprising. 
Travel, for Nieuhof, in a way that can seem surprisingly foreign to modern mindsets 
conditioned by the accessibility of even international travel, has little to do with leisure. By 
Nieuhof's official reckoning, the road is for revelations, a scholar's tool. The way by which 
the great man, whether ruler or sage, accumulates the store of his knowledge and builds 
the basis for later accomplishments. 
Nieuhof ends his tour of history's great philosophers by noting the growing 
importance of European “navigators” to geographic and scientific discovery. “But before I 
engage myself, it seems also not amiss to set forth briefly the Division of the Universal 
Globe,” he says, before doing so with special reference to the European men who divided 
it (3). Again, the symbolic importance of Nieuhof's gesture is obvious, identifying his 
travelogue as explicitly concerned with, as we would deem them today, geography and 
ethnography; and furthermore, as aware of the gravity of undertaking a rare assay of the 
“Genius and Manners of the People, and Customs of the Place, and Countreys supposed 
by all Geographers to be the richest in the World, and where any Stranger formerly durst 
never attempt” (3). And, in a move that will have become tiresomely familiar by the end of 
this thesis, he then directly avows the disinterestedness of his undertaking:
And herein (without breach of Modesty) I dare boldy affirm, that nothing 
considerable slipt my observation relating to my Design, and that in taking 
accurate Maps and Sketches, not onely of the Countrey and Townes, but also 
Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Plants, and other rarities never divulged (as I am 
informed) heretofore.
Nieuhof's meagre gestures towards “Modesty” do little to mitigate the bravado of his claim.
His parentheses hang off the passage like afterthoughts, and that is all they are; 
perfunctory, courteous – his statement of purpose is as heavy and self-important as van 
Meurs' frontispiece. He has already promised, as no “Stranger formerly durst,” to canvass 
China's people, here he further widens his scope to take in exactly everything else China 
has to offer. For the sake of the West, and that august lineage of learned men to whom he 
is so determined to be connected, he will faithfully describe every dish China serves him, 
in such exquisite detail that the entire Occidental world will be able to taste it – a task (as 
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he is informed) never before accomplished. His professional reputation is inextricably 
bound up with his noble “Design” to “divulge” China's secrets.
Again, that there is precedent to this rhetorical stance does not diminish its 
significance29 – conventions do not get to be conventions on accident. Nieuhof openly 
declares here what he has been implying all along: that he is indeed a man of learning, 
and in pursuit of learning; indeed heir to the illustrious elite into whose company he has 
placed himself. If anyone's account of China can be trusted, it is his, for like the heroic 
scholars he has listed, he too is determined to travel the world “in quest of Science.”  
Despite its lofty pretensions, Nieuhof's text very much follows the fashion of its day, 
both in its tendency to hyperbole and in its heavy reliance on material poached from other 
travelogues. Ambassador Vincent Paets, who headed the second VOC embassy to China 
in 1666, found An Embassy from the East India Company  “exaggerated and unfaithful”. A 
century later, Isaac Titsingh, head of the embassy in which Houckgeest served, would 
decry it as “too much embellished” (both quoted in Sun, 16-17). And on this point, Paets 
and Titsingh were not wholly incorrect. Schmidt and Odell have both spilt considerable ink 
stressing that premodern travelogues cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be 
characterised by either their modesty or factuality. But as I have already suggested, the 
genre's rhetorical flourishes and formalities are precisely what makes it such a rich vein of 
ideological ore: its tropes speak to its standards and priorities. And verisimilitude was 
clearly important to Nieuhof and his publisher, even if strict factuality was not. In Odell's 
work on the patchwork heterogeneity of Nieuhof's text, she observes that Nieuhof 
incorporates “the work of Martinio Martini (1614-1661) for descriptions of Chinese 
provinces through which the Dutch embassy did not travel,” going on to explain: “In the 
seventeenth century, making unacknowledged use of another writer's work was 
commonplace publishing practice. That Nieuhof [does so] is not remarkable, but that [his] 
work is deliberately structured to hide that fact behind a seemingly unified voice is” (Odell, 
“Soul of Transactions,” 229). Given my interest in the conceptual framework underpinning 
Nieuhof's text, the actual authenticity of his supposedly first-hand observations is moot; 
what is more significant is that he finds it important to strike a pose of objectivity in any 
case. 
29. See Sun's discussion of Engelbert Kaempfer's travelogue upon Japan (15-16). Kaempfer's embassy 
travelled to China in 1690, and his travelogue followed Nieuhof's, but Sun's point is to establish that by the 
late 17th century, authorial testimony to the purity and veracity of their own text was already firmly 
established, even a formality.
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Invoking, assessing, describing China
All of which is to say, that the famous illustrations that accompany Nieuhof's text are
only the most obvious part of a posturing towards objectivity that in fact permeates the 
travelogue. Nieuhof continues his introduction with a summary of the information known of 
China at that time, and his approach to the task helps to define what I have called 
semantic scientism. Firstly, he spends several long, hair-splitting paragraphs merely 
tracing the etymology of the word “China.” One cannot but recall Adorno and Horkheimer's
description of Enlightenment methodology: apprehension, categorization, superordination 
– the means by which the Western scientific intellect appropriates its surrounding world. 
Magicians and scientists alike believe in the power of names, naming; there is something 
obsessive about it, in Nieuhof's work and in general. The Frankfurt Schoolers describe the 
latter as the successors of the former:
The scientific calculation of events annuls the account of them which thought 
had once given in myth. Myth sought to report, to name, to tell of origins – but 
therefore also to narrate, record, explain. This tendency was reinforced by the 
recording and collecting of myths. From a record, they soon became a 
teaching. Each ritual contains a representation of how things happen and of 
the specific process which is to be influenced by magic. (5)
As if summoning from a grimoire, or for that matter invoking, in the Greek manner, a deity 
by listing its epithets, Nieuhof begins his textual re/construction of China by speaking its 
every name, both conjuring and delimiting, directing it. A feeling emphasized by his 
subsequent index of all of China's known provinces, down to its major and minor cities, 
and number of inhabitants. He precedes his journal proper, in fact, with a detailed listing of
the cities, population stats, notable wares, and primary features of all the Chinese 
provinces he was not, during his journey, able to visit in person (9-20). A feat enabled, he 
tells us, by his being able to recourse to official Chinese “Register-Books” to fill in the gaps
of his first-hand knowledge.30 He provides geographical and demographical taxonomies 
for the provinces he actually did visit as well. They occur throughout his journal, inserted 
as a matter of course wherever he documents his embassy's leaving one province to enter
the next. These crisp taxonomical lists divide provinces into capital cities, great cities, the 
30. About which books he says little else (8), but if Odell and Schmidt are right, then this information 
may have been taken from several sources, including Martini.
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small cities “commanded” over by the great cities, and finally, garrisons.31 I posit that this 
desire to quantify China – to translate it into a tidy list of concrete values – is an effort to 
force it, conceptually, fully into view; to make it comprehensible in Western scientific terms 
that it might later be made compliant to them. We will recall here Drayton's claim that the 
Scientific Revolution was characterised by an “increasingly mathematical and mechanistic 
approach to the world” (90). And this is a tactic we will find, and examine, again in later 
surveys of Macartney and Houckgeest – although neither of these later diplomats reaches 
Nieuhof's level of pedantry in the matter. Nonetheless, I take it as significant that this 
approach to understanding and describing China appears in the earliest of our travelogues
from its introductory pages.  
I also take as significant the thoroughness of Nieuhof's introductory description of 
China, which not only renders to the longitudinal coordinates its exact size, and lists the 
predominating terrains across its extent, but insistently assesses these in light of China's 
potential vulnerability to military invasion: 
[I]t seems a world in itself... where the Sea borders, it hath so many Islands, 
Banks, Flats, and blind Rocks, that it is altogether unsafe to approach China on 
that side with any great Ships of Men of War. On the West, and somewhat 
toward the South, lie the Woods and Hills of Tamessus, which are so thick and 
high, that it is altogether unpenetrable on that side, and which separates China 
from the next bordering Asia, and the lesser neighboring Kingdoms; all which 
adds to the Defense and Protection of this Empire. Toward the North and West 
it is also sufficiently secur'd against all Invasions by the Sandy and dry Flats of 
Samo, which endanger all Vessels that attempt any Landings in those parts. 
Lastly, the kingdom has toward the North a great Wall, which the Family and 
Branch of Cina built against the Invasion of the Tartars 215 Years before the 
Birth of Christ; but in what condition this Wall is at present, and how far it 
extends, we shall treat at large in the description of the province of Peking. (7)
The phrase “a world in itself” is telling, framing China in terms of a new frontier ready to be
opened, conceptually first of all, to the West. How? Through naming, description, 
measurement, assessment: that Nieuhof produced his quantifications of China as a 
representative of a country with no designs on actually invading China, begs the question 
of his preoccupation with its assailability – its capacities for “Defense and Protection” 
against “Invasions.” Other key locations within China are surveyed in this same way. For 
31. For instance, his treatment of the provinces of Nanking (Nanjing) (70), Xantung (90-91). Incidentally, 
regarding Nieuhof's “Peking,” which is today's “Beijing”: I have provided modern translations for my authors' 
often idiosyncratic renderings of Chinese place names where possible, but these have not always been easy
to determine. Generally speaking, this will not impinge on my analysis, since geographic specificity is not my 
focus.
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example, Macao: 
Whose Wall is wash'd round about by the Sea, except on the North-side, where it
joins to the Land by a little Slip, so that by the Sea on the one side, and the 
Mountainous Situation on the other, it is held invincible against the Power and 
Strength of any whatsoever. (31)
We will see this tendency again in Macartney, who makes no attempt to hide his tactical 
assessments of the Chinese coast (162-163); descriptions that, even aside from their 
potential usefulness as military reconnaissance, helped seed a cultural narrative about 
China as a stubbornly outmoded empire in decline (Kitson, ch. 5). But Macartney's Britain 
is at the time of his writing economically dependent on and indebted to China (Kitson, 
157), a tense state of affairs that might plausibly justify military preparedness. Nieuhof's 
United Provinces had no substantial relation to China at all during his writing – 
establishing one was his embassy's impetus – so the aggression of his geographic gaze 
cannot be explained in the same terms. A point which makes consideration of ideological 
influences (as opposed to pressing external contingencies) upon his conceptualization of 
China even more difficult to overlook in Nieuhof's case than in Macartney's. 
Recording the Tartar fall out
Additionally, and though it does not obviously qualify as an example of scientism, 
there is one other way that Nieuhof betrays his interest in the military prowess and 
fallibilities of the Chinese, and seems to speak to an imperialist desire to appraise the 
military vigour of the empire: his inveterate need to document the effects of the Tartar 
invasion upon every city he passes. His treatment of this topic is too pervasive to treat in 
any significant depth without spawning a whole second thesis, but, to review just a few 
pages chosen at random from his journal, we find descriptions of: the effects of the Tartar 
invasion upon the environs of Pekinnsa (60); the sieges of Canchu and Nanchang, and 
dramatic fall of the latter to Tartar forces despite the actions of the heroic commander 
Kiuns (63-64); the utter ruin of Tanglieu (71); and finally, the luck of former capital city 
Nanking (Nanjing), which astoundingly escaped mistreatment by the Tartars altogether, 
aside from the spiteful destruction of the imperial palace (76). These passages are not 
thematically scientistic; most eschew any sort of technical detail about military 
manoeuvres or techne. However, as in his story about Nanchang, such details are 
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sometimes not only included, but very exacting; even when they are not, these passages 
are indisputable evidence that Nieuhof was preoccupied with cataloguing the fall-out of 
war. For example, the Tartars' siege of Nanchang included diverting a river into a trench 
around the city, and then “blocking it up with Vessels” to prevent any supplies or aid to 
reach its inhabitants (64). Such descriptions, if habitual, might amount to a systematic 
inventory that could be interpreted as scientistic, but Nieuhof's accounts do not 
consistently provide such details (although this may have been because they were not 
always available to him). 
In any case, read against his personal, more obviously scientistic assessments of 
China's geography, demography, and military vulnerabilities, these records of the 
“unmerciful Tartars... who have laid waste abundance of noble Cities, Towns, and Villages 
(which are now places for Birds and Beasts to roost in)” (48) insist on descriptions of 
China grounded in military imagery – specifically the imagery of desolation. At the very 
least, these passages indicate that Nieuhof had a vested and ongoing interest in China's 
recent military history, and perhaps the foundation of the new Qing dynasty particularly. 
This supports my claim that one of the imperialist motivations for his travelogue was a 
general reconnaissance of the empire. Nieuhof meant to size up the new regime, and 
page after page, he did. And though this project was certainly not the expression of a 
literal desire for or anticipation of war; in a more general sense, Chinese military strength 
was clearly a topic that weighed heavily upon Nieuhof's mind. Enough so that he felt 
compelled to document China's recent war history in addition to making more pointed 
commentary about the vulnerabilities of specific regions.32
This aspect of Nieuhof's travelogue becomes even clearer when we compare his 
aforementioned description of China's general extent with Athanasius Kircher's description
of the same in the China Illustrata (1667), excerpts of which Ogilby included in his editions 
of Nieuhof's travelogue. Appended to Nieuhof's text as “An Appendix: or Special Remarks 
taken at large out of Athanasius Kircher's Antiquities of China,” in it Kircher measures the 
“the largest and vastest of Kingdoms”:
On the East it is compassed with the Eastern Ocean; On the North it hath 
Tartary adjoining, separated by a Wall, whose yet undiscover'd Bounds are 
extended even unto the Frozen Sea, and questionless they are in some part or 
other continu'd to the North part of America with Anian, whether it be a Straight 
32. Or, as in his extended description of the great wall, both. He discusses its precise dimensions, history, 
and the sizeable garrisons it housed (130-131).
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or Isthmus; although unto this very time (as with great pains it was search'd 
after by the Fathers of our Society employ'd in China), the Limits of these vast 
Kingdoms and Lands have as yet been detected by no Person: On the West is 
encompassed partly with Ridges of most high Mountains, partly a sandy Desart 
and other Kingdoms... Lastly, on the South it is limited with the Sea, the 
Kingdoms of Toucbinum, Cochinachina, Laum, and others. The Latitude 
beginneth from 18 degrees, and extendeth it self up unto 43, that is it is 
distended by the interval of a thousand four hundred and forty Italian Miles from
South to North, and from the West unto the East it almost consisteth of the 
same Distance. (Antiquities of China, 321) 
Nieuhof too, elsewhere in his text, sets about identifying China's extent in latitudinal and 
longitudinal terms; but it is not the similarities between their passages that stands out. 
Rather, what is most striking about Kircher's and Nieuhof's cousin-passages is the 
different tone each takes towards its object. Kircher introduces the Great Wall initially only 
to admire that its bounds are “yet undiscover'd.” When he gets around to describing its 
purpose a couple paragraphs later, he seems most concerned with it as an amazing feat 
of ancient architecture, failing to share Nieuhof's interest in it as a fortification per se (322).
What Kircher emphasizes instead is that the route he supposes may connect Asia to North
America has yet to be verified by any fellow Jesuits. Enclosed with feigned modesty in a 
parenthesis, this self-conscious reference tints Kircher's entire passage, tacitly pinning the 
trustworthiness of his description to the “great pains” taken by his famously well-educated 
religious order; an order that by Kircher's time was well aware of its status as the primary 
European custodian of first-hand information on China (Blue, 61). Whatever else this 
gesture accomplishes, it casts Kircher's measurement of China – both his literal, spatial 
measurement, and his assessment of Chinese civilization as a whole – in terms of 
religious, specifically Jesuitical, ideology. This does not preclude his text's also being 
informed by scientism – which it was. His close reckoning of China's size and shape (to 
the extent this was possible) and specification that he is using “Italian miles,” betray a 
scientistic assumption of precision as the shorthand of empirical honesty. But where 
Nieuhof's semantic scientism, imperialistically inflected, runs towards a more aggressive 
analysis of China's natural and man-made national defences, Kircher is merely 
descriptive. At most, his reference to the “great pains” taken by his religious order to 
discover China strongly hints at an opinion that much work was left to do – especially, we 
are liable to imagine, to the end of accomplishing Jesuitical aims at proselytization. Jesuit 
presence in China was not, after all, a happenstance. Not anymore than Nieuhof's 
embassy was. A point which only underscores how distinct Nieuhof's consistent attention 
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to China's vulnerabilities is by comparison, informed as it was by the 17th century's 
competitive imperialist race for overseas resources. But to be fair to Nieuhof, the 
aggression in his analyses of China is only latent, and he closes his journal by proposing 
that perhaps the Dutch might “assist his Imperial Majesty” with their ships “for the 
subduing” of notorious Ming loyalist and “ArchPyrate” Coxinga (139) (who would go on to 
oust the Dutch from Dutch Formosa in 1661).  
It would be careless to read too much into a comparison of two single passages. 
Still, Kircher's is useful as evidence that scientific methods, and scientism itself, do not 
inevitably run towards the sort of military speculations that Nieuhof – and later, more 
famously, Macartney – records. On the contrary, scientism's aggression is inherently 
conceptual; on its own, it provides the illusion of control. But its abstraction makes it 
pliable, easily bent to support the various aims of otherwise distinct ideologies that cannot 
but gain from association with its noble connotations. Connotations, such as impartiality, 
that science itself only arguably and with qualification deserves. 
Scientism and commodification
But the evidence of Nieuhof's imperialistically inflected scientism does not stop with 
his introductory passages on China. Ironically, one of the most enlightening passages in 
Nieuhof's early text is an aside about Java, home to the Dutch colony of Batavia and hub 
of Dutch-Asian trade in the 17th century, that he gives before beginning his journal proper. 
Describing the colony, Nieuhof explains that,
[It] is situated in the Island of Great Java, and so fruitful in all manner of Cattel 
and Corn, that the learned Scaliger extoll'd this Island for one of the most fruitful
and comprehensive Places in the whole World: for from hence comes not only 
Pepper, Ginger, Cinamon, and other spices in great abundance, but also all 
manner of tame and wild Cattel... It produces also all manner of Gems, Gold 
Mines, Precious Stones, and rich Silks... but [is] yet so subject to stormy and 
tempestuous Weather, that they are seldom free from Commotion'd Skies. (26)
This paragraph, so condensed it seems almost offhand, precedes several pages of the 
history of Dutch presence on the island. Considered in its own right, it is not, at first 
glance, remarkable. But put within the context of the island's contemporary history, and 
further, of his militaristic treatment of China, Nieuhof's decidedly economic description 
takes on a new light. China, then largely reckoned as impenetrable, is described in terms 
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of its formidable natural fortifications. But Java, long since infected by European presence,
and laid open to mercantile development by both the Dutch and English – whose jealous 
skirmishes over the island make up the bulk of Nieuhof's narrative about it (26-28) – is 
given as the sum of its commodities. In neither case is Nieuhof's description incidental. 
China's unsurveyed and unattainable resources invite the diplomat's hungry speculation 
and hungrier quantification; whereas Java, as a conquered landscape, is reduced to a 
mere accounting of trade goods: the end result at which the former speculation and 
quantification aims. 
To give another example of this dynamic, Nieuhof says of “Laos, Tunking, and 
Couchinchina” (which span modern day Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam): “These Countries
are very fruitful in everything belonging to the sustenance of Mankind,” with “Trees and 
Fruits... [and] a Bean, which makes an Oyl or Juyce, by the Portuguese call'd Rosamalia” 
(30). It is rich in “Eagle-wood, which is a Purple color” and set with “good store of Linen, 
Silk, and Cotton” (30). A local monkey's blood also makes an “excellent Purple Dye” (30). 
As with Java, in the absence of more pressing concerns, the language of scientific 
categorization is used to translate a country into the commodities that make it attractive to 
the goals of empire, while its native inhabitants, if they are not useful or extraordinary, are 
shrunk to a footnote. Nieuhof's language in these examples illustrates, in miniature, a 
progression of scientistic assessment from an early stage of conceptualization 
characterised by the identification of resources/analysation of vulnerability to invasion 
(China), to a later stage characterised by the language of mercantile development (Java, 
etc.).  
But where Nieuhof's descriptions of the riches of Java, Laos, Tunking, and 
Couchinchina rather take them for granted, casually listing their commodities but sparing 
them little other discussion, his descriptions of potential Chinese commodities tend to also 
include a vested interest in the technologies used to produce them. “Ucienjen,” for 
instance, is “a Village famous for Shipping... where lay great store of Vessels of several 
sorts and sizes... to lade with China Earthen Ware” (65) which is then shipped “through all 
China, but also through the whole World” (66). Presuming a competitive, stereotypically 
European view of trade, Nieuhof's party are surprised and admiring when the townsfolk tell
them: 
[T]hat there was no better Porcelane made in all the Kingdom of China, than in 
the Village Sinktesuno... and they added withal (which greatly increased our 
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wonder) that they did not fetch the Earth whereof this Porcelane is made out of 
the Province of Kiangsi, wherein this village is situated, but from the Province of
Nanking. (66)
That Nieuhof's interest in Chinese manufacturing techne is thematically scientistic is 
obvious, but further, he relates in detail how and where the raw earth for the porcelain is 
obtained, how porcelain is made from it, what sorts of items are made from the porcelain, 
and even how these are typically decorated. His observations, in sum, read like a how-to 
guide. Regarding vessels ready for firing: they are “stopt” for thirty days total in an oven, 
the first fifteen over a live fire, and the last fifteen with the fire out, until cool. By now these 
careful quantifications should not be surprising: materials, locations, methods of 
production, production times – all the trappings of semantic scientism. Nieuhof habitually 
measures Chinese culture by literally measuring both its manufactures, and processes of 
manufacture.
The Chinese “Arts” 
 
It might be noted, however, that Nieuhof rarely uses the words “science” or 
“technology” themselves. Rather, one of Nieuhof's more characteristic terms is “art,” under
which heading he includes Chinese technologies. Of the residents of the province of 
Nanking (Nanjing), for example, Nieuhof says, 
The Natives of this Place are generally very Civil, Witty, Serviceable, and 
Mannerly: It likewise breeds great store of Handicrafts men, who prove most 
excellent in their several Arts... It produces great store of Cotton and Silk, which
maintains there abundance of Weavers, who work in either Commodity; but this
is the Womens Business, and the Men follow Husbandry and other 
Employments, or else look to the Children whilst the Women Spin... This Seat of
Nanking is so famous through all China, that whatsoever is made in it, is 
preferr'd before any such thing of the likewise nature wrought in other parts of 
the Country. (69)
It does not seem accidental that Nieuhof so favourably describes the temperament of a 
people associated by the Chinese with quality craftsmanship; regardless, this passage 
demonstrates which Chinese “arts” Nieuhof is most often and most pointedly interested in. 
And while the diplomat elsewhere evinces a genuine curiosity about any of several other 
aspects of Chinese culture, his travelogue as a whole makes clear that his attention is 
especially invested in Chinese techne, especially manufacturing techne, which he takes 
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every opportunity to document. Of the small city of “Ufu,” for example, located on an island
in the river “Kiang,” he writes that “This city is cri'd up through all China for Arms, the 
Inhabitants being most dextrous and exquisite in making all manner of Military Utensils” 
(72) (he also mentions, hearkening to our previous discussion of Nieuhof's military 
interests, that the town's “strong Block-houses” (guard houses) are not “Mann'd, or have 
any Guns mounted on them.”). “Pekkinsa” trades in “all Naval Materials, to the great 
benefit of the Inhabitants” (60). Macao “exceeds all others for great Cannon... they are the 
best of all India, being Cast of Chinese and Japanese copper, and are sent for far and 
near” (31). The province of Quantung (Guangdong) – which he exhaustively lists as 
possessing “great quantities of Gold, Pearl, Precious Stones, Silk, Quick-silver, Copper, 
Steel, Iron, Salt-petre, Eagle-Wood, and several other odiferous Woods” (35) – is also 
famous for the skill of its inhabitants:
The People in thee Parts are very ingenious, laborious, and nimble, and can 
imitate any thing which they see made before them: and whatsoever the 
Portuguese bring thither out of Europe woven of Gold, Silver, or the like, which is 
strange unto them, they will immediately endeavor to work the same, and in short
time will accomplish what they undertake: for I gave a Chinese Goldsmith a Silver
Button to make a set by, and the next day he brought to my Lodging what I had 
bespoke, very curiously wrought, as if he had been us'd to such work, though he 
had never done the like before; which argues their Ingenuity to be very great. 
(35)
Here is proof not only of Nieuhof's keen interest in Chinese craftsmanship and 
manufacture, but an example of him empirically testing Chinese smithing “ingenuity.” It is 
impossible to know from what he has written what originally motivated his button 
solicitation, of course. Perhaps he was possessed by the spirit of inquiry, perhaps he 
merely needed new buttons (which do tend to be below appreciation until they're missing) 
– the options are not mutually exclusive. But what is clear is that Nieuhof was delighted 
and impressed by his experience with Chinese buttonsmithing, which he in fact does not 
represent in terms of buttonsmithing at all, but as hard evidence of Chinese craftsmanship 
and technological savvy in general.  
The attempted appropriation of the “Lou-wa” birds: 
Another illustrative example of Nieuhof's interest in Chinese techne: he records how
at the river Tao (Danwen), near the small city of “Nynyang,” (Ninyang) local fisherman 
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plied their trade in a very unusual manner. 
[W]e saw them fish with a Bird, which they call Lou-wa... They have small 
Boats, very artificially made of Reeds or Bamboes.... and place the Bird 
perching upon the out-side of the Vessel, from when she suddenly shoots, and 
diving, swims under Water as fast as they can thrust forward their Cables with a
light Pole: As soon as she has caught her Prey, she instantly appears above 
Water, the Master of the Boat standing ready to receive her, opens her Bill by 
force, and takes out the Dainty: Afterwards he turns her out again to catch 
more. (92)
 
Nieuhof gives a further few particulars of the birds, including their local market value 
translated into Dutch guilders (150). He then relates that his crew tried to purchase a 
couple of the marvellous animals from the fishermen in question, but were turned down. 
Following the description above, the significance of Nieuhof's attempt to purchase Lou-wa 
birds is obvious. Had we any doubt at this point that the Dutch were not only curious of 
Chinese technology, but actively seeking useful technologies to appropriate, this anecdote 
would have removed it.33
The Imperial palace
Nieuhof also takes great Interest in Chinese architecture, and his awe at the 
imperial Chinese Palace at Peking is superlative. “And to the end that all Men may be 
sensible how far this Court exceeds all the Royal Palaces in Europe, for Splendor, Art, 
Wealth, and Pleasure, I shall give you a large Account thereof, and of the Platform of it, 
which I took myself” (120). Again, as implied everywhere in Nieuhof's travelogue, veracity 
is conveyed by means of exact measurement – and here, his measurement of the Chinese
Imperial Palace can be understood as measurement of Chinese achievement generally, 
for which the palace metonymically figures. It would be redundant to list all of Nieuhof's 
quantifications, which run to several pages, but it is notable that they are produced in 
addition to a detailed illustration of the palace: it was clearly of the utmost importance to 
Nieuhof that he capture its dimensions for European posterity. “All the Edifices, which are 
very many, are most richly adorn'd with gilt Galleries, Balcones, and Carv'd Imagery, to the
33. As a matter of background: Nieuhof's “Lou-wa birds” (Laogua) were cormorants, and there are places in 
China still today where they are employed to fish exactly as they were in Nieuhof's time, and well before. 
See for instance Andy Beal's “Dying Art of Chinese Cormorant Fishing - in Pictures.” And while it might be 
most correct to refer to cormorant fishing as a practice, Nieuhof clearly considers the birds as tools, which 
instrumental approach seems to validate referring to them, in context, as a technology.  
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admiration of all that ever saw them. Each Dwelling hath a large Penthouse, so that you 
may walk dry in Rainy Weather” (121). The Chinese ability to make pleasure weather-
proof, and bend nature to their aesthetic demands, enchants Nieuhof. They bend nature 
for more practical reasons, too: Nieuhof explains, with geographic specificity, how a 
“Channel” that winds through the “whole Court, with several Windings and Turnings... 
serves to water the Gardens and Woods. This receives its Water from the river Yo, which 
springs from a Pool call'd Si, near to the mountain Jaciven” and is “so broad and deep, 
that it will bear great Vessels” bearing supplies from the outside world (121). Discussing 
the Peking gardens, he admires, “There is not any thing wherein the Chinese shew their 
Ingenuity more, than in [artificial] Rocks and Hills, which are so curiously wrought, that Art 
seems to exceed Nature” (121). He then gives a fascinating description of this peculiar 
fixture of wealthy estates:
Artificial Mountains or Cliffs are commonly contriv'd with Chambers and Anti-
Chambers, for a defence against the scorching Heat in Summer, and to refresh 
and delight the Spirits, for they commonly make their great Entertainments in 
these Grots, and the Learned seek to Study in them rather than any other Place.
(122)
The enthusiasm of Nieuhof's many descriptions of the palace's features make clear how 
roundly impressed he is with it, especially as an expression of Chinese engineering skill. 
The Chinese' ability to redirect rivers and defy the rain and sun is, for him, connected to 
their ability to make art that “exceeds nature” – is this a particularly Dutch admiration, 
given the constant battle with elemental nature that typifies life in the low countries? Either 
way, it satisfies Adorno and Horkheimer's concept of science's mythological function.  
But Nieuhof is not only concerned with the imperial court's management of their 
nonhuman environment. He is equally interested in the imperial palace as an instrument 
for the management of people: he meticulously describes the different compartments 
belonging to the emperor, the “several Women in... his seraglio,” (120), the court children 
(121), as well as the numerous wings where one can find “a great many other Houses and
Dwellings for their Priests, Artificers, Servants, and others” (121). This regard for the social
utility of built spaces is even more explicit in the final section of his travelogue, his “A 
General Description of China,” a portion of which he devotes to “The Courts of the 
Governors of Provinces.” There, he spends several paragraphs describing not just the 
layouts of these court buildings, but who is allowed to use which rooms, and which gates, 
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on which occasions; and other related socio-spatial protocol. He explains the decorum 
surrounding the Emperor's furnishing of the courts for the appointed governors, who, to 
Nieuhof's surprise, are allowed on retirement “to take all the Household Good with him.” 
Afterwards, “the Court is furnished anew for the succeeding Governor” (203). There is an 
overarching preoccupation here with the relationship between society and the spaces it 
fills that strikes me as surprisingly modern. But regardless, the final impression his writings
on the topic convey is that Nieuhof indeed thinks of Chinese courts (including the imperial 
court) as similar in kind to the other productions discussed in Chapter XI of his “General 
Description”: “Common Ways,” “Bridges,” “Ships” – that is, as a physical construction built 
to direct, and not merely house, people. To this end, even his accompanying birds-eye 
illustration of the imperial palace seems closer to a map than a mere record of 
architectural features (see fig. 3 in “Images”). Nieuhof, with great acuity, recognizes the 
built environment's symbolic social functions, and consequently subjects China's state 
buildings to searching analysis along just these lines – which leads him to create both 
textual and visual blueprints of the imperial palace, China's spatial and symbolic heart. 
A General Description of China
And having now mentioned Nieuhof's “A General Description of China,” it seems 
appropriate to consider this unique bookend to his journal in greater depth. The “General 
Description” is a fascinating appendix, structured rather like a modern encyclopedia, or 
perhaps textbook, that reflects Nieuhof's scientistic predisposition even at the formal level. 
It is titled by topic: headings like “Of Idol Temples” and “Of Towers and Sea-marks” sit 
beside others like “Of Rivers, Waterfalls, Lakes &c” and “Of Animals.” A place for 
everything and everything in its place, the “General Description” finds all of China's human
and nonhuman inhabitants snugly sorted into their respective chapters. It is impossible not
to be reminded here of Nieuhof's introductory declaration to be the first to thoroughly 
investigate the “Genius and Manners of the People, and Customs of the Place, and 
Countreys supposed by all Geographers to be the richest in the World” (3) – a scope 
reflected in the thoroughness of the “General Description's” chaptering. 
Of the chapters themselves, a couple deserve special attention. In Chapter XV, “Of 
Roots, Herbs, Flowers, Reeds, Trees, and Fruits,” Nieuhof makes the following assertion:
And thus much I dare from my own knowledge affirm, That whatever is to be 
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had in Europe, is likewise found in China; and if in truth there want any thing, 
Nature hath supply'd that single defect with divers other things beyond those we
have in Europe. Now that it may be obvious to every Understanding, with what 
a copious Harvest of Fruits and Vegetables mild Nature has bles'd this Empire, 
and the Inhabitants thereof, I shall briefly discourse thereof as followeth. (212)
Epitomizing science put into the service of imperial greed, this twenty page chapter – one 
of the longest in the “General Description” – is a list of useful Chinese plants, where they 
are found (to the very city or mountain), and how they are used. I will refrain from giving 
specific examples presently, as we will be returning to this topic in my chapter on 
Macartney, when I compare Nieuhof's “General Description” to Macartney's similarly 
structured “Observations.” But it suffices to say that Nieuhof openly identifies China's 
botanical riches as equal to, or perhaps surpassing, that of the entirety of Europe; and 
then declares that he will enumerate these for his audience – which he does with great 
gusto. I cannot read this chapter without again hearing Drayton's claim that one of the 
most important goals of the scientist-qua-imperial-agent was to “[name] the natural riches 
of new territories” (232) in preparation for their appropriation. Nieuhof's would-be study of 
Chinese botany was, at the end of the day, a thinly veiled VOC wishlist: a record of desired
commodities which spanned medicines (213, for just one example), teas (215), cottons 
(217), timber (221), and innumerable other possible trade goods. It literally both names 
and locates scores of valuable Chinese plants, and where possible even relates how they 
are prepared or otherwise utilized – and consequently, makes it possible for us to 
ascertain that his previous descriptions of Chinese (and other) regions by way of their 
natural resources was not incidental, but part of a larger project to further Dutch trade by 
identifying potential commodities.
But besides identifying commodities, Nieuhof's “General Description” also gives us 
some direct insight into his measure of Chinese learning itself. In Chapter II, which 
concerns the “Characters, Language, Writing, and Literature of the Chinese,” Nieuhof 
states: 
[T]hey are great Proficients in the Art of Astrology, and in several other Arts and 
Sciences; as also heretofore in that of Arithmetick, in the understanding whereof 
they have of late years decay'd, insomuch that now the Shop-keepers use 
Boards to tell upon, which are full of Holes; yet they are so ready at it, that with a 
Peg they know how to cast up an Accompt with as much Method and Expedition, 
as the most skillfull European with Counters. (154)
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Nieuhof's valorisation of the premier sciences of his day rings full force here, but it is 
interesting that he feels the need to point out that the Chinese have “of late years decay'd”
in their grasp of mathematics, when he then immediately qualifies that, nevertheless, they 
can keep accounts as well as any European. He asserts that Chinese astrologers are 
familiar with many more stars than European, but that their art is yet “full of Errors and 
Mistakes.” (154). “As to Physick and Chirurgery, they are very expert therein, and their 
Rules of Art differ not much from those of our European Physicians” (155), but Nieuhof is 
confounded by what he interprets as the small esteem “the Degree of Doctor” – which 
requires an examination in both Peking and Nanking – brings the Chinese compared to 
the designation philosopher (155), explaining that “this Degree [of Doctor], when obtain'd, 
doth advance neither the Honor or Respect of the Person” (155). Nieuhof closes out the 
chapter with several paragraphs' description of the Chinese bureaucratic examination 
system, the degrees it affords, and the differences between these (156-157). Overall, 
Nieuhof's assessment of Chinese learning is approving, and corroborates Blue's claim that
17th century European views of China, though increasingly varied, were still largely 
positive, and yet unbeholden to widespread accusations of cultural degeneracy (Blue, 60-
70). 
But Nieuhof is certainly not without his criticisms, and as the passage above 
indicates, these, when they occur, are blatantly scientistic in tone. In the following chapter 
(III), he complains that the Chinese' poor show at crafting great bells, given Europe's 
superior metallurgic prowess, “proceeds in all probability from their general averseness to 
deal with Foreigners; it being a Rule among them, to prohibit them entrance into their 
Country, at leastwise not to admit them farther than Frontires” (158). Implying a poor grasp
of geometry, Nieuhof slates Chinese painting for both its flatness and poor media – “they 
neither understand the making of Shadows, nor have learned to temper their Colours with 
Oyl” (158). To Nieuhof's reckoning, and despite the compliments he pays the Chinese in 
other fields, the insularity of the Qing has prevented their flourishing in at least these 
arenas to European levels of achievement, an idea we will see again in our other 
diplomats' journals. These examples show us that Nieuhof did self-consciously measure 
the Chinese by their scientific and technological development, even if he didn't always find
them to come up short. But the measurement, in this case, is less important than the ruler. 
Nieuhof's thinking demonstrates one of the most fundamental tropes of scientistic 
ideology, and one which would pick up increasingly ethnocentric ramifications, as Adas 
has argued, with the increasing valorisation of science in the West during the premodern 
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period (Adas, 203-205).
Appending the China Illustrata
And finally, before concluding with Nieuhof's travelogue, I will take a moment to 
quickly revisit Athanasius Kircher, a hundred-page extract of whose China Illustrata was, I 
have noted, included with Nieuhof's own text on publication.34 The foremost Jesuit scholar 
of his time, Kircher's inclusion in Nieuhof's travelogue can be justified on a number of 
pragmatic grounds. As Schmidt has argued, one of the defining traits of premodern travel 
literature – Dutch especially – is an eye to marketing. The inclusion of Kircher within 
Nieuhof's travelogue was in fact the decision of English publisher Ogilby, but certainly, 
including two different accounts of China in a single, opulently illustrated book only 
doubled its appeal to those in a position, and of the disposition, to buy such leather-bound 
spectacles. And these were big business, indeed, even outwith the Netherlands.
But that only explains the most superficial appeal of adding Kircher to Nieuhof. The 
addition of China Illustrata to Nieuhof's travelogue can also be read as providing a gesture
of deference towards Christian ideology that Nieuhof's own text does not. Many of 
Kircher's chapters relate almost exclusively to Christian presence in China. This is not 
surprising, of course, given that Kircher declares in his introductory chapter that the 
occasion for his writing is to prove the validity of the Nestorian Stele, and therefore that 
“the Gospel Preached formerly in China is the same with that which the Universal 
Catholick Roman Church enjoineth to be believ'd to this Day” (320). On the one hand, 
anyone familiar with the great rites controversy will understand the aim of this line of 
argumentation immediately. Kircher's treatise on China was not incidental, or written for 
knowledge's own sake, but a Jesuit propaganda meant to justify the order's 
accommodationist tendencies. By demonstrating that, after all, the culture being 
accommodated was not a heathen but a degenerate Christian one, he could argue that it 
fell well within the scope of holy rectification.35 What was required was a bit of a light 
touch; and to that end, missionary appointees to the imperial retinue could use their 
positions to try and encourage the Chinese back to their purported roots. Michael Keevak 
has argued that the Eurocentricity of the narrative surrounding it may explain the stele's 
34. See Michael Keevak, The Story of a Stele: China's Nestorian Monument and its Reception in the West, 
1625-1916 (61). Keevak is concerned with the importance of the Nestorian Stele to Western thought, but he 
gives a good overview of Kircher's extract as it came to find a home within Nieuhof's travelogue.
35. See Blue (61-62); Sun (9).
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appeal to Europeans: “The [Nestorian Stele] was a self-interested point of access that 
appealed to readers because it was so 'Western,' even if in a larger context it was little 
more than an obscure piece of eighteenth-century limestone from a very brief moment 
when Christianity (in some form or another) had managed to gain a degree of official 
acceptance” (61). Building on Keevak's thought, perhaps the stele implied a universality to
Christianity that comforted Europeans because it folded China back into a Western 
cosmological schema, without challenging any notion that European forms of Christianity 
were indeed the purest ones. 
However, Kircher does depart from his religious agenda to treat of China more 
generally. On the whole, Kircher's ethnographic chapters are dense, detailed, and well-
studied, if occasionally possessed by a tendency to wander. His eighth chapter, for 
instance, “Of the Correction of the Chinese Calendar, and how much Good redounded 
from thence,” begins with a discussion of the Chinese obsession for exact calendars – 
“without which they justly believ'd, that neither the Actions of Princes, or Histories of any 
Age could methodically be compos'd” (383). Kircher describes how this typically Chinese 
obsession, considered in relation to their outdated means of actually keeping time, paved 
the way for the introduction of astronomically advanced missionaries into the imperial 
court. This sort of critique would not be out of place in Nieuhof (or Macartney or 
Houckgeest). Kircher's account, however, ends many pages later with a series of cultural 
observations culminating, somewhat abruptly, in an unexpected discussion of Chinese 
concepts of beauty. There, Kircher relates how the practice of foot binding is a 2,800-year-
old tradition to the Chinese, taken from the example of an ancient empress of celebrated 
elegance and allure, and since justified largely on those grounds (although he notes as 
well that some have told him that foot-binding was also valued for rendering wives unable 
to leave the private sphere to which they'd been consigned). Although Kircher is as 
interested in Chinese scientific and technological achievement as any of our other 
diplomats, and I think as beholden to scientistic measures of cultural sophistication, his 
treatments of this topic are less systematic, and his overall observations on China more 
miscellaneous.
Nonetheless, the China Illustrata was a closely observed and well-written assay of 
numerous aspects of Chinese culture, and stocked with rich visual media as well; by the 
time of Nieuhof's publication it had already found its reputation – so any new publication 
that aimed for similar status might well have been considered remiss not to acknowledge 
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it.36 And acknowledge it Ogilby does; circling back to the beginning of this chapter, we will 
recall here how self-consciously, in his first paragraphs, Nieuhof inserts his travelogue into 
a larger, and grandiose, tradition of learning. Perhaps building from this foundation, or 
perhaps again merely intuiting a marketing opportunity, Ogilby's incorporation of Kircher 
into Nieuhof's work, by literally connecting Nieuhof's text to that of one of the foremost 
intellects of the age, performs Nieuhof's insertion at the formal level. And so doing, evinces
a scientistic concern for the credibility of Nieuhof's travelogue that we will find paralleled, 
more emphatically, in the numerous paratexts that accompany Houckgeest's text. Kircher's
addition to Nieuhof also overtly helps to develop the encyclopedic quality of the latter 
travelogue. Kircher's excerpt ends with a few lines from the publisher that indicate exactly 
this:
Those that are earnest to make further scrutiny in quest of all these wonderful 
Relations, may resort to the Author himself, and to those in his Quotations; for 
this we thought a sufficient Appendix to the Dutch Embassy, the one seeming 
better to Illustrate the other, many of the same concerns being handled in both.
(431)
Incidentally, this concern for the intellectual validity of An Embassy from the East India 
Company implies a somewhat greater consciousness on the part of premodern reading 
audiences of the difference between verisimilitude and factuality than the freely-
plagiarizing tendencies of many travel book publishers might at first indicate. So perhaps 
Kircher's text was simply too well known by the time of Nieuhof's publication to be 
plagiarized discreetly. Either way, a care has been taken here, both in the adjoining of 
Kircher's work to Nieuhof's, and in its conscientious attribution to Kircher, that suggests 
that the larger travelogue thus composed was intended as a scholarly endeavour. One 
very much designed to withstand even, in its own words, the closest “scrutiny” of its 
sceptical readers. This gesture, when considered in context of the various other 
deferences to scientism within Nieuhof's travelogue, helps to make (if not actually settle) 
the case for scientism being, even in the mid-17th century, an important ideological 
component of the Dutch cultural imaginary, and not a solely Nieuhoffian trait.
And indeed, it must be mentioned that not everyone in the mid-17th century held 
science, or “natural philosophy” as it was often called at this time, in very high regard – 
36. That said, Kircher's academic reputation was by no means beyond reproach, and while his China 
Illustrata was widely acknowledged a valuable work, opinions differed as to his efforts in other fields. See 
Thijs Weststeijn, “Vossius' Chinese Utopia,” (211-212).
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some distrusted it outright. “But what reasonable sort of argument could possibly be 
made,” the modern reader asks, amusedly, bemusedly, or both, “against science?” 
And that is an excellent question. Enter: Sir William Temple.
Chapter Three: Sir William Temple, the Anti-hof
The same faculty of reason which gives mankind the great advantage and 
prerogative over the rest of creation, seems to make the greatest default of 
human nature; and subjects it to more troubles, miseries, or at least disquiet of 
life, than any other of its fellow creatures; 'tis this furnishes us with such variety 
of passions, and consequently of wants and desires, that none other feels; and 
these followed by infinite designs and endless pursuits, and improved by that 
restlessness of thought which is natural to most men, give him a condition of life
suitable to that of his birth; so that he alone is born crying, he lives complaining,
and dies disappointed. (Temple, Upon the Gardens of Epicurus, 3)
So, with great cheer, does Sir William Temple begin his famous essay “Upon the Gardens 
of Epicurus; or of Gardening in the Year 1685.” An extended and sophisticated meditation 
upon the relationship between human and nonhuman masquerading as a gardener's 
manual, Temple's essay, even down to its tone, epitomizes the esteem and social 
significance of the aristocratic gardener in early modern Europe. What today would be 
called landscape design – as opposed to the brute work of rooting about the soil itself, 
trenching and planting according to the garden master's grand plan – was in the 17 th 
century an occupation of considerable prestige. And so, as Wybe Kuitert (2013) explains, 
was the literary discourse that sprung up around it. Kuitert's research demonstrates how, 
in the 17th century, “in the Netherlands... the discourse on gardening became an 
intellectual's pastime at the level of writing poetry,” while “in England, it evolved into a 
genteel, at times political, field for proposing elevated statements, sometimes quite 
pompous or full of scathing understatement addressed at literary or other adversaries” 
(170). Consequently, acclaimed gardeners, and gardening discoursers, like Temple, found 
themselves granted a sort of celebrity amongst the lettered. Their ability to apply their 
knowledge of plant growth and the seasons to bend raw nature to meet prevailing human 
aesthetics was treated as an enormous, and gentlemanly, accomplishment. And this, not 
despite, but because of nature's immensity and unfathomability, Temple at least took as 
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license for a certain level of philosophical speculation upon mankind's role in the greater 
scheme of nature. Certainly, Temple writes with the breezy authority of a man who expects
to be taken seriously – and taken seriously he was, not just as a diplomat, but as a public 
intellectual (Blue, 64-65). And it is worth taking him seriously still. Especially, I propose, as 
a counterpoint to Nieuhof, whose enthusiastic embrace of the burgeoning field of “natural 
philosophy” structures and permeates his travelogue. Temple's notably divergent strain of 
thought on this same topic, and also his views on China and travel generally, we shall 
presently explore, by consideration of, as they become pertinent, three of Temple's best 
known and most influential works: “Upon the Gardens of Epicurus,” “An Essay upon 
Ancient and Modern Learning,” and “Of Heroic Virtue.” 
From the first paragraph of “Upon the Gardens of Epicurus” (quoted above) Temple 
presents man's relationship to nature as fraught and essentially “disappointing.” Born with 
a self-awareness that separates him from the rest of the denizens of earth, humanity alone
enjoys the exquisite pain of reflection. His “faculty of reason” curses him with a refinement 
of “passions... wants and desires” whose complicated delicacy makes satisfaction difficult 
at best. No comparable nonhuman experience exists. Thus does Temple establish nature 
from the get-go as an imposing archetype – tall and forbidding – looming inscrutably over 
a humanity that it seems neither to cherish nor favour, but whose fate it administers. 
This is no exaggeration. Humanity, Temple explains, began simply: men “lived by 
the hour, or by the day, and satisfied their appetite with what they could get from the herbs,
the fruits, the springs they met when they were hungry or dry” (4). From these vegetal 
origins, man learned to cull from the animal realm; and after chancing to come upon more 
than was immediately needed, learned to set aside his extra, so inventing the concept of 
wealth. “From such small beginnings,” Temple laments, “have grown such vast and 
extravagant designs of poor mortal men” (5). Temple attributes to these natural and yet 
somehow fundamentally faulty origins the rises and subsequent inevitable falls of the 
“Assyrian kings... Caliphs of Egypt” and even “the latter part of the lives of Scipio, Lucullus,
Augustus, Diocletian.” This ambivalence towards nature is in fact one of the hallmarks of 
Temple's thought. He remarks tartly of the study of nature that: “I know no advantage 
mankind has gained by the progress of natural philosophy during so many ages it has had 
vogue in the world, excepting always, and very justly, what we owe to mathematics.” 
Mathematics he sets aside as both the apparent source of “all that seems valuable among 
the civilized nations,” and further, as that study which seems to divide the elite nations 
from “those we call barbarous.” (9). Temple's comments overall give an indication that the 
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mathematical representation of transcendent natural laws so taken for granted today – 
particularly in studies like physics and chemistry – was not yet a commonplace, or was at 
least still at a nascent level of development. Given the early state of scientific endeavour in
the mid-17th century, perhaps Temple can be forgiven this.37 But his tirade is fascinating 
because from this point, just where it might be expected to end, it in fact only gathers 
steam.
The lot of man 
“How ancient this natural philosophy has been in the world is hard to know” (9-10), 
Temple writes in “Upon the Gardens.” King Solomon he conjectures as the first to “[find] 
out the vanity” (10) of natural law – “of which discovery he has left such admirable strains 
in Ecclesiastes.” For Temple, Solomon's virtue lies in how his study of “the book of nature” 
leads him to the moral precepts that make up Ecclesiastes – a book which, for all its 
meanderings, concludes decisively on the pre-eminent importance of humankind's need to
prostrate itself before an ultimately unknowable and all-powerful God. Just the opposite of 
the disposition of scientism towards the nonhuman world. It is the fundamental premise of 
scientific endeavour, after all, that nature can be known, and from its study the 
transcendent laws that govern its actions discovered. But for Temple, the viability of this 
premise is yet undecided. In “On Ancient and Modern Learning,” he makes his position 
clearer: 
There is nothing new in Astronomy to vye with the Ancients, unless it be the 
Copernican System; nor in Physick, unless Hervey's Circulation of the blood. 
But whether either of these be modern discoveries, or derived from old 
Fountains, is disputed: Nay, it is so, too, whether they are true (25). 
And if they are true, Temple adds, they have “made no change in the conclusions” of either
field (25-26). This scepticism towards science's potential to meaningfully advance human 
knowledge of the world, in as well lettered and respected a contemporary of Nieuhof's as 
Temple, rather dramatically throws Nieuhof's quite different stance into relief. 
The foundation for Temple's scepticism of science seems to be largely two-fold. On 
the one hand, he doubts the human capacity to press (at any rate quickly) beyond the 
37. Although, then again, perhaps not: C.B. Macpherson, in “William Temple, Political Scientist?,” an essay 
meant to shore up the evidence for Temple's amenability to inductive reasoning, states flatly that Temple 
“ignored whole tracts of contemporary scientific activity” (42).
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boundaries of natural philosophy as they stood during his day – without, that is, the 
sacrifice of other forms of knowledge. And secondly, comprising the most idiosyncratic 
aspect of his critique, Temple believes that what must be traded away to allow for greater 
knowledge of nature is ultimately far more important than anything science could ever 
provide in recompense. Regarding this first of these points, Temple speaks in his “On 
Ancient and Modern Learning” of the “little grain of Intellect or Good Sense” that men 
“bring with them into the World” at birth, and which “may be improved or impaired in some 
degree by accidents of Education, of Study, and of Conversation or Business,” but yet 
“cannot go beyond the reach of its Native Force, no more than Life can beyond the period 
to which it was destined by the strength or weakness of the seminal Vertue” (18). This idea
is not in the end so controversial: it is taken for granted today that differing genetic 
possibilities – the modern iteration of Temple's “seminal Vertue” – are variously gifted to 
humans at birth, and that these potentialities environment then acts upon to develop or 
not. But Temple is unusual in finally concluding that it is possible that the study of ancient 
knowledge may hinder the natural inventiveness of gifted men (18).38 
The value of natural philosophy
And this is perhaps the most interesting of Temple's critiques of natural philosophy 
– certainly, it is the most surprising. Temple asserts that the study of natural philosophy is 
detrimental to humanity because it distracts men from the superior study of moral 
philosophy. Returning to “Upon the Gardens,” we find Temple summarizing of Solomon, 
Socrates, and Marcus Antoninus that:
And indeed, whoever reads with thought what... [these men] have said upon the
vanity of all that mortal man can ever attain to know of nature, in its originals or 
operations, may save himself a great deal of pains, and justly conclude, that the
knowledge of such things is not in our game; and (like the pursuit of a stag by a 
little spaniel) may serve to amuse and to weary us, but will never be hunted 
38. Although he does not discuss Temple specifically, Earl Wasserman's “Nature Moralized: The Divine 
Analogy in the Eighteenth Century” (1953) is a useful reference here. In it, Wasserman traces the rise and 
fall of the “universal analogy” – by which moral laws can be deduced from the study of God's physical world 
– in 18th century thought. Wasserman at one point quotes George Turnbull: "...tho' natural philosophy be 
commonly distinguished from the moral; all the conclusions in natural philosophy, concerning the order, 
beauty, and perfection of the material world, belong properly to moral philosophy... In reality, when natural 
philosophy is carried so far as to reduce phenomena to good general laws, it becomes moral philosophy" 
(51). Writing in the early mid-18th century, a generation after Temple's death, Turnbull seems to reconcile 
moral and natural philosophy in a way that does not yet give up God's (holy) ghost; his view of the double-
sidedness of natural and moral philosophy is a fascinating contrast to Temple's dichotomous view.
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down. Yet I think those three I have named, may justly pass for the wisest 
triumvirate that are left us upon the records of story or of time. (10)
There is a lot to parse in this comment. Most broadly, of course, it (almost superfluously) 
supports our previous claim that Temple was no friend to the field of natural philosophy, 
which knowledge he believes is simply “out of our game” as human beings. But it is 
Temple's way of characterizing this argument that makes his thought a useful contrast to 
scientism. Large, elusive, and elegant, nature's “originals or operations” are a stag that 
easily outbounds the “little spaniel” of mankind's intellect. Note here how Temple does not 
figuratively remove humanity from the natural realm, but casts us instead as a lesser 
member of its cohort; a tiny, jumping thing, which can find amusement and weariness in 
pursuit of the understanding of nature, but never at last succeed in the catch. Framing his 
argument in zoomorphic terms, Temple asserts a transcendent natural hierarchy even as 
he denies humanity's ability to decipher its nuances. We should hear certain echoes of 
Christian theology in this, surely, especially following the explicit mention of King Solomon 
and Ecclesiastes. The acceptance of human limitation in the face of an unimaginably great
and complex higher power is, as before mentioned, a distinctly ecclesiastical theme. But it 
is noteworthy that Temple doesn't pin his metaphor to any overtly theological argument, 
nor does he here set humanity aside from the rest of nature as its divinely appointed 
steward. The balance of power Temple portrays between nature and humanity in no way 
favours the latter term.
Temple continues on to make a canvass of philosophy's great names, explaining in 
detail how “all the different schemes of nature that have been drawn of old, or of late, by 
Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Descartes, or Hobbes, or any other that I know of...” converge 
finally in their futility, “and seem more or less probable one than another, according to the 
wit and eloquence of the authors and advocates that raise or defend them” (11). All of 
these different conceptions of nature are just “rover shots, some nearer and some further 
off, but all at a great distance from the mark; it may be, none in sight” (11-12). Natural 
philosophy, institutionalized science's direct European precursor, was for Temple a field 
that promised objective and concrete truths, but provided only rhetoric. His grasp of the 
discursive nature of “truth” remains admirable today, even if we fault him for his 
unfamiliarity with or low opinion of scientific inquiry. It is useful to recall here Macpherson, 
whose full quote, noted in part above, runs: “while Temple ignored whole tracts of 
contemporary scientific activity and did not appreciate the nature of some of the 
outstanding discoveries of his day, he was at least not hostile to the inductive method 
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which was the essence of the new science” (42).39 And that much is indeed true; but it is 
also true that Temple's thought processes and his opinions of this “new science” were not 
nearly sympathetic enough to portray him as a scientist himself in anything but, perhaps, 
the broadest sense. Temple himself, unfortunately, doesn't address this latter point in 
“Upon the Gardens of Epicurus,” gracefully shifting topics instead, from the sad state of 
disagreement amongst philosophy's great men over fundamental natural tenets, to an 
arena which he finds more agreeable in every sense: moral philosophy.  
In Temple's own words:
Yet in the midst of these and many other disputes and contentions in their 
natural philosophy, they seem to agree much better in their moral; and upon 
their inquiries after the ultimate end of man, which was his happiness, their 
contentions or differences seemed to be rather in words, than in the sense of 
their opinions, or in the true meaning of their several authors or masters of their 
sects: all concluded that happiness was the chief good, and ought to be the 
ultimate end of man; that as this was the end of wisdom, so wisdom was the 
way to happiness. The question then was, in what this happiness consisted? 
(12)
Working backwards from this gracefully limned big picture, Temple proceeds to consider 
the differences in how his various great men have answered the question of “in what 
happiness consists.” But for our current purpose, what stands out here is Temple's sharp 
distinction between the usefulness of moral as opposed to natural philosophy. He 
addresses the latter only to list its faults; the former he discusses at length, to uncover, for 
example, the hidden sympathies between Stoic and Epicurean thought. The first make the 
“pleasure of virtue” man's greatest happiness, whereas the second make “the greatest 
pleasure to consist in virtue,” with Temple concluding that “the difference between these 
two seems not easily discovered” (12). And during his subsequent gloss of these 
superficially opposed sects, Temple lets slip a small phrase that, as it turns out, is 
essential to understanding his approach to the natural world. Temple admires that, at their 
39. Macpherson continues: “[W]hen he was contemptuous of modern scientific experiments and projects it 
was because he believed they were not useful” (43). Unfortunately, and as Macpherson himself amply 
documents, Temple so frequently and thoroughly did not think “modern scientific experiments and projects” 
were useful that Macpherson, in light of his subject's own words, is constantly put to pains qualifying his 
assessment of Temple as possessing “the attitude of the scientists” even just as a political thinker (44). This 
scrupulousness is honourable, but Macpherson only succeeds in demonstrating Temple's method as being, 
as he puts it, “indolent inductive” (46) – which is to say that, even in political matters, at his most inductive, 
Temple was an inconsistent proto-political scientist whose evidence was “very loosely handled and not 
subjected to any critical scrutiny of historical evidence.” Ultimately, and despite his claim that some of 
Temple's theories “appear to be reached inductively from analysis of a wide range of relevant material,” 
Macpherson's case seems overblown (40).
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best, both the Stoics and Epicureans “neither... dispute life with the fears of death, nor 
death with the desires of life; but in both, and in all things else... follow nature” (13). 
Mastery of nature is not Temple's ideal; nor is the penetration of its deepest mysteries – 
where this does not lead to practical application – his goal. They are wastes of time. The 
virtue of the ancient philosophers, rather, lies in the extent to which they common 
sensically advocated working with and not against natural rhythms and impulses.
The superiority of moral philosophy
But this assertion again begs the question of just how Temple intends his audience 
to respond to his ambivalent concept of “nature” – which term we have now seem him use 
to refer both to the savagery of humankind's original conditions, and, approvingly, as the 
basis of classical philosophy's flowering. Kuitert too notes an ambivalence in Temple's 
conception of nature, even at the level of his garden aesthetics, explaining that Temple 
“struggled with the reconciliation of irregularity and prescribed Vitruvian geometrics in 
garden design” (169). Kuitert then quotes a particularly vague passage out of “Upon the 
Gardens of Epicurus” in which Temple, having praised gardens of “regular” form, proceeds
to make the qualification that, “there may be other Forms, wholly irregular, that may, for 
ought I know, have more Beauty than any of the others” (169). Temple argues that out of 
“many disagreeing parts” a yet harmonious, “agreeable” whole may be, by nature or 
human art, sometimes formed. Kuitert uses this quote, as Temple himself does, as the 
starting point for explicating Temple's concept of sharawadgi, which he describes as a 
Chinese-derived aesthetic concept founded on the appreciation of balanced asymmetry. 
The finer points of the sharawadgi aesthetic aside, Kuitert's example helps demonstrate 
that in several dimensions of his thought on the natural world, Temple grappled with an 
ambivalence that he eventually, if not always clearly, reconciled.
The key to deciphering his apparently self-contradictory views of nature at the 
philosophical level – and indeed, to better understanding even his garden aesthetics – 
comes in Temple's essay “Of Heroic Virtue,” which sees Temple take temporary leave of 
his beloved Occidental philosophers to try his luck in the East. “Section II” of the essay 
treats exclusively of China. In it, he writes approvingly of the most ancient of China's 
heroes, Fuho, that he “reduced [the pre-historical Chinese] from the common original lives 
of mankind, introduced agriculture, wedlock, distinction of sexes by different habits, laws, 
orders of government,” and also invented the first Chinese writing system (321-322). His 
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use of the word “reduce” here is unexpected and idiosyncratic. Its generally negative 
valence jars against the context in which he has used it. Is this simple carelessness? 
Surely not – Temple was too masterful a writer. Rather, his usage superficially suggests 
that mankind's evolution from the “common original” state of pre-civilization towards 
gentler living was, at least for the Chinese – and despite Temple's subsequent list of the 
varied and virtuous inventions Fohu gifted upon the Chinese – an exchange. Physis for 
Nomos. Humanity, it seems, only became a spaniel nipping at the heels of Nature by 
trading away its original wolfishness. But by giving up the “original life” granted by nature, 
humanity was able to move past savagery to the order of civilization. Here, for perhaps the
first time, do we find a conceit in Temple's thought reminiscent of scientism's 
dichotomization of human and nature. But whereas scientism predicates its conceptual 
divide on the latent human capacity to understand and consequently control the 
nonhuman natural world, Temple seems to predicate his on the impossibility of civilized 
order developing in a wholly natural context – that is, he seems to.
But what then do we make of Temple's enthusiastic paraphrase of Confucius' 
teachings that the sage's “chief principle” was that “every man ought to study and 
endeavour the improving and perfecting of his own natural reason to the greatest height 
he is capable, so as he may never (or as seldom as can be) err and swerve from the law 
of nature” (323-324)? How can the nature whose savagery humankind needed to leave 
behind be the same nature whose “law” determined the course of a best-lived life amongst
Epicureans, Stoics, and Confucians alike? To use a delightfully appropriate metaphor for a 
gardener-philosophe: it is a matter of growth. It is not that humanity's earliest conditions 
were inherently deplorable – but to have remained in such a state would have been. Frank
Herriot's archaic but still insightful essay on Temple's political thought too emphasizes this 
tendency:
[Temple] grasps clearly the fundamental idea that underlies all law and 
institutions, namely, that they are a growth, an evolution. Modern society and 
government arose, he tells us, not from any self-conscious act or determination 
but as the result of an unconscious bending to conditions and surroundings. Its 
structural formation is moulded, modified, and directed by circumstances, by 
situation, by climate, by innumerable minute but character-shaping forces. He 
discerns... the subtle but powerful influence of soil, scenery, physical 
environment, of food stuffs even, upon the physical, intellectual and moral 
energies and character of a people. (33)
Herriot's reading stresses Temple's placement of human civilization onto a spectrum 
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alongside humanity's “natural state.” Civilization, that is, is everywhere in the world and in 
all its local forms the regional expression of a universal and natural human impetus. Or in 
other words, “The State is the embodiment in law and the mechanism of administration of 
the social, gregarious instincts of men” (43) as fitted to a specific environment. It is to this 
end that Temple theorises the beginning of religion, in “Of Heroic Virtue,” as stemming 
from the post-mortem deification of the first great men. Those men “who were the first 
inventors of arts generally received and applauded as most necessary or useful to human 
life,” and specifically those who introduced “civil government.” We shall return to this 
quote, but for the moment it is worth noting that these men, in the context of Temple's 
conception of the non-dichotomous relationship between nature and civilization, were 
great not for saving humanity from nature, but exactly for embodying the impulse towards 
civilization with which nature had imbued humanity. So doing, they were able to usher 
humankind from “savage and brutish lives to the safety and convenience of societies, the 
enjoyment of property, the observance of orders, and the obedience of laws; which were 
followed by security, plenty, civility, riches, industry, and all kinds of arts” (Of Heroic Virtue, 
306). Growth, improvement, the pursuit of (specifically moral and civic) perfection: 
cultivation is the lot of man. His greatest gift, his greatest burden, and his natural legacy. 
This explains both Temple's inconsistent characterizations of nature, and his superficially 
incompatible claims that it is both in man's best interest to follow “the law of nature” but yet
a waste of time to study natural philosophy. The study of natural philosophy, for Temple, is 
often superfluous because it does not actually cultivate in humanity humanity's greatest 
gift – the potential for a virtuous civic life. Rather, study of the laws that govern mere 
matter is only justifiable to the extent that its fruits prove “necessary or useful to human 
life.” But these will always be subordinate to the study of morality, which alone directly 
refines that moral sense, or at least impulse towards morality, that has been granted 
humanity alone of creation.
Maryanne Cline Horowitz (1974) might describe this impulse, which Temple terms 
the “little grain of Intellect or Good Sense” that all men are born with, as man's “seminal 
reason.” In her discussion of the primary motifs of Stoic thought, Horowitz unpacks what 
she calls the “unit-idea” of the seed, and its relation to “seminal reason” and “seminal 
virtue” (the latter of which terms Temple uses himself):  
An important development in the concept of seminal reason is its use in 
explaining how man can become virtuous. Logos means the reason of the 
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universe, the law by which things occur. A man seeking to be virtuous must 
conform himself to this law. How does man come to know this law? We have 
already seen that man's reason contains natural law within it, and that the 
common notions in man's reason teach the virtues of goodness, justice, and 
wisdom. Reason, in the universe and in man, is also called "seminal reason." 
From the concept spermatikos logos comes the concept semina virtutis, seeds
of virtue existing in man, and the phrase semina scientiae, seeds of 
knowledge. This phrase, in both its versions, is scattered throughout Stoic 
writing. A Greek fragment states: 'By nature, we are all born with the seeds of 
virtue.... We must develop them with learning of virtue.' Within man is the 
potentiality for virtue, a potentiality that must be developed in learning. (12)
Horowitz' painstaking explication of Stoic thought, although not addressed to Temple or his
writings, illuminates them beautifully. The spermatikos logos is the natural law that not only
orders the universe, but lives in men's souls as the “little grain of Intellect or Good Sense” 
in Temple's “On Ancient and Modern Learning.” In “Of Heroic Virtue,” he deems it “natural 
reason”; in both cases, he refers to a human potential for reason that makes possible, 
when it is properly cultivated, a civilized and virtuous life. And it is just such cultivation that 
Temple finds in the best teachings of all of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Confucians. 
But further, this understanding of the divine origin and natural latency of reason 
helps us to better understand Temple's theorisation of the rise of society in “Of Heroic 
Virtue.” As Horowitz describes the Stoic world-view: “Containing within himself a part of 
God, man contains within himself the law of nature, for God is the law of nature. Man thus 
has direct access to natural law, which contains the precepts of moral behaviour” (15). 
This assertion certainly seems consonant with Temple's aforementioned valorisation of the
“convenience of societies, the enjoyment of property, the observance of orders, and the 
obedience of laws,” which he tacitly endorses by noting that these are the prerequisites to 
“security, plenty, civility, riches, industry, and all kinds of arts” (306). All things which, just a 
page later, Temple describes as arising from the “virtues” of great men (Of Heroic Virtue, 
307). Note that comprehensive understanding of the workings of nature seems, by modern
standards, conspicuously absent from the list. And while Herriot asserts that the 
development of civilization in humankind is given as an “unconscious” process in Temple's
thought, in “Of Heroic Virtue” Temple in fact strongly implies that this process is the result 
of deliberate action taken by heroic men. Men whose ability to implement the lasting 
institutions that constitute human society implies not that they are different in kind from 
other men, but different in quality; different for having manifested the spermatikos logos – 
a virtue that yet slumbers in, but is not absent from, their fellows.
And if this reading of Temple's commentary on the primacy of moral versus natural 
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philosophy – with moral philosophy understood as the proper, even teleological end of the 
development of natural reason – does not immediately appear to relate to his idea of 
sharawadgi, it is telling that in describing that aesthetic Temple gives the following 
anecdote: “The Chineses scorn [European-like, uniform] Planting, and say a Boy that can 
tell an hundred, may plant Walks of Trees in strait Lines,” (Kuitert, 169). The Chinese, that 
is, consider the geometrical regularity characteristic of European garden design an 
immature aesthetic, masterable even by children; an opinion with which Temple's glowing 
description of sharawadgi seems to agree.40 Temple's rhetoric here again stresses the 
importance of cultivation, of growth: if simple, rigid regularity is the province of children, 
then moving past it towards the sophistication of sharawadgi is the task of the cultured 
adult. Or as Kuitert puts it: “For Temple, liking or disliking the irregular was a faculty of 
discerning, it was a judgement, which brings it to the level of intellectual, literary discourse”
(169). Sharawadgi is the aesthetic of the properly civilized man. And so, putting his money 
where his mouth is, Temple himself takes up the task of elucidating and disseminating 
sharawadgi in the West, both literarily and in his landscape designs. Designs whose break
from the strict geometry of earlier British garden forms imply the incorporation of a sense 
of conceptual progress into his aesthetic – the enactment, in the aesthetic sphere, of the 
cultivation of spermatikos logos. But even besides their convergence on the principle of 
cultivation, that Temple's aesthetics and his general moral philosophy can be read as 
mirroring one another is underscored by the fact that he finds the highest contemporary 
expressions of both, as we have seen, in China.
Reconciling Temple's natures
  
So the “nature” that underlies both Temple's aesthetics and his more general 
understanding of humanity's place in the larger world, it turns out, is more coherent and 
more consistent than it at first seems. Its overriding principal is the progression from 
immature simplicity (figured in different contexts as both regular geometric garden design, 
and the barbarous state of pre-civilized humanity) towards cultured sophistication (the 
delicate irregularity of sharawadgi; the refinements, comforts, and moral achievements of 
40. Surprisingly, Houckgeest – whose observation on this point is striking exactly because it is not a regular 
topic of his – seems, a century after Temple, to confirm this dichotomy. He writes of Chinese garden 
aesthetics that “[e]verything is disposed according to a system in which art seems to hide herself in the midst
of the irregularities of nature... [which] compose a scene that seems due to chance alone” (vol. II, 138). 
Houckgeest finds no strict geometries in a Chinese garden, and to him it is a novel “system” of “art.”
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civilization). Placed into the company of Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest, Temple 
instantly stands out for conceiving of a nature that is not scientistically inflected. In fact, it 
is this distinct lack of scientistic inflection that characterises the tone of Temple's actual 
gardening advice, once he very eventually gets around to it in “Upon the Gardens of 
Epicurus.” 
He does not rush to do so. First, Temple must skip down several other tangents: 
who designed Western history's first recorded gardens, and for what reason, and where, 
and what the differences amongst these were. Then there are many lectures to give on the
fruits and flowers that records suggest were being kept in these ancient gardens. But 
notably absent in all this is any scientistic obsession with quantification. Lists of species 
are given, yes, but they are less genuinely taxonomical than, say, Nieuhof's notes on 
Chinese flora. Where Nieuhof aims at adding to Western knowledge by the creation of a 
comprehensive document of Chinese species, Temple's essay focuses on addressing the 
particular species listed in various pre-existing horticultural documents. That is, Temple's 
specimens are presented in the context of the histories of their discovery and cultivation; 
they are a scholarly response to a Western tradition of gardening literature, rather than a 
systematic accounting of botanical life per se.41 This approach sets Temple's essay quite 
apart from the botanical assays of Nieuhof or Macartney. But ultimately, the actual 
horticultural histories and advice in “Upon the Gardens of Epicurus” are less germane to 
my argument than the overarching dichotomization of moral and natural philosophy that 
characterises them. What was explicit in Temple's discussion of moral philosophy is 
present here, stylistically, in his horticultural historiography. This, if nothing else, at least 
demonstrates that the scientism that characterises Nieuhof's An Embassy from the East 
India Company was in no wise the only or even dominant line of contemporary thinking on 
that field, natural philosophy, that as it grew in esteem and institutional clout, would come 
to play such an important role in shaping Western European conceptions of China.
The value of travel
But before moving to Temple's own conceptions of China, it is worth mentioning one
other area, aside from natural philosophy, where Temple markedly departs from 
Nieuhoffian views. In “On Ancient and Modern Learning,” Temple addresses the topic of 
41. See for instance his detailed discussion of the “Mala Aurea,” which Temple explains was commonly 
taken in the writings of Virgil to refer to oranges; Temple disagrees with this interpretation (30-31).
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travel as a mode of learning. A starker contrast to Nieuhof – whose enthusiastic advocacy 
of the benefits that world travel has made to human knowledge we have already seen him 
posit as the premier justification for his own travelogue – can hardly be imagined. Temple, 
writing from a pointedly Western European vantage, quips that improvements to the 
science of navigation have: 
[I]ntroduced into our Acquaintance... great Increases of Wealth and Luxury, but 
none of Knowledge... further than the Extent and scituation of Country, the 
customs and manners of so many original Nations, which we call Barbarous, and 
I am sure have treated them as if we hardly esteem them to be a part of Mankind.
(28) 
If Temple's defence of the common humanity of Europeans and so many “Nations, which 
we call Barbarous,” is unexpected, striking the modern reader as progressive, his 
minimization of the non-economic effects of travel upon Europe seems hopelessly 
outdated. It seems quixotic, even, predicated as it is upon his romanticisation of Ancient 
Greece and Rome. With pompous certainty, Temple avers that, living as they did in an age
“when Knowledge and Fame were in as great Request as endless Gains and Wealth are 
among us now,” the ancient Greeks and Romans would have drawn from these same 
exotic lands such superior wisdom that it is literally unimaginable anymore (28). Setting 
aside the unfalsifiability of Temple's claim – which boils down, really, to an indictment of 
the materialism of his own age – what we are left with is a clear example of an attitude 
towards travel that direct opposes Nieuhof's.
The Chinese challenge to Biblical chronology – and speaking of China... 
 
Temple was also quite familiar with the predominantly Jesuit body of European 
writings on China extent in his day, and with the controversies that abounded in early 
Sinological discourse. He gives, for example, a history of missionary presence in China in 
“On Heroic Virtue”: 
Since [Marco Polo's] time, and within two or three hundred years, several 
missionary friers and jesuits have, upon devotion or command of their superiors,
pierced with infinite pains and dangers through these vast and savage regions...
and arrived at Peking. (314) 
And yet, centuries of European surveillance of Chinese history span only a comparative 
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moment of its length. Temple is certain that Chinese records go back at least 4000 years, 
to the time of the aforementioned Fuho, observing that “the progress [of the Chinese' 
historical records] has ever since continued so clear, that they are esteemed by the 
missionary jesuits unquestionable and infallible” (On Heroic Virtue, 321). In “On Ancient 
and Modern Learning,” he elaborates this point, touching upon one of the most important 
ramifications of China's record-keeping:
[I]t may be asserted with great Evidence that, though we know little of the 
Antiquities of India beyond Alexander's time, yet those of China are the oldest 
that any where pretend to any fair Records: For these are agreed by the 
Missionary Jesuits to extend so far above Four Thousand Years, and with such 
Appearance of clear and undeniable Testimonies, that those Religious Men 
themselves, rather than question their Truth by finding them contrary to the 
vulgar Chronology of the Scripture, are content to have recourse to that of the 
Septuagint, and thereby salve the Appearances in those Records of the 
Chineses. (12-13)
The challenge that the Chinese people's extensive native histories posed to Biblical 
chronology has been discussed closely by Blue, who provides useful context here. Blue 
introduces the topic in his “China and western social thought in the modern period” by 
quoting Edward Van Kley's famous assertion from “Europe's 'Discovery' of China, and the 
writing of world history” (1971) that “'perhaps the most serious challenge to the traditional 
scheme of world history and the factor most instrumental in changing that scheme was the
discovery of ancient Chinese history.'” Blue goes on to describe how, in 1659, “one year 
after publication of the Jesuit Martini's Decas sinicae historiae, the Dutch Historian Isaac 
Vossius used that work to argue that the Chinese historical annals were superior to the 
Biblical chronology and that the flood of Noah had not been universal” (62-63).42 The dates
in these lengthy annals were often enough corroborated by verifiable astronomical 
observations that Christian authors could not dismiss them out of hand (63). And as 
Temple notes, the complications they introduced to Biblical chronology forced these 
authors to “have recourse” to the Septuagint in their attempts to reconcile Biblical with 
Chinese history. None of these attempted reconciliations found unanimous approval, 
however, and debates surrounding Chinese history's challenge to Biblical chronology 
raged until well into the 18th century (Blue, 63). Outlining three major trends that ramified 
from these debates, Blue explains:
42. See also Van Kley, “Europe's Discovery of China...” (359-360).
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The first was an increasingly critical, de-sacralizing attitude towards historical 
sources, whether Biblical or Chinese. The second was a skeptical readiness to 
treat the fabulous as myth. A third trend, one that came to mark the entire early 
Enlightenment, was a relativization of Western historical experience and in 
particular an acceptance of the restricted validity of Judeo-Christian culture. (63)
The effect of Chinese record keeping upon not just Western Biblical chronology, but 
Western attitudes towards the accuracy of its own histories cannot be underestimated. 
Temple demonstrates that this challenge had already registered in the mid-17 th century; its 
ramifications were beginning to snowball. And a century later, as Van Kley asserts: 
A mid-eighteenth-century historian might question or reject parts of ancient 
Chinese history and chronology; he might doubt the virtues and wonders of 
Chinese civilization described by the Jesuits; but it had become exceedingly 
difficult for him to ignore Chinese history. And for many writers the inclusion of 
ancient Chinese history had seriously altered the traditional conceptions of 
universal history. (“Europe's 'Discovery' of China,” 385)
Perhaps after all there is reason to challenge Kitson's claim that the Macartney debacle 
would become Britain's defining Chinese trauma. Centuries before, China, with its long 
scholarly tradition and government of literati that had produced annals so reliable that they
could threaten even the authority of the bible, had already struck a telling blow to 
Eurocentric dreams of Christian infallibility. Not to say that it toppled them; but to properly 
contextualise the appeal of scientism's tacit promise of control-through-comprehension – 
and that, after all, is what I posit as scientism's fundamental appeal to Nieuhof, 
Houckgeest, and Macartney – it is important to recall the significant anxieties that the 
longevity of Chinese culture posed to Western European thinkers in the premodern era.  
Which brings us back to Temple. For in the face of these anxieties, Temple does not
seek, like Nieuhof, to quantify, and so imaginatively contain, China. Even the 
measurements of China's various dimensions given in “Of Heroic Virtue” are generally 
contextualised within the history of Jesuit efforts to explore the vast country, and qualified 
when he is uncertain of their precision. And even then, his discussion of China is given 
within a larger work that similarly treats several other nations. Typical of his approach is 
Temple's final paragraph on China's extent:
Whatever length it has, which by none is esteemed less than twelve or thirteen 
hundred miles, it must be allowed to be the greatest, richest, and most 
populous kingdom now known in the world; and will perhaps be found to owe its
riches, force, civility, and felicity, to the admirable constitution of its government, 
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more than any other. (319)
China's “admirable” government – and the morality-focused tradition of learning from 
which it originated – Temple later treats in much greater detail than he anywhere does its 
size or geographical particulars. Temple is more invested in Chinese culture – for instance,
tracing the contours of Confucian thought – than systematically reducing China to a series 
of neat units as our other diplomats do. On the contrary, for Temple, it is China's example 
against which all other cultures should be measured; it is irreducible to European terms 
because they are too crude by comparison to contain it. Blue too notes this impulse in 
Temple, calling him bluntly “probably the greatest of the English Sinophiles” (64), before 
quoting the diplomat's famous assertion, also from “On Heroic Virtue,” of the clear 
superiority of Chinese government to “all those imaginary schemes of the European wits, 
the institutions of Xenophon, the republic of Plato, the Utopias, or Oceanas, of our modern
writers” (Qtd. In Blue, 64).  
Even by today's standards – when effort is more routinely made not to portray the 
“rise of Western civilization” as a global inevitability – this blatant valorisation of Chinese 
over Western governmental designs seems bold in a Western writer. Temple fleshes out 
his logic in “On Ancient and Modern Learning,” where he makes the following interesting 
argument for the effect of climate upon cultural development:
Besides, I know no Circumstances like to Contribute more to the advancement 
of Knowledge and Learning among men than exact Temperance in their Races, 
great pureness of Air, and equality of Clymate, long Tranquility of Empire or 
Government: And all these we may justly allow to those Eastern Regions more 
than any others we are acquainted with, at least till the Conquests made by the 
Tartars upon both India and China in the later Centuries (15).
This quote is important on two counts. First, it supports the notion of Temple as man of 
cosmopolitan mind, who held China (and India) in high regard, not because of any stock 
he had put into fabulous tall tales, but from an apparent familiarity with their histories. But it
also, incidentally, showcases Temple's conceptualization of nature in significantly larger-
than-garden-sized terms. Temple here portrays mankind as dependent upon and delimited
by its natural environment: man cannot thrive where the material conditions for civilization 
are not optimal. Compare this with the scientistic conceit that a civilization's sophistication 
is best measured by how well it can understand and manipulate its material context, and 
suddenly the stark difference between Temple's and Nieuhof's most primal ideological 
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disposition towards the nonhuman world comes sharply into focus. China-the-empire is a 
model and paragon to Temple because of how it has learned to capitalize on China-the-
land's gifts: blessed with “pureness of Air, and equality of Clymate,” China-the-land does 
not require that the Chinese constantly battle against the elements merely to survive.43 
Liberated in this way, the Chinese have sensibly chosen to pursue moral questions instead
– to take up, essentially, the cultivation of their “little grains” as a pan-cultural practice. A 
method which, for Temple, means refraining from impractical investigations into Natural 
Whys. Two pages earlier in his essay, he has already made this latter point resoundingly, 
admiring that “...near the Age of Socrates lived their Great and Renowned Confutius, who 
began with the same design of reclaiming men from the useless and endless Speculations
of Nature to those of Morality” (13). 
Temple as foil: the Anti-hof
Extracts like these, in which Temple valorises Chinese culture, or minimizes 
“Speculations of Nature” – and occasionally, as here, both at the same time – well show 
how Temple makes an ideal foil to Nieuhof. Temple, in fact, helps us to place Nieuhof into 
a lineage of ideas that culminates in the profoundly scientistic views of Houckgeest and, 
even more so, Macartney. Indeed, juxtaposing Temple and Nieuhof helps to define the 
very boundaries of this lineage. Across the considerable breadth of his letters, from the 
history of Western gardening to the legacy of Confucius, time and again Temple 
underscores the futility of natural philosophy in relation to the immediate and practical 
import of moral philosophy; providing evidence in so doing that scientistically inflected 
approaches to non-Western peoples were not, at least in his day, a foregone conclusion. 
Chapter Four: Lord George's Adventures in Blunderland
43. It is worth noting that Temple's effusive praise of the Chinese does not – quite – rise to the level of 
romanticization. He notes, for instance, a tendency towards a general cultural “effeminacy” brought about by 
“great ease, plenty, and luxury” (333), and gives this as the cause of the Tartars having successfully invaded 
“three several” times. He is also comparatively scathing about Chinese religion, and on this topic almost 
attains actual condemnation: “The great idea which may be conceived of the Chinese wisdom and 
knowledge, as well as their wit, ingenuity, and civility, by all we either see or read of them, is apt to be 
lessened by their gross and sottish idolatry; but this itself is only amongst the vulgar or illiterate... But the 
learned adore the spirit of the world” (334-335). This is still a very tepid critique overall, and smacks more of 
classism than anything else, but is nonetheless worth noting as an example in Temple of ambivalence 
towards the Chinese.
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So far, I have close-read examples of scientistic ideology in Johan Nieuhof''s 
travelogue An Embassy from the East India Company, as Nieuhof expresses this in his 
choice of Chinese subjects, ways of describing them, and even by certain formal qualities 
of his travelogue. Then I compared his travelogue with several of the works of Sir William 
Temple, who also addresses such topics as China and the general status of natural 
philosophy – but to very different, decidedly non-scientistic ends – and by this was able to 
further throw Nieuhof's scientism into relief. I will now continue with close reading, by 
looking for a continuation of Nieuhoffian patterns in the theme and style of Lord George 
Macartney's An Embassy to China. As I eventually shall also with Houckgeest, I will here 
pursue evidence that the similarities between our primary texts point towards a shared, 
distinctly European, distinctly scientistic ideological ground – one which seems notably 
self-conscious and self-referential in Macartney and Houckgeest. 
But then, this self-consciousness might be expected of book produced during a 
period which saw science itself developed into its first literal institutions. Europe's original 
scientific society, after all, sprang up in Macartney's own backyard. King Charles II 
(possibly to Sir Temple's everlasting dismay) chartered the Royal Society of London in 
1662, with the aim of fostering the “Improvement of Natural Knowledge.” Its – and history's
– first peer-reviewed scientific journal was published three years after this, in 1665. 
There's no need to overstress here the Royal Society's symbolic importance as the first 
institutionalization of the field of natural philosophy, complete even with royal patronage; 
typically of events viewed in hindsight, its significance is now obvious – and it was only the
beginning of what was to come. Between Nieuhof's embassy in 1655 and Macartney's in 
1793, scientific ideology and methodology were together established across Western 
Europe as a bonafide and transnational institution and driving cultural force. This was a 
time of, as they are inevitably labelled, “scientific breakthroughs,” now recognized as 
fundamental to the inauguration of various fields of study. There was Anton van 
Leeuwenhoek's discovery of “animalcules” circa 1675 (which wee beasties later found 
their first broad audience, incidentally, via the Royal Society's publications); Newton's 
publication of the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica in 1687, wherein he laid 
out his famous laws of motion, and thus the foundation of physic's classical mechanics; 
Carolus Linnaeus' Systema Naturae in 1735, which in subsequent publications would 
popularize Linnaean taxonomy; Antoine Lavoisier's chemical discoveries in the 1770s and 
publication in 1787 of Méthode de Nomenclature Chimique, which introduced to the 
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fledgling science of chemistry the sense of organization that Linnaeus had brought to 
taxonomy – and these are no more than a smattering. Between Nieuhof's era and 
Macartney's, the brutal efficiency of science as a means of understanding, systematizing, 
and, in Adorno and Horkheimer's terms, imposing order upon the natural world, became 
woven into the fabric of European culture.
And these developments comprised more than just a background ambience to 
Macartney's life. As John Spence notes, Macartney himself ran in extremely well-read and 
intellectual circles. He was a Royal Society fellow himself, and a member Edmund Burke's
famous Club, where he was described by no less than Samuel Johnson as “in some 
degree a literary man” (Spence, An Embassy to China, Introduction, vii) – a phrase that 
might seem damnation by faint praise coming from anyone else, but Johnson wasn't just 
anyone else. Notably, Macartney hand-picked Sir George Staunton, his “confidential friend
and former secretary” to be the official secretary of his embassy (Barrow, 343). Staunton, 
who would author the official and first-published account of the embassy's travels in 1799, 
was also a fellow of the Royal Society – a fact Staunton advertises proudly on the 
frontispiece of his own travelogue. Several other scientists also made up Macartney's 
retinue, including a botanist, metallurgist, and mechanist (Berg, 14). And of course, we 
have already mentioned botanist, bureaucrat, and Royal Society president Sir Joseph 
Banks' involvement in orchestrating the technological espionage that formed the greatest 
covert goal of Macartney's embassy. Clingham, in his work on the cultural dissonance 
between Macartney's embassy and the Qing, writes of Macartney that “[i]n expressing his 
idea of the 'proper organization of the embassy,' Macartney situates it in the global context
of Britain’s late eighteenth-century scientific and cultural exploration” (9). Indeed, in his 
personal letters, Macartney describes his embassy as directed by his Sovereign explicitly 
“for the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge” (Clingham, 9). More pointedly, he wrote to 
Birmingham tradesman Matthew Boulton that he sought:
[A]n operative tradesman, skilled in metallurgy, who by being in the train of an 
ambassador might have opportunities of inspecting the Chinese 
manufactories, foundries etc. and of making such observations as would tend 
to improve our own & to discover the taste of the people, in order that we 
might know how best to adapt to it, the different articles in your branch for 
future exportation to China. (Berg, 14)
These biographical tidbits do not exhaust the evidence of, but are sufficient to prove 
Macartney's familiarity and engagement with the scientific community of his day. (They 
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also, of course, make blatant how central technological appropriation was to Macartney's 
mission.) 
Indeed, the clique-ish and intellectual nature of Macartney's social circle illustrates 
something vital about the premodern period: to the extent that such a thing as a pan-
European culture can even be spoken of in the 17th and 18th centuries, it was in great part 
crafted from the international correspondences and collaborations of Europe's lettered 
men. As the work of Lisa Jardine has shown, these early scientists were able to transcend 
even war in the name of discovery, and amongst them, scholarly ideas, in the form of 
treatises, letters, and books, circulated with near modern speed.44 By the time of 
Macartney's embassy at the twilight of the 18th century, the cumulative effect of these 
myriad discrete assays into various aspects of the natural world – often performed by men 
with governmental positions or connections, and membership to local scientific societies; 
that is, men of Macartney's own standing and circle – was a convergence upon the belief 
in universal scientific laws thought to account for all earthly phenomena.45 Laws which the 
scientific method could, and inarguably should uncover. And as this goal increasingly 
united disparate scientific fields, ideologically, under a single institutional umbrella, a 
scientific discourse of recognizably modern scope and authority arose. 
The British empire's standing
This discourse, which finds an early but unmistakeable expression in Nieuhof, albeit
in rudimentary form, is even more obvious in the journal of Lord George Macartney, and 
we shall examine it presently. But there is another great change that we must keep in 
mind, before shifting our critical gaze from the mid-17th to late 18th century. By the 
departure of Macartney's embassy in 1793, the economic stakes involved in China's trade 
with Western Europe had also changed. In fact, the entire hierarchy of Western European 
powers had changed, and quite dramatically. We may allow Spence to set the stage here:
Great Britain, despite its recent loss of the American colonies, had a powerful 
Eastern base in its Indian dominions, while Spanish and Portuguese strength 
was much reduced from its former glories, and the French and Dutch had seen
their commercial power decline in comparison to Britain's. The China trade 
44. See Jardin, chs. 10 and 11.
45. Drayton speaks often about individual scientists as imperial agents, but see especially chapters six and 
seven.
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already totalled close to a million pounds sterling in a year, and Macartney was
sure it had huge potentials for expansion. (An Embassy to China, xi)
By the time of Macartney and Houckgeest's embassies, the British had become the most 
powerful Western empire on earth; the Dutch were still important players on the field, but 
as Spence says, they were no longer as pre-eminent as they had been in Nieuhof's day.46  
And indeed, the general mood at the start of Macartney's mission reflected British pride in 
their position at the top of the European imperial food chain. An optimism Berg too notes: 
Macartney's company was “confident of British technological progress and commercial 
institutions,” she writes, observing that “Macartney himself wrote in his pocket book for the 
journey, that the English were ‘at this moment the first people of the world – whenever they
are out of their own country...Their generosity, the child of opulence and industry, is 
unbounded...'” (13). 
It goes without saying then that Macartney's embassy, for all its scientism, was 
officially engaged with and motivated by the imperialist goal of correcting what 
Macartney's first biographer John Barrow called Britain's “large yearly balances in favor of 
China” (Barrow, 339). Barrow substantiates Spence:
[I]t was conceived that if a new market could be opened on the northern part of 
the coast of that extensive empire, a new and increased demand for [textiles, 
lead, tin, and various minor sundries], and others not wanted in the southern 
provinces, might there be created, and thus diminish the inconvenience arising 
from the difficulty of procuring bullion. (339-340)
Barrow's statement requires little explication, but is reproduced here as a counterweight to
my previous emphasis on the scientistic influences upon and premises for Macartney's 
mission. This study, after all, means to stress that the scientism recorded in Macartney's – 
and all of our diplomats' – text(s) was always already imbricated within a matrix of other 
contemporary ideologies. That, in fact, is the point here: the scientism recorded in these 
texts helped to reinforce the imperialist aims motivating their embassies – which aims, as 
we have just seen, are also rather well documented. 
Macartney's gifts
46. For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see Patrick O'Brien, “Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise 
and Decline of the Dutch and British Economies,1585-1815.”
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Indeed, it is at just such an intersection between scientism and British imperialism 
that one finds the impetus for Macartney's embassy. An embassy that was not, in 
execution, nearly so grand or sophisticated as Macartney's testimony to the civilizing goals
of his mission might have indicated; a fact attested by the embassy's poor choice of gifts 
to the Qianlong emperor. Kitson describes the intended outcome of the embassy's tactical 
choice of gifts, as it was envisioned in the happy early days of the mission: “Confronted 
with the magnificence of British manufactures and scientific progress, it was thought that 
the Chinese could not help but be impressed” (128). Unfortunately, Macartney's gifts not 
only famously failed to whet the Chinese appetite for British wares, but hardly provoked 
any reaction at all – except in the indignant ambassador. To understand why, we may look 
to Berg's analysis of the embassy's decision to forgo presenting Qianlong with much in the
way of practical, day-to-day British manufactures, in favour of gilded automata and other 
novelties. These latter, significantly, included a certain much-ballyhooed planetarium that 
had in fact been crafted in Germany, and only decorated in Britain (17). Berg gives a 
detailed inventory of the gifts: 
The categories of mathematical, scientific and philosophical instruments 
contained numbers of microscopes, telescopes, thermometers, barometers, a 
chronometer, apothecaries’ scales, a set of diamond scales, an air pump, a gold 
watch and various astronomical instruments. The descriptions of these give as 
much detail to the mahogany, japanned and glass casings with their 
ornamentation as they do to the instruments. The category of chemical, electrical 
and philosophic apparatus contained items more immediately relevant to 
manufacturing technology. This contained chemical apparatus, bottles and 
stoppers for acids, vitreous acids and sulphuric acid, magnets and magnetic 
apparatus, portable furnaces, a foundry, fire works, electrical machines and 
engines, a portable steam engine, a model of a lock, a printing press and various 
mathematical and optical tools. This scientific apparatus dominated the goods 
taken on the Embassy. It certainly conveyed the ‘taste for science’ in Europe, but 
did it convey a close integration of science and technology? (31) 
She explains that “[t]he Embassy’s rather disorganized and even cavalier method in going 
about collecting... [examples of] British manufacture shows little of the aspirations 
conveyed in the letter of George III for transmitting the ‘arts and comforts of life’ to other 
parts of the world” (23), later remarking that “[a] German planetarium embellished by a 
luxury London jeweller and clockmaker, despite its cost and the subsequent difficulties of 
its packaging, assembly and display, was considered crucial for the Embassy; a steam 
engine was not” (27). Few images better paint the true relation of scientism to the imperial 
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goals of the Macartney embassy than the boatload of gaudy orreries and clocks that were 
meant to convey – to an emperor whose palace was very literally already glutted with them
– the distinction of the British race. Mistaking from the outset the Qing's capacity to 
distinguish gold-plated trifles from such wares as might be widely made use of – ones that,
like steam engineering, truly showcased British ingenuity – the embassy had indicated an 
underestimation of the Chinese that the Chinese did not fail to notice. Berg illustrates the 
Chinese response to another instance of British condescension with a revealing anecdote:
The Embassy made claims to the Chinese about the delicacy of the 
instruments, the length of time it would take to assemble them and the need for 
their own skilled craftsmen to get them working properly. What happened when 
the presents were being assembled, however, was that an edict was sent out 
by the Grand Council to gather ‘the most skilful Western Ocean men from the 
Halls [Churches of the missionaries in Peking] who are versed in astronomy 
and capable of repairing clocks, and bring them to Jehol.’ This and other 
documents indicate that there was in Peking a class of Western missionaries 
who could be called on by the Emperor as super craftsmen when needed. The 
Chinese officials made the point that the Embassy’s claims to superior 
craftsmen were exaggerated: “Now that the tribute Envoy has seen that there 
are also people in the Celestial Empire who are versed in astronomy, 
geography and clock-repairing, and are now helping alongside those who are 
setting up the articles, he can no longer boast that he alone has got the secret. 
Presumably he has begun to stop boasting.” (15-16)
In some ways symbolizing Macartney's mission as a whole, here the Chinese demonstrate
their mastery of Western technologies by calling upon their own European court pets, a 
symbolic exercise of power that Macartney and company, still flabbergasted by the Qing's 
refusal to bow to their technological superiority, completely fail to register – and an 
ominous sign of miscommunications to come. To be fair to Macartney, though, and at the 
risk of jumping ahead, it should be mentioned that Houckgeest's journal betrays a similar 
line of thinking. He is much less concerned overall with the Chinese reception to his 
embassy's gifts – which he never details in his journal, referring to them only as “pieces of 
mechanism” – but he does mention at one point that he thinks it “not at all improbable that 
these trifles would find a good market here,” given how much the “pieces of mechanism” in
question amused the emperor (vol. II, 48; vol. I, 199-200). But that is the extent of 
Houckgeest's speculations; compared to Macartney's obsession with the importance of his
gifts for Qianlong, Houckgeest seems strikingly nonchalant.
The journal; Tourane Bay, the Liuchiu Islands
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As for Macartney's travelogue itself: J. L. Cranmer-Byng's authoritative 1969 edition
of Macartney's journal is the most commonly available print version today. Cranmer-Byng 
based his edition off of a manuscript that began in possession of Macartney's heirs, but 
was later sold to a string of private collectors before finally ending up in Tokyo. For the 
most part, Cranmer-Byng's edition follows the version of the journal published in the 
second volume of Barrow's 1807 Some Account of the Public Life, and a Selection from 
the Unpublished Writings of, The Earl of Macartney, differing from it mostly with the 
addition of Qianlong's infamous letter to King George, and copious editorial notes of his 
own. Cranmer-Byng himself referred to Macartney's journal as “perhaps the most 
important single Chinese document for the study of Sino-Western relations between 1700 
and 1860” (qtd. in Clingham, 1). It is from the 2004 London Folio Society re-edition of 
Cranmer-Byng that I have made the current exegesis. 
Macartney's journal is ordered in a simple, chronological way, without any of 
Nieuhof's fussy regional lists. And though Clingham, who concedes that “scientific 
rationality” is “essential” to Macartney's journal, oddly finds that its “temporal exactitude, 
diplomatic niceties, and empirical realism – are nicely balanced by his openness to the 
particularities of Chinese culture” (8), I posit that the journal's scientism is not nearly so 
mild, nor Macartney's ambivalence towards the Chinese so innocuous. The former point, 
in fact, seems to develop from a distinctly Nieuhoffian precedent. There are several 
instances, even in its opening pages, at which Macartney's journal immediately recalls 
Nieuhof. Perhaps most strikingly, Macartney treats his first descriptions of geographical 
place in a manner that Nieuhof has already made us familiar with. For example, of 
Tourane Bay, in Cochin China (Da Nang in modern day Vietnam), where he met with “His 
Cochin Chinese Majesty,” Macartney notes with striking nonchalance: “The place affords a
most excellent harbour and there is a spot where a fort might be built and garrisoned at a 
small expense sufficient to withstand any attempt, against any force likely to be brought 
against it from any power of this part of the world” (3-4). Any attempt, against any force, 
from any power of this part of the world. Macartney's superlatives would seem ironically 
anxious, overdetermined, if it weren't for the breezy brevity of his description overall. He 
assesses the tactical vulnerability of Tourane Bay in a single breath, without otherwise 
remarking on its natural features, and then proceeds, again like Nieuhof, to finish his 
description with a list of its commodities. “[I]t produces excellent cinnamon, common rice 
and mountain rice in vast abundance and has many rich mines of both gold and silver, one
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of the latter at no great distance to Tourane Bay” (4). We have already seen that, in 
Nieuhof, a conquered landscape is a commodified landscape. In Macartney too this logic 
holds, for although Cochin China is not a British possession, Macartney's calculations 
indicate that it could be. His description of Tourane Bay is an act of imperial performativity 
that prepares Tourane Bay for the possibility of later conquest by weighing the value of its 
natural resources against its vulnerability to both initial conquest and post-conquest 
retention. The act is conceptual, but in outlining the direction of subsequent imperial 
action, it makes that action possible – and even if, historically, a British invasion of Tourane
Bay was never carried out, nevertheless, Macartney's passage clearly illustrates one route
by which scientific ideology can help direct imperial activity.
Such assessment of foreign lands is habitual in Macartney, and later in his journal, 
in the entry for November the 18th, he makes the same kind of analysis of the Liuchiu 
Islands (modern Ryukyu Islands). After favourably describing the manner of the Liuchiu 
ambassadors he has met in Hangchowfu, he jumps headlong – rather with the air of a 
man relieved to conclude formal pleasantries – into something like a cost-benefit analysis 
of the Liuchiu as potential trade partners:
They told me that no European vessel had ever touched their islands, but if they
should come they would be well received. There is no prohibition against 
foreign intercourse; they have a fine harbour capable of admitting the largest 
vessels not far from their capital, which is considerable in extent and population.
They raise a coarse kind of tea, but far inferior to the Chinese, and have many 
mines of copper and iron. No gold or silver mines have as yet been discovered 
among them, which may in some measure account for these islands being so 
little known. (132-133) 
To a modern audience, used to assessing the world in consumerist terms, there is perhaps
little surprising about Macartney's description. But the breeziness of its reduction of a new 
land – and people – to a list of trade resources is significant, not the least because of its 
nonchalance. Granted, as both an ambassador and representative of the East India 
Company, trade was the avowed motive for his mission; but that does not change the fact 
of the aggressive commodity-focus of Macartney's thinking, nor the reliance of that 
thinking upon scientistic quantification. As with Tourane Bay, Macartney begins with a 
description of the islands' geophysical accessibility. But the Liuchiu's alliances with both 
the Chinese and Japanese, and apparent openness to foreign trade – especially in light of 
their mediocre offerings – seem not to warrant an inventory of their vulnerabilities to 
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attack. The subtext couldn't be clearer: if the Liuchiu are only hardly worth trading with, 
they are only hardly worth knowing at all – and certainly not worth invading. And so, with 
just the faintest trace of a sneer, Macartney finishes his description with what approaches 
a bon mot, speculating archly that they'd be better known to the West if they were rich in 
anything worthwhile.
Assessing China; Nieuhoffian patterns
But Tourane Bay and the Liuchu islands are mere blips on Macartney's radar, and 
neither elicits more than a couple paragraphs. The casualness of his peculiar descriptions 
makes them interesting, but in the absence of similar assessments of China, they might 
not be very important. Macartney doesn't dally, however, in establishing this Nieuhoffian 
pattern of description relative to his true subject. With the same eye to quantification and 
demystification as his Dutch predecessor, but more aggressively deployed, Macartney, for 
example, describes Shantung province: 
The background of the province of Shantung as we sailed along it appeared 
generally barren, mountainous and rocky, but wherever we could perceive the 
smallest interval of cultivable ground it smiled under the hand of industry. We 
could not well distinguish the kinds of grain that were growing, but they seemed 
to be Indian corn, millet, beans and peas. (8)
This apparently off-handed comment becomes more ominous the more it is 
contextualised. Scanning the countryside to its “smallest intervals” to inspect the efficiency
of Chinese agriculture, the ambassador's imperial eye devours all. So desirous is he to 
document his observations that Macartney rather commits speculation to record – “[w]e 
could not well distinguish the kinds of grain growing, but” – than nothing at all. This need to
quantify China, to uncover the secrets to its long celebrated natural wealth, dominates 
Macartney's relationship with the Chinese land in a way that echoes, but surpasses 
Nieuhof, and brings to mind Drayton's summation of science's ideological contribution to 
empire: “Those who best used land and labour had the right to control both” (229). Of 
course, one or two excerpts of this kind would prove little – but Macartney's approach to 
the Chinese landscape is habitual. Elsewhere, he writes: “I believe there is scarcely an 
acre of cultivable land in China that is not cultivated. Although a general resemblance runs
through the whole nation as viewed in the gross, yet almost every province has its own 
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particular mode of husbandry” (152-153). Macartney, that is, has continually and actively 
been noticing not only which parts of China the locals had cultivated, but also how they did
so. Describing the agriculture of Yu-san-Chien: “I did not see a spot the whole way that 
was not... compelled to produce every grain and vegetable of which it was capable” – an 
unremarkable observation on its own, but he goes on – “The soil is naturally indifferent... 
[thus] the care with which everything convertible into manure is preserved would appear 
ridiculous elsewhere, but is here fully justified by the effect” (136-137). He proceeds to 
describe the region's agricultural methods for several paragraphs, noting the use of 
terraces, the planting of different crops at different altitudes, the manner of local plough 
used, the neatness of the husbandry, the quality of roads, the specific technology used to 
water the terraced crops (a transportable chain pump), and even the spacing of villages 
(about a mile part) (137). He marvels at the agricultural efficiency he is witnessing: “The 
husbandry is singularly neat, not a weed to be seen, everything is sown in drills, and there 
are never less than two crops in the year and often there are three” (137). Only after 
exhausting this topic does Macartney leave off to discuss the tea plants from the area that 
he was able to obtain (137). In all of these instances, Macartney marries scientistic 
observation with approving judgements of the inhabitants on the basis of their ability to 
successfully work the land, especially in less forgiving regions (hence Shantung's “smile” 
under “the hand of industry.”) Agricultural techne becomes, synechdochally, a primary 
measure of Chinese culture as a whole.
The attempted appropriation of the waterwheels
Especially notably in this vein, in the section of his journal-closing “Observations” on
Chinese “Arts and Sciences,” Macartney devotes an entire section to “Hydraulics.” In this 
section, he reproduces blueprints of a particular “simple, ingenious and effective” build of 
waterwheel used by the Chinese for “raising water from rivers to the high banks, not 
exceeding forty feet, for the purposes of irrigation” (243). Macartney's detailing of the 
waterwheel is so minute and confusing that Cranmer-Byng omits most of it in place of a 
quick and exasperated summary (244).47 Macartney describes its size, the materials from 
which it is built, and even goes into extensive calculations to determine roughly how much 
water the wheel is capable of delivering per hour. He finally arrives at the conclusion that 
47. Cranmer-Byng: “Here follows a technical – and rather confusing – discussion concerning the 
components and construction of a typical Chinese waterwheel” (244).
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“in twenty-four hours this very simple and slight machine will raise forty thousand three 
hundred and twenty gallons or one hundred and sixty tons of water” (244). Note the 
painstaking precision implied by his twin measurements. Not surprisingly, Macartney 
commissioned a precise illustration of the wheel as well. This section of Macartney's 
travelogue is remarkable as an overt expression of one of the central goals of the 
embassy, proving scientism's amenability to mercantilism by way of technological 
assessment and, where advantageous, appropriation. And while we saw appropriation in 
Nieuhof as well (e.g. the attempted purchase of the Lou-wa birds), in Macartney the 
appropriation more common and more blatant.
Measurable and immeasurable China 
Perhaps as a direct ramification of his goal of quantifying China, and translating it 
into known, measurable terms, Macartney at one point gives away his game in a 
particularly evocative passage on the horrors of China where it cannot be measured. In his
entry for Sunday, November 24th, he writes:
[T]he night... was still, moist, cold, and comfortless. The mist grew every 
moment darker and heavier, and so magnified the objects around us that no 
wonder our senses and imaginations were equally deceived and disturbed, 
and that the temples, turrets, and pagodas appeared to us through the fog, as 
we sailed along, like so many phantoms of giants and monsters flitting away 
from us, and vanishing in the gloom.(138-139) 
 
This marked eruption of monstrous imagery stands out as one of the most vivid passages 
in Macartney's entire journal, not the least because of its fantastic simile. Chinese 
architecture, which he has elsewhere memorably compared to a harmonious face made 
out of all ugly features (243, and quoted in full below), becomes here something even 
more grotesque: the skulking “phantoms of giants and monsters.” Absent the scrupulous 
brightness of the sun, Chinese buildings, half cloaked in darkness, “deceive and disturb” 
Macartney and crew by their flouting of familiar Western forms. They are somehow akin to 
– or perhaps embodiments of – the “still, moist, cold, comfortless” foggy night through 
which they stalk. Where it cannot be seen, be measured, be categorized; where 
Macartney is unable to deploy scientific methodology to assess and contain it, the 
manmade Chinese environment swells into a swaggering parade of boogeymen. There is 
something childlike about Macartney's description – one imagines a toddler terrified by the
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long night shadows flitting across the bedroom wall. Where it cannot be quantified, China 
terrifies Macartney's – and significantly, his cohorts' – British eyes with its ambiguity and 
size. If any single passage in Macartney's journal sums up the emotional undercurrent that
belies his perpetual scientistic analyses of China, it is this one. Macartney's white whale is 
a black pagoda.
And this fact is substantiated by Macartney's unusually effusive description of the 
gardens at Jehol, which, though quite different in tone from the previous passage, 
converges finally on the same sentiment. On Sunday, 15th September, Macartney writes: 
It would be an endless task were I to attempt a detail of all the wonders of this 
charming place. There is no beauty of distribution and contrast, no feature or 
amenity, no reach of fancy which embellishes our pleasure grounds in England, 
that is not to be found here. Had China been accessible to Mr. Brown or to Mr. 
Hamilton I should have sworn they had drawn their happiest ideas from the rich 
sources which I have tasted this day; for in the course of a few hours I have 
enjoyed such vicissitudes of rural delight, as I did not conceive could be felt out 
of England, being at different moments enchanted by scenes perfectly similar to
those I had known there, to the magnificence of Stowe, the soft beauties of 
Woburn or the fairy-land of Painshill. (73)
Macartney outdoes himself here, the rollicking gait of his prose alone conveying such 
exaltation that the passage fairly sings. It is all over with superlatives: there is no English 
gardening art or “embellishment” that the Chinese have not also mastered. The description
is notable for its geographical comparisons: Jehol's grandeur does not merely ring English,
or approximate English garden aesthetics, but in fact contains “scenes perfectly similar” to 
three distinct, and distinctive, English estate gardens. It has, somehow, to the 
ambassador's delirious joy, reproduced England within itself. Clearly, Macartney looks 
upon the gardens of Jehol as a triumph of their medium. But what is the significance of this
enthusiasm? 
In fact, his description dovetails perfectly with the previous passage. Just as 
Macartney depicts China where it cannot be measured as quite literally a writhing mass of 
“giants and monsters,” he depicts China where it is not only naked to British eyes, but 
reminiscent of Britain, as, unsurprisingly, nearly beyond reproach – nearly. The 
ambassador's rapturous description does not come from any deep understanding of 
Chinese aesthetics or culture, however, but from his capacity to project British aesthetics 
upon a China that he has not attempted to measure by any other standards. The notion 
that any other legitimate standards could exist at all does not appear to cross his mind. 
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(Were he primarily concerned, after all, with understanding Chinese customs from the 
inside out, rather than forcing outward the recognition of British superiority, then would his 
disastrous kowtow kerfuffle have happened at all?) And so, unsurprisingly, from the high 
point reproduced above, Macartney soon falls into the niggling that is more characteristic 
of his journal's observations. Unable to refrain from vitiating the recommendation he has 
only just given, he self-consciously adopts the pose of botanist to write, just two 
paragraphs later: 
In many places the lake is overspread with the nenuphar, or lotus (nymphea), 
resembling our broad-leaved water-lily. This is an accompaniment which, 
though the Chinese are passionately fond of, cultivating it in all their pieces of 
water, I confess I don't much admire. Artificial rocks and ponds, with gold and 
silver fish, are perhaps too often introduced, and the monstrous porcelain 
figures of lions and tigers usually placed before the pavilions, are displeasing to 
an European eye. But these are trifles of no great moment, and I am astonished
that now, after a six hours critical survey of these gardens, I can scarcely 
recollect anything besides to find fault with. (73)
I do not find Macartney's final assertion convincing. It has the passive-aggressive quality 
of any compliment given by a constitutional pedant; he is “astonished” to be able to give it 
at all. Even here in splendid Jehol, it seems Macartney cannot long gaze upon Chinese 
works without tripping his prim “European eye” – the same one that is so “disturbed” by 
shadowy architecture – over something “monstrous.”48 And when he does, it must, of 
course, be catalogued. In detail. Although “when he does” perhaps gives the wrong idea: 
like an implacable governess, Macartney always finds a fault. In the entry from the prior 
Sunday, for example, he quips: “A Chinese gardener is the painter of nature, and though 
totally ignorant of perspective as a science, produces the happiest effects” (62) through 
other, simpler means. Again, as so often in his journal, Macartney figures a Chinese 
deficiency as a failure of “scientific” achievement, surprisingly compensated for in other 
ways. We find this same sentiment in his assessment of Jehol, but writ large. In the end, 
the ambassador's apparent garland of compliments, so bright on the surface, turns out to 
be a condescension. Only well-behaved Chinas merit praise. And to Macartney's 
standards, that means playing by, or at least convincingly appearing to play by, British 
48. Houckgeest makes an interesting contrast here. He has much less to say overall about Chinese gardens
than Macartney, but at one point reflects that: “Every thing is intermingled, and seems on the point of being 
confounded; the triumph of genius is to prevent the smallest disorder that might hurt the eye” (vol. II, 138). 
There's that probing European eye again! Houckgeest's, however, does not seem perturbed by lions and 
tigers.
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Comparing European and Chinese techne
But the ominous potential of Macartney's nitpicking extend beyond measuring 
regional vulnerability and appropriating native technologies – to the assessment of the 
Chinese people themselves. Indeed, Macartney's measures of the Chinese by their 
technologies is one of the defining characteristics of his journal. For example, he admires 
that although “most of the province of Kiangsi... is a poor soil,” and “not naturally very 
fertile,” that nevertheless the land was “wonderfully well cultivated.” He even pays the 
Chinese an unqualified compliment, all the more memorable for its strange, terse flatness. 
“The Chinese are certainly the best husbandmen in the world” (139) he writes, without 
further explication, before changing the subject. Especially notable is Macartney's 
discussion of the most celebrated of Chinese infrastructures, “the numberless 
communications by water through the interior of their country” (237). The courses of these 
waterways Macartney describes in some detail, before generalizing that “[f]rom the 
account above it may be inferred that the Chinese in flat or nearly flat countries are chiefly 
directed by the apparent course of the natural streams [and] follow it as nearly as possible,
without regarding the labour or expense attending such a system” (239). Here the 
Chinese, instead of manipulating nature’s organic patterns as they do in arranging their 
magnificent (not to say perfect) gardens, allow nature to set the course of their design (62;
73; 242). So doing, however, they create more work for themselves in the end, and 
Macartney concludes that Chinese technology is less impressive in its own right than 
simply for the extent of its implementation.50 Still, he admits that Chinese water 
architecture, specifically flood gates, are superior to European ones in certain situations 
(239).51 The pains to which Macartney goes to detail these and other examples of Chinese
49. Blue makes passing but useful commentary on this subject, writing that, “At the end of the seventeenth 
[century], Chinoiserie and Gothic styles were linked in an assault upon the austere symmetry of aesthetic 
neo-classicism” (70). This observation, if only tangentially related to Macartney's personal tastes, does 
emphasize that at the time of Macartney's embassy a dichotomizaton of (at least) neo-classicism and the 
perceived frippery and asymmetry of Chinoiserie had been registered on a broad cultural level in Western 
Europe.
50. Which recalls, again, Bray's thesis on the fundamentally capitalist, Eurocentric distinction between 
increases in commodity production as a result of technological efficiency vs. involution. See also my 
discussion, in “Premodern Techne, East and West” of this thesis, of Pomeranz, who too notes the (not 
specifically Chinese) logic of involution.
51. Macartney explains: “Since writing the above I have received the following note from Dr Dinwiddie who, 
having separated from me at Hangchowfu in order to proceed to Chusan... had an opportunity of examining 
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technology, especially those like the flood gates that rival their European equivalents, 
implies an anxious need to convince himself that, after all, the Chinese couldn’t possibly 
equal the British scientifically: a point his demystifying explanations, with their exhausting 
quantifications and generally muted enthusiasm, make tacitly again and again. This would 
also explain his ambivalence even when he does encounter an example of Chinese 
technological superiority. 
As a case in point, let us consider Macartney's discussion, during his 
“Observations,” of the state of Chinese sericulture and silk weaving. He writes: 
The raw material itself is, I understand, superior to any of the same kind of any 
other country; but I have been assured that the fabrics of Lyons and Spitalfields 
are sometimes even superior to those of Nanking. Of this I cannot pretend to 
judge, but admitting that the Chinese can weave the best silks in the world, it is 
no less true that they also make the worst, for they suffer nothing to be lost; the 
flosses, combings, refuse, etc., are all carefully saved and worked into some 
useful texture or other, such as nettings, curtains, gauzes, girdles, etc. All that I 
could learn relative to the silk, silk worms, and mulberry trees of China is 
contained in my answers to the Honorable East India Company's queries to 
which I refer. I am concerned to say that they are not very satisfactory, for I 
found it impossible to obtain all the information I wanted. (241)
Again, Macartney struggles to reconcile the sophistication of Chinese industry with a 
presumption of Western technological superiority, and it infuses his entire passage with a 
certain anxiety. He vacillates over the world ranking of Chinese raw silk: is it truly the best 
in the world? He both “understands” that it is, but is “assured” that it is not, that French and
English manufacturers are superior. In both cases he is referring to anecdotal evidence, 
and arrives at a final plea of ignorance before declaring in no uncertain terms that 
whatever the status of China's best silks, it undoubtedly produces the world's worst. He 
attributes this to Chinese thrift; the weavers make use of every last scrap of serviceable 
material. In a different – say, European – context, it is easy to imagine Macartney 
interpreting this habit as evidence of resourcefulness and industry. Indeed, he nears the 
sentiment, listing several products for which lower quality silks are often used. But here it 
reads almost as an indictment. One that leads directly into the confession that he has 
been unable to gather nearly as much information on Chinese sericultural and silk 
weaving methods as he had “wanted.” Macartney's logic begins with an assessment of the
quality of a general Chinese manufacture (i.e. silk textiles), proceeds to what discussion is 
more at leisure not only the common canals, but also the others whose communication is preserved by 
means of a glacis...” (239). He goes on from there to relate Dr. Dimwiddie's observations.
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possible of the techne required to produce it, provides a list of examples of specific 
iterations of the good, and ends finally, and alas, with the rueful acknowledgement that not
enough information of it had yet been obtained for actual appropriation to occur. 
What, exactly, does Macartney gain from diminishing Chinese scientific 
achievement in this way? On the one hand, the gentleman doth protest too much, and his 
explanations – quite literally circumscriptions of Chinese knowledge by English text, and a 
bit of a spectacle of Freudian reaction-formation – can, on one level, be read as wishful 
containments of the threat of Chinese ingenuity. This certainly is the impression given by 
his similar assessment of the Chinese printing press. Mindful of his didactic duties as 
Western commentator, Macartney writes: “As it is generally supposed that the art of 
printing is of great antiquity among the Chinese, I must not pass it by without some notice” 
(240). He goes on to describe it:
Their printing, such as I saw, is merely a wooden cut... which when wetted with 
ink and impressed by the paper, delivers a reversed copy of itself. From the size
of the page, which is incapable of decomposition, from the necessary accuracy 
of the process, and the tediousness of execution, it would seem that new 
publications are not very frequent, and that knowledge is not so rapidly 
disseminated in China as in England by reviews, magazines and such other 
periodical oracles of taste and literature. (240)
Notwithstanding that Macartney's highborn sarcasm in this passage extends also to his 
native country's “oracles of taste and literature,” the point of this commentary is to 
demystify China's printing press and make clear its inferiority to England's press. The 
Chinese use “mere wooden cuts” to “tediously execute” infrequent publications. 
Knowledge simply cannot “disseminate” here as it does in England, despite all that has 
previously been made of Chinese skill in printing. And that so much had been made of it is
just the point: starting with an invocation of China's illustrious reputation as the birthplace 
of the printing press, Macartney proceeds to methodically dismantle this reputation, one 
minute observation at a time. “Whether printing as practiced by us be an original European
invention, or whether the first hint of it was derived from China, I will not presume to 
determine” he says finally, before slyly implying the former by noting that the first record of 
it in Europe did not appear until 150 years after Marco Polo's return from China, and was 
never mentioned by that august traveller. Despite his lack of open disdain, a subtle but 
distinct arrogance pervades Macartney's analysis; in any case, the function of passages 
like these is to reposition China, vis-à-vis England especially, as the less ingenious, less 
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industrious empire. And for neither the first nor last time, he does this through scientistic 
analysis of a culturally and economically vital technology.
It is interesting to compare Macartney's assessment of Chinese printing to Kircher's,
from his China Illustrata (as excerpted in Nieuhof). Kircher's critique of Chinese printing 
seems largely to agree with Macartney's, and he says of “that ingenious art of PRINTING,”
that it: 
[W]as us'd by [the Chinese] long before it was known in Europe: But yet they 
understand not the right use of it, being ignorant of the Art of Founding Letters, 
or Composing with them, but Cutting or Engraving upon Wood what they have 
to Print, like our Sculp'd Plates fitted for the Rowling-Press; so that not being 
able to Distribute their Character, they are forc'd to have a standing Form for 
every Page, by which means the Printing of one Volume oft-times filleth a whole
House with their Typographical Tables; as for Example, if the whole have but 
100 Sheets, they must have 400 Tables. (Antiquities of China, 426). 
This description of Kircher's, in so closely substantiating Macartney's, which was written 
over a century later, seems to validate Macartney's observations, and perhaps even save 
them from my accusation of scientism on grounds that they were, after all, quite accurate. 
But I will note that Kircher's description, like Macartney's, occurs in the context of a larger 
comparison of European versus Chinese technologies. Both authors are keenly concerned
in this case to determine who has developed it further; a fact that I cannot but feel points 
to an underlying anxiety over the general sophistication of the Chinese. 
But moreover, Macartney's habitual inscriptions of Chinese techne (and perhaps to 
a lesser extent, aesthetics), whatever their tone, can also be read as a clever, self-eliding 
incorporation of Chinese knowledge into the British cannon. Under guise of critique, he 
can appropriate Chinese techne and manufacturing methods even while soothing the 
anxiety they provoke. However, to his credit, Macartney is typically more direct in his 
appropriations; a dynamic that we may look to Kitson to explain. One of the main 
arguments underpinning Kitson's claim that “Britons and their collaborators constructed a 
‘new’ idea of China in the [Romantic] period… inflected by their own increasingly national 
concerns” (3), is that China as a Romantic-era trope was never a flat Saidian caricature, 
taken for granted by the British imaginary. “Rather than imposing a fully formed notion of 
British science and modernity on Asia, Britain was at this crucial time forging its own sense
of national identity informed by its encounters with other cultures such as China's” (3). 
China, a dynamic and imposing presence on all fronts – certainly economically, as the 
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premier hub of a network of trade routes cobwebbing the globe – became central to the 
British identity because it, frankly, couldn’t not do. It was too vast, and too powerful for the 
Western upstarts to ignore. And though the respect it elicited from them may have been a 
fraught and ambivalent respect, inflected by imperialist anxiety and as begrudgingly given 
as a Macartneyan compliment, it was nevertheless one born from engagement with an 
active participant, not a docile receptacle. As a serious imperial competitor, it seems 
China's world prominence if not demanded at least invited the plundering of its intellectual 
heritage – a claim which finds support in the fact that the theft of Chinese techne and trade
commodities was Joseph Banks' top directive to Macartney. Macartney is candid in his 
journal about these designs himself, stating plainly on more than one occasion that he 
desires to take Chinese tea plants to Bengal for cultivation: 
The Viceroy, observing our curiosity about everything relative to natural 
history, allowed us to collect seeds and fossils as we came along, and to take 
up several tea plants in a growing state with large balls of earth adhering to 
them, which tea plants I flatter myself I shall be able to transmit to Bengal. 
(138; see also 132)
It is telling that Macartney euphemistically frames his desire to poach valuable Chinese tea
as “curiosity about everything relative to natural history.” The fossils he mentions may 
have been intended for show amongst his Royal Society pals, but he is very clear that the 
tea plants are meant, ultimately, to literally and figuratively seed a British industry. Again 
we find them: imperialism and scientism, hand in hand. (Incidentally, that the Viceroy 
acceded to Macartney's request for tea, when he must have known how important an 
export it was, is rather surprising, especially given how “jealous” (132) Macartney says the 
Chinese were of parting with any similarly valuable silkworms; but as his views of the 
matter are not accessible to me, I shall have to leave them aside.) Taken in sum, the 
ambassador’s disparagement of certain technologies (e.g. Chinese printing) and 
appropriation of others (e.g. Chinese water wheels); and, as in this case, appropriation of 
Chinese commodities (e.g. tea) for British benefit – are amenable on all counts to 
imperialist ambition. Technologies and commodities he deems valuable, Macartney 
attempts to take without compunction; and those he does not deem valuable, he uses, 
without apparently even a blush of cognitive dissonance, to inspire doubt in Chinese 
technological achievement.
It is not difficult to see how this doubt would have been useful in preserving 
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Macartney's sense of the superiority of British culture. By criticizing Chinese scientific and 
technological (and even aesthetic) achievements, Macartney protects a central pillar of his
own identity. He also helps to undo what romanticisation of the Chinese still remained in 
his day (Voltaire, for instance, whom Macartney knew, continued to idealize the Chinese 
until late in his career).52 And in these ways, he contributes to that denigration of the 
Chinese that must precede any more extreme dehumanization. Scientism was 
instrumental to this process. And that is why, ultimately, I must disagree with Clingham's 
central claim that Macartney's Eurocentricity is somehow mitigated or balanced out by his 
occasional moments of sympathy with the Qing, as significant as these are. A great 
example of his ambivalence, also from the “Observations”: 
The architecture of the Chinese is of a peculiar style, totally unlike any other, 
irreducible to our rules, but perfectly consistent with its own. It has certain 
principles from which it never deviates; and although, when examined 
according to ours, it sins against the ideas we have imbibed of distribution, 
composition and proportion, yet upon the whole it often produces a most 
pleasing effect; as we sometimes see a person without a single good feature 
in his face, have nevertheless a very agreeable countenance. (243)
Macartney's wit is impossible to deny; but so is his perpetual difficulty in granting the 
Chinese unqualified praise. The compliment that rounds out the passage above is so 
backhanded that it stings to this day. Macartney's goal here seems to be to reaffirm, in the 
face of China's “peculiar” architectural style, the superiority of Western, presumably neo-
classical, architecture, with its emphasis on balance, order, and linearity. We saw before 
how Temple contrasted these with the delicate asymmetry of sharawadgi – to considerably
different effect than Macartney. Macartney's description, with its idealization of 
“distribution, composition and proportion” exalts the mathematically inflected aesthetics of 
the Enlightenment. That is, it exalts scientific principles as aesthetic ones. The mysterious 
and incomprehensible Chinese somehow attain a certain internal coherence even forgoing
these principles, but Macartney's description hardly reads like a recommendation of the 
Chinese method – and it is not one. The slightest comparison to Temple's enthusiasm 
settles the matter there. 
Joking at China's expense
52. Blue gives a useful and brief gloss of Voltaire's views of the Chinese (66). 
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But recourse to Temple is not, as it turns out, strictly necessary. There is one other 
notable barb in Macartney's journal, and it too derives from the ambassador's desperate 
confidence in his own fine taste. His tour of a major Buddhist temple at Potala occasions 
the following observation of Buddhist icons: 
There are, in some of these pagodas, a thousand of these monstrous statues, 
all most horribly ugly, and so ill-represented, and so unlike anything in heaven 
or earth, or in the waters under the earth, that one would think they might be 
safely worshipped even by the Jews without incurring the guilt of idolatry. (83)
I admit to laughing aloud the first time I read this pronouncement, which could as well have
come from Lady Bracknell. For all that Clingham is correct in asserting that several times 
in his journal, Macartney sympathizes – even empathizes – with the Chinese, it is 
unmistakable that on purely literary grounds he is at his best when he is on the attack.53 
His unconscious pomposity here, and the great purple build-up that leads to his punchline,
so fulfils one's notion of the Supercilious British Aristocrat that it is almost impossible not to
forgive him for it. But entertainment value aside, Macartney's condescending sport of the 
Chinese is not incidental, because humour is never incidental. Freud tells us that humour 
is a process of the psychic economy that mitigates anxiety by transforming it into positive 
affect (or at least distracting us from negative affect) (Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, 165-166). Here, as in Macartney's quip about Chinese architecture being a 
pleasant face without any pleasant features, Macartney is compelled to belittle an 
aesthetic that cannot be translated into crisp, neo-classical European terms. Where 
scientism fails, sardonicism, apparently, prevails. In Macartney, both function to psychically
neutralize the threat posed by Chinese Otherness. A fact which might not amount to more 
than an amusing aside, but that the equivalence of scientism and demeaning humour on 
this point underscores my central claim that scientism is fundamentally dehumanizing; and
that that, along with its convenient aura of noble objectivity, is precisely why, historically, 
scientism has so well been able to abet imperial aggression.
Indictment of the Qing
And indeed, it is possible to press this sentiment about the relation between 
53. Macartney offers, for instance, an eloquent defence of the Chinese in the face of their tradition of foot-
binding – while still condemning the practice as abominable – by comparing it to European corseting (184-
187). I do not, however, find that moments of measured consideration like this are characteristic of 
Macartney's views of the Chinese overall.
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scientism and imperial aggression even further. It is quite likely that Macartney's 
description of the Qing foreshadows later British military action against them; that in his 
language all the ideological components of the excuses that would eventually be made for 
the Opium Wars are already discernible. I posit that Macartney's textual containment of 
China by the terms of Western science helped shift British estimation of China enough to 
make subsequent aggression culminating in the Opium Wars seem a legitimate response 
to Chinese trade restrictions. This is not to say that Macartney alone precipitated the first 
Opium War; as I have already shown in previous comparisons to Nieuhof, Macartney's 
approach to China was embedded in an ideological ground that had begun to form at least
a century earlier. But it certainly is true that Macartney’s portrait of the Qing as a once-
grand empire in decline – a depiction clothed in, and in fact rhetorically dependent upon 
the presumed objectivity of scientistic thought – both undermined the awe in which the 
empire had long been held, and presented China as, on various levels, an assailable 
opponent after all. Macartney's observations of Chinese technologies were neither a fluke 
nor performed simply to satisfy the whims of the Royal Society. They were an aggressive 
measurement of Chinese efficiency motivated by the tacit assumption that a China that 
had lost its scientific and technological edge over the West would not only be open to 
conquest, but be practically begging for imperial – as we might call it today – 
“intervention.”  
There is evidence for this both in the ambassador’s own words, and, significantly, 
those words' dubious afterlife. Macartney speculates that because of the Qianlong 
Emperor’s aversion to scientific progress, the Chinese have come to teeter on the edge of 
atavism (234). It is significant that Macartney does not seem to connect this “decay” in 
Chinese science to natural impediment – figured either externally, as some limiting factor 
in the Chinese environment, or internally, as the flaw or quirk of a presumptively inherent 
Chinese character. He perhaps hints at the latter when he claims that “[m]ost of the things 
which the Chinese know they seem to have invented themselves, to have applied them 
solely to the purpose wanted, and to have never thought of improving or extending them 
further” (236). But that seems unlikely given his indictment of Qianlong's indifference to 
scientific study, which Macartney explains as an effect of “the policy of the present 
government to discourage all novelties, and to prevent their subjects as much as possible 
from entertaining a higher opinion of foreigners than of themselves” (234). He also 
suspects China's massive population, in granting a sort of wealth of manpower, has 
counterintuitively stunted Chinese innovation, speculating that:
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So far they have proceeded in the use of [the single pulley] but no further, 
because, as from the immense population of the country, any number of hands 
can be easily procured. Their principle is rather to gain in time than in power, 
otherwise having already employed the single pulley, the double one would 
have naturally occurred to them” (236).54 
There is something perverse about the Chinese: they ought to have “naturally” discovered 
the double pulley – which suggests at least that Macartney considers them latently able to 
rise above their present level of technological development – but a faulty “principle” has 
arrested their development. They have failed to “cultivate” the sciences, and this lack of 
cultivation is the reason for the ever widening gap between their civilization and that of 
Europe.
Macartney elaborates this theory eloquently, in one of his journal's most important 
instances of thematic scientism:
It sometimes happens that men by mere dint of natural parts, without the 
advantage of education... will hit upon methods of accomplishing great 
undertakings, where the most plausible theories have been found insufficient or
inapplicable to the purpose; but this can rarely happen except in a country like 
Europe, where the general effect of the mechanical powers is familiar to the 
vulgar, from the daily observance of their universal use. Thus every common 
person will have recourse to a pulley, a lever, a tooth and pinion wheel, 
because he has seen them perform their functions a thousand times, and 
although he has no just idea of their exact powers, yet by repeated trials he is 
certain of succeeding. But in a country like China, where the sciences, which 
first pointed out those artificial powers, are little known and little cultivated, 
difficulties when they occur can only be surmounted by the increase and 
exertions of numbers. (236)
Macartney's reasoning is sound enough, even persuasive. The European, from long 
cohabitation with pulleys, levers, and other useful feats of mechanical engineering (with 
which Macartney at several points in his journal shows considerable familiarity) becomes 
fluent in their use, even if he does not understand the exact principles behind why they 
work. The Chinese, however, has not benefited from the same technological trickle-down 
effect, since his intellectual elite have “little cultivated” science. This passage is 
54. To highlight the bias in Macartney's assessment we might consider Needham's declaration that “one 
constantly finds that in spite of the seemingly inexhaustible masses of man-power in China, lugging and 
hauling was avoided whenever possible. How striking it is that in all Chinese history there is no parallel for 
the slave-manned oared war galley of the Mediterranean... When the water-mill appeared in the first century 
AD for blowing metallurgical bellows the records concerning Tu Shih distinctly say that he considered it 
important as being both more humane and cheaper than man-power or animal-power” (34).
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remarkable for a few reasons: most fundamentally, it conflates science and technology in a
thoroughly modern way that presumes that increased scientific understanding necessarily 
leads to more sophisticated technologies. An in-depth analysis of the legitimacy of this 
claim would draw me far outside the orbit of the current work, but it is interesting to note 
that Macartney, in the late 18th century, was already connecting the two. But more 
generally, and more importantly overall to current purposes, this passage compares China 
to Europe on expressly scientific grounds (as Macartney himself designates them), and 
finds China lacking. “[I]n a country like China, where the sciences” are not sanctioned, he 
reasons, a general deficiency has become obvious. If there were any doubt about the 
centrality of scientism to Macartney's conception of the Chinese, this passage must satisfy
it. In China, Macartney finds a people whose technological difference from Europe justifies
their complete recategorization as human beings – a “country like” the former is clearly 
distinct from a “country like” the latter. Macartney has explicitly distinguished two peoples 
on the basis of their scientific and technological understanding.
Macartney’s dissatisfaction with the state of Chinese science, and the Chinese' 
consequent inability to recognize Britain's scientific superiority, is a perpetual feature of his
journal – and typically directed at the Qing mandarins. In particular, his petulant insistence 
upon the mandarins' performance of disaffection faced with British technology becomes 
something of a mantra during his visit with the Emperor. Macartney gripes that “it was 
observed that most of the great men who came to see the globes, the planetarium, the 
barometers, and pendulums put up at Yuan Ming Yuan affected to view them with careless
indifference,” expressing some relief when recalling, “they could not, however, conceal 
their sense of the beauty and elegance of our Derby porcelain, when they saw the 
ornamental bases belonging to Vulliamy's clocks” (235). Macartney is so sure of the 
impressive quality of his gifts that he cannot even entertain the idea that the Chinese did 
not, at least in their secret innermost hearts, stand in awe of them (Kitson, 127-128). 
Macartney’s feat here is remarkable: sussing out a simple, rational cause for the noted 
effect of Chinese scientific retrograde, he self-affirmingly manages to bring his scientific 
ideology to bear upon its own absence among the Qing. It is their own fault – that of their 
mandarins, at least –  that they have not kept up with Europe. Thus he declares of the 
Chinese that “[i]n respect to science they are certainly far behind the European world,” 
before going on, with palpable scorn, to complain of the Qing mandarins particularly that 
“none of them discovered the slightest notion of the pressure of fluids, the principles of 
optics, perspective, electricity, etc.” although they had had occasion to observe such 
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things in the workings of European technology gifted to the emperor (235). He is willing to 
modify a similar sentiment some few pages later, in the “Navigation” section of his 
“Observations”:
In my journal of the 11 August 1793 I have some account of the junks and 
shipping employed by the Chinese, and expressed my astonishment at their 
obstinacy in not imitating the ingenuity and dexterity of Europeans in the build 
and manoeuvre of their vessels, after having had such striking examples before
their eyes for these two hundred and fifty years past; but I must now, in good 
measure, retract my censures on this point, as... I believe the yachts and other 
craft usually employed [upon the rivers and canals]... are perfectly well 
calculated for the purposes intended, and probably superior to any other that 
we in our vanity might advise them to adopt. (245)
This is one of the few times in Macartney's record that he truly rises to Clingham's opinion 
of him. But it is crucial to note that even here Macartney's gracious retraction is predicated
on his deciding that Chinese sailing techne wasn't so bad after all “for the purposes 
intended.” He is far from asserting that the Chinese could match “the ingenuity and 
dexterity of the Europeans” overall. In his estimations of both cultures, the ability to master
the natural environment is a key determinant. It just so happens that on this particular 
count Macartney feels he misspoke – and so he makes due note of the flub, but only after 
being sure to emphasize the sophistication of the Europeans generally.55 His precision in 
marking out the exact journal passage in which he makes his mistake is admirable: the 
gesture seems, by implication, to ensure the truthfulness of the rest of his entries. It is, as 
both an example of Macartney's fallibility and of the Chinese surpassing his expectations 
of them in a given technological arena, an exception that proves the rule. 
And this in fact is precisely the effect of Macartney's next paragraph. “With regards 
to vessels of a different kind for more distant voyages... I am informed that the Chinese of 
Canton, who have had frequent opportunities of seeing our ships there, are by no means 
insensible of the advantage they possess over their own” (246). The Hoppo of Canton, 
however, refused to allow any Chinese to “depart from the ancient established [ship-
building] modes of the Empire which, according to his notions, must be wiser and better 
than those barbarous nations which come from Europe to trade with them” (246). 
Macartney cannot restrain himself from using this latter remark as a jumping off point for a 
topic we have already heard him address:
55. And he does indeed, after his normal fashion, go on later to enumerate the Chinese' various navigational
deficiencies: they have “neither charts of their coasts or seas... nor forestaff, quadrant or other instrument for
taking the sun's altitude” (247).
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It is indeed, as I have before remarked, the prevailing system of the Tartar 
Government to impress the people with an idea of their own sufficiency, and to 
undervalue in their eyes as much as possible the superior invention of foreign 
nations; but their vigilance in this respect, and the pains they take for the 
purpose, evidently betray the conscious fears and jealousy they entertain of 
their subjects' taste for novelty, and their sagacity in discovering and wishing to 
adopt the various articles of European ingenuity for use, convenience and 
luxury, in preference to their own clumsy old-fashioned contrivances. (246)
Identifying China’s current state of scientific decay as an effect of Qing mismanagement, 
Macartney implicates the “Tartar Government” as a government of brutes, anxious of their 
Han subjects' tastes for clearly superior European wares. But doing so he also, in light of 
his reading of Chinese history, implicitly delegitimizes the Qing's claim to a technological 
heritage accumulated during an implied but never specified Golden Age prior to their 
political ascendency. One they have neglected – a convenient justification for the 
appropriation of this heritage by the British.56  
An appropriation which Macartney's travelogue literally and self-consciously 
attempts to carry out. It is with a mixture of exasperation and pride, for instance, that he 
describes the silkworm eggs that he “with great difficulty” was “so fortunate to procure,” 
explaining that “[t]he Chinese, whether from jealousy or superstition or both, could 
scarcely be persuaded to part with them” (132). Macartney does not overtly connect his 
interest in Chinese sericulture to Chinese scientific naivete, but the episode does suggest 
that Macartney considers the jealousy- and superstition-bound Chinese unjustified in 
withholding their sericultural techne from British possession. The implication here and 
throughout his journal is clear: the Qing's claim to China's abundant natural resources is 
only valid insofar as they possess the ability – including, crucially, the scientific know-how 
– to properly manage them. Best use of nature, indeed. Stepping back to consider his 
travelogue as a whole, even when Macartney does admit to Chinese ingenuity, his 
attempts at appropriation imply that these useful technologies and agricultural methods 
would be better utilized by the British. This is a profoundly scientistic attitude, and one that 
trends in the direction of assigning the British a prerogative for Chinese commodities and 
technologies on the basis of superior scientific understanding. 
56. See for instance Macartney's discussion of Emperor K'iang-hsi's active employment, “about fourscore 
years ago,” of well-learned missionaries to teach advanced mathematics and “experimental philosophy” to 
his court. In context, Macartney is lamenting Qianlong's neglect of European learning amongst his people 
(234).
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Mapping the cracks in the China 
All of this said, it is of course quite a leap to go from advocating, however discretely,
for the appropriation of foreign knowledge – to advocating for war. But that Macartney's 
reasoning heads in just such a direction is borne out by both his own words, and 
subsequent historical events. Regarding the former: Macartney was not shy about 
boasting that British aggression against the Chinese could only end in their ruin. Doubting 
(as it would turn out correctly) that his embassy's requests – as for the appointment of a 
resident British ambassador in Peking – would be met, he at one point in his journal 
fumes:
Can they be ignorant that a couple English frigates would be an overmatch for 
the whole naval force of their empire, that in half a summer they could totally 
destroy all the navigation of their coasts and reduce the inhabitants of the 
maritime provinces, who subsist chiefly on fish, to absolute famine? (118-119)
Here, Macartney makes clear that British naval technology alone is not only enough to 
raze the entire Chinese navy, but reduce the coastal inhabitants to starvation. He makes 
no overtures towards self-justification. The possibility that his embassy will not achieve its 
goals is enough to stir up a fantasy of devastation; the ambassador frames it as a 
rhetorical question because its feasibility gives it a likelihood that he assumes must also 
be obvious to the Chinese. No thought is given to the morality of the scenario. In fact, 
Macartney implies that Britain has been magnanimous in attempting diplomacy to begin 
with, with such a navally inferior nation. And it is that idea – Britain's technological 
superiority to China – that the whole scenario revolves around. Macartney apparently 
takes it for granted that technological might makes right: if China will not cede to British 
demands, war must be the logical response.
Macartney reiterates this sentiment in a collective entry spanning Jan 1 through 
January 7th:
If, indeed, the Chinese were provoked to interdict us their commerce, or do us 
any material injury, we certainly have the means easy enough of revenging 
ourselves, for a few frigates could in a few weeks destroy all their coast 
navigation and intercourse from the island of Hainan to the Gulf of Pei-Chihli, and
if I were to indulge the speculations of an ambitious or vindictive politician, I doubt
not but we might vulnerate them sensibly in many other quarters. (162-163)
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He goes on to describe how Britain might be able to draw neighbouring nations into the 
conflict to their benefit: the Bengalese, the Koreans, the Formosans. The Portuguese 
could be made to abandon Macao easily, which would negate their presence as potential 
Chinese allies and trade partners; this might be done by invading Macao from “Madras,” or
by establishing a competing settlement in “Lantao” or “Cowhee” (163). “The forts of the 
Bocca Tigris might be demolished by half a dozen broadsides... and the whole trade of 
Canton annihilated in a season” he writes, before bragging that “[t]he millions of people 
who subsist by it would be almost instantly reduced to hunger and insurrection” (163). 
Then he hypothesizes how Russia might be stirred to action against China from this 
activity – and continues to hypothesize, for several paragraphs, about the additional 
knock-on effects of such a war. Macartney's speculations here, especially given their level 
of detail, cannot be overemphasized. They are not vague, petulant fantasies born from 
personal frustration, but considered scenarios. They address the vulnerabilities of specific 
Chinese geographic regions to a specific British military technology, the frigate. And what 
kicks off this ominous line of thought? The possibility that China might “interdict” trade with
Britain – the following clause about the possibility of China “materially injuring” Britain 
reads like an afterthought; an addendum meant to soften an otherwise brazen declaration 
of imperialist greed. And while on the one hand this passage seems to indicate that by the 
time of Macartney's embassy, British anxiety over the uncertain future of its trade with 
China was quite high – high enough to tempt the ambassador to not only entertain dark 
hypotheticals, but commit them to paper – for the purposes of this thesis, it is equally 
important to note that Macartney makes military technology central to his ruminations. 
Indeed, the only clear images in the passage, aside from the Chinese locations, are the 
frigates that float through it: an image that we have seen Macartney brandish before as a 
fetish of British military strength, and an almost preternaturally apt symbol for the 
convergence of British technology and British imperialism.
But aside from Macartney's blatant military reconnaissance, there is another way in 
which his journal seems to directly anticipate the disintegration of Sino-British trade 
relations. Although he does not always distinguish between the Han Chinese and the 
Tartars (Manchu), when he does specify the latter, it is almost always to foreground their 
status as cultural interlopers. He writes tellingly at one point that “a series of two hundred 
years in the succession of eight or ten monarchs did not change the Mogul into a Hindu, 
nor has a century and a half made Chi'en-lung a Chinese. He remains at this hour, in all 
his maxims of policy, as true a Tartar as any of his ancestors” (197) – a statement that 
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underscores the image of the Qing as usurpers. And in several instances, Macartney 
draws this distinction by reference to the contemporary Qing court's failure to encourage 
scientific inquiry. He asserts, for example, that the Tartars “prefer active military duty to 
tranquil or sedentary occupations” like education (197). In the “Manners and Character” 
chapter of the “Observations” that end his journal, Macartney gives the following gloss on 
Chinese history:
When Marco Polo, the Venetian, visited China in the 13th century, it was about 
the time of the conquest of China by the western or Mongol Tartars, with Kublai 
Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan, at their head. A little before that period the 
Chinese had reached their highest pitch of civilisation, and no doubt they were 
then a very civilised people in comparison of their Tartar conquerors, and their 
European contemporaries, but not having improved and advanced forward, or 
having rather gone back, at least for these one hundred fifty years past, since 
the last conquest by the northern or Manchu tartars; whilst we have been every 
day rising in arts and sciences, they are actually become a semi-barbarous 
people in comparison with the present nations of Europe. (176) 
The scorn and scientism both of this passage are difficult to miss, but perhaps more 
disturbing is how familiar Macartney's portrayal of a premodern China devoid of innovation
and dynamism will be to (at least) any modern-day student of the premodern era. 
Macartney makes this complaint more than once: lamenting, for instance, how little 
Qianlong patronizes the sciences (“Neither Ch-ien-lung himself nor those about him 
appeared to have any curiosity in these matters”) compared to Kiangxi, and the 
deleterious effect this has had on the state of Chinese learning overall (234). And while 
these instances of measuring a civilization by measuring its perceived intellectual 
achievements comparative to Europe is clearly enough Eurocentric not to require 
explanation, Macartney's allegations deserve additional consideration for their legacy. For 
his opinion that the Qing court was responsible for China's “semi-barbarity” would prove 
crucial decades after his own embassy's failure, in the meteoric rise and catastrophic fall 
of one Lord William John Napier. 
Lord Napier and Macartneyan echoes
As Ulrike Hillemann has written, a generation after Macartney, with the British 
Crown's dissolution of the East India Company in 1834 and appointment of Napier as 
Chief Superintendent of the British traders at Canton, Macartney's image of a China 
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crippled by inept Manchu rulership re-emerged to spectacularly ill effect. Quoting from a 
letter Napier wrote to Lord Palmerston, Hilleman explains, “Napier again picked up on 
Macartney's interpretation of the position of the Manchu dynasty in China: 'If the Emperor 
refuses on demand, remind him that he is only an Intruder and that it would be his good 
policy to secure himself his throne by gratifying the wish of his people'” (95-96). Lord 
Napier justifies his aggressive stance towards Qing authority by invoking a distinctly 
Macartneyan conception of the Qing. One which, as I have shown, was heavily inflected 
by an aggressive, imperialistic scientism. Napier's goal was to attempt to circumvent 
established protocols and, in his new role as Chief Superintendent, make his demands 
directly to the Cantonese viceroy, bypassing the Hong Merchants that had long managed 
China's side of all Sino-British trade talk. As a show of British might, he even ordered two 
ships of war into Canton harbour – the first time such a thing had ever been done. This 
rashness would prove Napier's undoing: not only did he fail to accomplish his primary 
goal, but provoked the Chinese into temporarily halting all trade whatever with the British; 
a move which, unsurprisingly, did little to endear him to merchants on either side 
(Hillemann, 94). In the end, defeated and humiliated, he made his way back from his failed
mission in Canton only to die of fever in Macao, in October of the year of his appointment 
(Hillmann, 94). But the point of this episode is to show that Macartney's scientistically 
inflected conception of the Chinese did indeed shape later imperial policy, helping to move
it towards open military aggression by profoundly informing the conception of China held 
by later British officials. 
Again, to be clear: I am not claiming that Macartney's journal was the only, or even 
the most important factor influencing Napier's disastrous tenure as Superintendent of 
Canton. And even if it had been, the First Opium War didn't occur until 1839, some five 
years after Napier's death, and thirty-three after Macartney's. Rather, I am claiming that 
consistently in Macartney's recorded thought we find imperialist aggression couched in the
distinctive language of scientistic thought, which rhetoric culminates in an overall 
conception of the Chinese as “semi-barbarous.” A conception that seems later to resurface
in the strident declarations of the diplomat whose actions against the Chinese so greatly 
strained Sino-British relations that they directly set the stage for the Opium War – a 
coincidence too big to ignore. Moreover, we find in Blue the following quote by Napier's 
sometime penpal, Lord Palmerston himself, director of British military activities during the 
Opium Wars:
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These half-civilised governments such as those in China Portugal and Spanish 
America all require a Dressing every eight or Ten years to keep them in order. 
Their minds are too shallow to receive an Impression that will last longer than 
some such Period and warning is of little use. They care little for words and they
must not only see the Stick but feel it on their Shoulders before they yield. (77)
Blue does not connect this tirade, made in 1850, directly to Macartney. But it hardly strains
the imagination to see Palmerston's conception of the Chinese, and the vehemence of his 
aggression towards them, as a bolder colouring of Napier's – which was itself a bolder 
colouring of Macartney's own. And while perhaps any extended analysis of a single 
historical figure will tend, from the very nature of its focus, towards a certain myopic 
exaggeration of its subject's importance, in Macartney's case at least wide scholarly 
consensus supports the idea of a lasting cultural and political legacy – as indeed Kitson 
and Drayton have thoroughly argued, and of which Hillemann's excerpt of Napier provides 
a vital example. By shaping British conceptions of China generally, it seems highly likely 
that Macartney also helped to shape British action towards China for generations 
afterwards.  
But significantly, Macartney's approach to China did not develop spontaneously, 
and many of its ideological components, as we have seen, are already present in 
Nieuhof's time. And while we have already looked at several of the diplomats' textual 
similarities, it would be wise to take a moment here to consider one area where the 
differences between Macartney and Nieuhof speak as loudly. If we recall the importance 
that Adorno and Horkheimer place on scientism's esteem for categorization as expressive 
of the urge to control, then the differences in the extent of Nieuhof's and Macartney's 
respective taxonomies of China deserves mention.  
The “Observations” vs. Nieuhof's “General Description”
Both diplomats' travelogues are organized in approximately the same manner, 
starting with their journals, and ending with a series of encyclopedic entries on Chinese 
culture and, to varying extent between the two, countryside. Nieuhof, true to his 
pretensions, titles this section of his text “A General Description of the Empire of China,” 
whereas Macartney modestly proffers his “Observations.” At risk of extravagance, I list 
each author's chapter headings here, in published order, as I find them very revealing 
when considered in light of each author's text overall. Macartney's, which are briefer, read:
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Manners and Character
Religion 
Government
Justice 
Property 
Population
Revenue 
Civil and Military Ranks and Establishments 
Trade and Commerce
Arts and Sciences 
Navigation 
Hydraulics
Navigation
Chinese Language 
By contrast, Nieuhof's (with any subheadings listed in parentheses) read:
I. Of the Government and several Chief Officers in China 
II. Of the Characters, Language, Writing, and Literature of the Chinese: And in 
what manner the Learned in China arrive to the several Degrees of Knowledge  
III. Of Several Chinese Handicraft-Trades, Comedians, Juglers, and Beggars 
IV. Of some Strange Customs, Fashions and Manners, in use amongst the 
Chinese
V. Of their Ceremonies, and manner of Burials; and of their Tombs or 
Monuments
VI. Of the Form, Shape, and Make of the Body, and the Fashion of their Clothes
VII. Of some Superstitious Customs, Fashions, and other Errors in use amongst
the Chinese
VIII. Of several Sects in China: Concerning Philosophy, and Idol-Worship 
IX. Of Idol Temples 
X. Of Towers and Sea-Marks (Triumphal arches) 
XI. Of Rivers, Channels, High-Ways, Bridges, Ships, &c (Common Ways; 
Bridges or Sluces; Of Ships; The Courts of the Governers of the Provinces) 
XII. Of Rivers, Waterfalls, Lakes, &c (Of Water-Shoots and Great Falls of Water;
Of Springs, Wells, and Fountains) 
XIII. Of Hills and Mountains 
XIV. Of Mines of all sorts, as Metals, Stones, &c
XV. Of Roots, Herbs, Flowers, Reeds, Trees, and Fruits (Of Flowers; Of Reeds; 
Of Trees; Of Fruits 
XVI. Of Animals (Of Four-footed Creatures; Of fowl; Of Fish; Of Creeping 
Creatures; Of Vermine) 
XVII. Of some things more than Natural, and Strange Pools 
XVIII. Of the Chinese Kings and Emperors, which have Govern'd in China 
before and since Christ's Birth 
XIX. Of the last Chinese and Tartar War, wherein the Tartars over-ran and 
conquer'd the whole Empire of China
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By comparing these lists, we can compare how the two authors prioritized otherwise 
disparate aspects of their experiences in China, and assembled these into a textual whole 
intended as representative of its subject. That our diplomats did intend these sections of 
their texts as representative summaries of China is clear enough. Nieuhof, as we have 
seen, titles his notes a “General Description,” and presents them as an educational primer 
in just the manner suggested by his magnificent introduction, with its insertion of the 
author into a romanticized scholarly tradition. But Macartney, too, despite his more 
circumspect title, is dedicated to selling his “Observations” as objective, and he follows 
them with the definitive claim that while he “may have seen neither so well, nor so much” 
as previous travellers to China, that yet he has “made it a point most faithfully to represent 
and report” (250) all that he did see. Continuing, he ends the “Observations” with an 
assertion of its value that appeals to virtuous impartiality, figuring his travelogue as the 
textual analogue of a naturalist painting or textbook image: “the fancy of the painter has 
intruded nothing into the picture that did not appear to him in the original from which he 
drew. He meant neither to embellish nor disfigure, but solely to give as just a resemblance 
as he could” (250). This was, of course, the de facto stance of any travelogue in the 
premodern era – but that rather underscores, than not, the rhetorical cache of such 
appeals to scientific objectivity.
And what do we find in these objective “pictures” of China? The difference between 
the two diplomats is stark. Nieuhof is considerably more concerned with China's natural 
resources than Macartney, and his seven chapters on Chinese species and land features 
never fail to mention their cultural significance and uses to the local inhabitants. Examples 
here are almost too numerous to mention. Many are quite concise, but many others are 
exceptionally detailed. Nieuhof says of the “best Root of China”:
[T]here is of two sorts, the true and counterfeit, yet both natural; the true grows
near to [Liping], and in other places the counterfeit, or, to speak more properly, 
the wild Root, and is that which is brought generally into Europe: It is of a 
reddish colour within, but neither so big, nor of so great Vertue as the true, 
which grows and increases under Ground, almost in the manner of Potatoes in
India, and especially in old Pine-tree Woods, from whence they say this Root 
proceeds, first of all from the Gum or Juice of the Pine-tree, which falling upon 
the Ground, takes Root, and brings forth an Herb, which by degrees spreads 
itself upon the Earth, and grows under Ground with knotty Roots, in shape, 
bigness, and colour, not unlike Indian Coco-Nuts, but thinner and softer, which 
they use in several Medicines. The Root was first known in Europe in the Year 
1535, when the Chinese brought the same to be sold in the City of Goa in 
India; and although the like Root may grow in other parts of India, as also in 
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the West-Indies, yet it is much inferior in goodness to that of the East; the best 
whereof is tasteless, heavy, sound, and firm.
This Root has a particular Vertue, according to the relation of Garcias, for the 
cure of the Spanish Pox, and is soveraign against Itch, Tremblings, Aches, 
Gout, etc. It is also very good for a weak Stomach, Headache, the Stone in the
Bladder proceeding from Cold. (213)
Nieuhof goes on from there to discuss, in equal depth, further virtues of the root; and how, 
exactly, it is prepared as a medicine; and how it is consumed by the Indians and the 
Chinese; and etc. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the description is most 
important for what it reveals about Nieuhof's general approach to Chinese flora: that it 
must be considered within the context of Chinese culture. For while Nieuhof details the 
areas where the root grows at length, and even relays speculation of its originating from 
pine resin droppings, ultimately, he is most concerned with the root's uses to the Chinese. 
Similarly, his discussion of tea spans three pages, includes an illustration, and details all 
of: the plant itself, where it is grown, how it is grown, how it is harvested, how it is 
consumed, its medicinal properties, and the differences between Chinese and Japanese 
methods of brewing it (215-217). Foregrounded in such passages is a portrayal of the 
Chinese living in direct relationship with a specific landscape and array of local natural 
resources. This is what Nieuhof means when he says, at the beginning of his 12 th chapter, 
“On Rivers”: “Having spoken at large of the chiefest things which the Hand or Industry of 
mortal Man has produc'd, we shall now proceed to particularize such things wherewith 
Nature has abundantly funish'd the Chinese out of her rich Store” (203). Understanding 
the Chinese, for Nieuhof, means understanding the Chinese landscape, and even its 
nonhuman milieu, with whom they are always depicted in relation. 
And while Macartney's journal's descriptions of, say, Chinese agricultural methods 
sometimes rise to Nieuhoffian levels of detail, he doesn't devote a single chapter of his 
“Observations” to any such topics.57 His “Observations” of China, though touching on 
Chinese gardening, for example, (which probably speaks more to his personal interests 
than anything else) overwhelmingly emphasize the cultural; as if he identifies a distinction 
between the land and its inhabitants that Nieuhof does not. Perhaps he thought the 
descriptions of Chinese terrain in his journal, together with the illustrations provided by his 
draughtsman, would be sufficient to evoke the Chinese countryside in the minds of 
readers who would have been familiar with chinoiserie designs. The idea doesn't quite 
57. For example, his discussion of local farming methods in Kiangsi (136-137).
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satisfy, but chinoiserie was a well established decorative aesthetic by the late 18 th century, 
and Macartney does directly refer to it once in his journal, noting that near the city of Tchin-
chien the landscape “almost realises the extravagant paintings of China fans and screens”
he has seen in Britain (230). But surely Macartney's odd neglect of the land in what he 
offers as a general treatment of China boils down to more than presumed audience 
familiarity, or mere whim, especially given how often his journal treats Chinese methods of 
working the land. How do we make sense of this?
Given Macartney's damning assessment of the Qing court's policy towards science 
education, and yet frequent (and not unironic) attempts to purloin ingenious Chinese 
technologies; perhaps, in light of this, it isn't straining credibility to see in Macartney's 
natureless “Observations” evidence of an underlying opinion hinted at elsewhere in his 
text: that China the countryside – that endless reservoir of potential commodities that the 
British crown had so coveted, and for so long – does not essentially belong to the Chinese
who inhabit it. Macartney's “Observations,” in both its chaptering and content, quarantines 
Chinese culture from its natural setting, even when addressing such things as Chinese 
agriculture – which he does by airily and vaguely referring the reader to notes scattered 
elsewhere throughout his journal (241). He does not foreground, as Nieuhof does, the 
Chinese' relationship to their lands at any point in his “Observations,” and shows none of 
the Dutchman's interest in China's natural features. His “Trade and Commerce” chapter, 
for instance, discusses commodities with no reference to the extraction of raw materials. 
Aside from a footnote about Kiangnan brown cotton (which “loses its original colour in two 
or three generations” [230] when transplanted in Canton), this chapter is strictly economic. 
By contrast with Nieuhof's “General Description,” Macartney's “Observations” portrays 
China as a people and a place, not a people in a place. Formally, his “Observations” divest
the Chinese of their lands – a distinctly imperialistic gesture, even if only a small, symbolic 
one. 
But small symbolic gestures too count for something, especially in an appendix 
meant to flesh out and complement the journal to which it was attached. De-located, the 
China of Macartney's “Observations” is as decontextualised as a specimen on a plate: the 
distillation of a people to its most general elements. And that is just one of many instances 
of the scientism that informs An Embassy to China – the record of one of the most 
influential and debated of British diplomats, and a crucial volume of the history of Sino-
British relations. And though Nieuhof's travelogue too is, as we have seen, a scientistic 
work, it is notable how much severer Macartney's is in comparison. An Embassy to China, 
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relative to Nieuhof's An Embassy from the East India Company is astonishingly cynical: 
habitually concerned with recording China's commodities, profitable techne, and military 
vulnerabilities; and insistent on depicting the Qing rulers as usurpers somehow wholly 
ignorant of science, and yet clever enough to be jealous of their subjects' potential 
discovery of the superiority of European wares. And though it does display moments of 
sympathy for or wonder at the Chinese, these qualities in no wise counterbalance its 
pervasive grimness – or temper the severity of its scientistically inflected imperial 
aggression. 
Chapter Five: Houckgeest, A Lighter Shade of Imperialism
Properly introducing A. E. van Braam Houckgeest's An Authentic Account of the 
Embassy of the Dutch East India Company to the Court of the Emperor of China, in the 
Years 1794 and 1795, means starting things off, unexpectedly, with a pirate story. As 
George R. Loehr (1938) explains: “In 1798, as a result of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain,
a state of undeclared naval warfare existed between France and the United States,” one 
consequence of which was that the French Directoire “authorized the use of privateers to 
prey on American shipping” (186). And prey the privateers did, on any number of ships 
whose stories do not cross into the current thesis – and one whose story does. A ship 
whose freight just happened to include 500 freshly minted copies of the first full volume of 
Houckgeest's travelogue – what has come to be known as the “Philadelphia edition” – a 
French translation of Houckgeest's original Dutch manuscript by the Philadelphia-based 
Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry. These books were smuggled to France, where 
most were subsequently lost to history. But not before an enterprising Parisian printer 
named Garnery “pirated the first volume of the Philadelphia edition, bringing out its 
contents in two octavo volumes” (186). Further pirated translations quickly followed from 
this “Paris edition,” including R. Phillips' London-published English translation (1798), upon
which my thesis is based (186-187). Houckgeest, incidentally, was never able to make any
reclamation against this piracy (Duyvendak, 103). 
Phillips' “London edition” has become the predominant English language translation
of Houckgeest's travelogue, and if any other English translations are available, they have 
done a fine job hiding from me. And this is unfortunate, because Phillips' book, as the 
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preceding story relates, misses out the entire second volume of the Philadelphia edition of 
Houckgeest's travelogue – which was the only edition ever actually sanctioned by 
Houckgeest himself.58 Phillips' London edition follows Garnery's Paris edition in splitting its
single original volume into two smaller, octavo volumes, and for the remainder of this 
thesis any mentions of volumes I or II will refer to these octavo volumes. Luckily, there is 
plenty to read and analyse just within the London edition: it spans more pages than either 
of Nieuhof's or Macartney's entire travelogues, considered separately; or roughly as many 
pages as Nieuhof's and Macartney's travelogues together, if Kircher's excerpts are 
dropped from the former.59 This is remarkable given that the rare second volume of the 
Philadelphia edition apparently contained a further 205 pages of journal, as well as a great
variety of supplementary material (Duyvendak, 104). To my knowledge, however, the 
second volume of the Philadelphia edition, besides being exceedingly difficult to procure, 
is not available in English – and as there is nothing else I can say about it, I must here 
sadly leave it aside.
The paratexts
R. Phillips' 1798 English translation of Houckgeest's An Authentic Account finds the 
diplomat's journal embedded, like a gem in a Baroque setting, within an elaborate, even 
fussy assortment of paratexts that provide its intended context. Its paratextual 
extravagance is in fact what most immediately distinguishes Houckgeest's work, at the 
formal level, from the previous two travelogues we have examined. On that basis, I have 
decided to consider them in a section of their own before turning to his text proper. In their 
myriad ways, each of these paratexts contributes to Houckgeest's overall image as a man 
of scientific mind and disposition. 
Volume I of the travelogue contains most of the travelogue's paratextual material: 
firstly, an “Advertisement to the Reader” from Houckgeest's English publisher; secondly, 
Houckgeest's dedication to the United States' then-sitting president, George Washington; 
thirdly, the “Advertisement to the Editor,” a pointed mini-biography of Houckgeest originally
written in French by Saint-Méry; fourthly, Houckgeest's “Introduction”; fifthly, a “Notes” 
section that combines a glossary of Chinese terms, concepts, and places, with a few 
58. Loehr (186-187); Duyvendak (103-105).
59. My maths here are based on my specific editions of Nieuhof and Macartney, as detailed in their 
respective chapters. But my point is merely to indicate that Houckgeest's full travelogue was considerably 
larger than Nieuhof's or Macartney's.
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miscellaneous observations on the culture and climate; and finally, an “Itinerary” that gives 
the dates for the locations Houckgeest et al. visited in China. 
Formally displaced from its cousins, but performing a similar rhetorical function, 
volume II of Houckgeest's travelogue also contains a notable paratext, subsequent to the 
journal proper and closing out the English edition: the curious “Notice of a Collection of 
Chinese Drawings.” The “Notice” is a minutely detailed description of the numerous 
drawings of China and its inhabitants – human and non – made under Houckgeest's 
direction during his mission, which was published in lieu of the drawings themselves 
(which were at that time on display in Philadelphia). There is no such thing as an incidental
paratext; the considerable forethought put into producing and ordering those attending 
Houckgeest's commissioned journal demand scrutiny for their individual and cumulative 
rhetorical functions relative to Houckgeest's text. It is with them, then, that we shall begin 
our reading of Houckgeest's travel tome, before moving on to his journal itself.
Houckgeest's travelogue begins with London publisher R. Phillips' “Advertisement 
of the English Publisher,” a formal, if largely perfunctory document that accomplishes three
goals with businesslike efficiency. Firstly, it affirms the value of Houckgeest's observations 
(“an acceptable and valuable addition to the existing knowledge relative to an Empire, the 
extent and antiquity of which render it an almost exhaustless subject of information and 
curiosity” [vol. I, iii]); secondly, it affirms the quality of its translation from the French 
(effected by an unnamed “Gentleman of approved talents” whose previous “long residence
in France has rendered incapable of the blunders that almost always deform books 
translated from the French tongue into ours” [vol. I, iii]); and lastly, it offers a brief 
explanation of the rationale behind the placement of certain paratexts (e.g. the placement 
of the glossary-containing “Notes” at the beginning of volume I for reader ease [vol. I, iii]). 
These functions are not themselves unusual, but do attest to the level of care taken in the 
presentation of Houckgeest's travelogue. And without demanding too much more of such a
slight handful of paragraphs, the “Advertisement of the English Publisher,” with its brisk 
confirmation of the high ability and reliability of all the parties involved in the production of 
Houckgeest's travelogue, can certainly be seen as consonant with what will become An 
Authentic Account's overriding paratextual motif: the credibility of the text, as evinced by 
the scientific disposition of the author. 
We find this sentiment also budding in Houckgeest's brief dedication, which follows 
the “Advertisement.” Written to the first president of the United States, George 
Washington, the dedication, in advertising Houckgeest's national alliances, serves as a 
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convenient summary of the principles with which he meant to associate his literary 
endeavour – a point that becomes especially clear when we remember that the United 
States had nothing to do with the embassy to which Houckgeest had become attached. 
On the contrary, Houckgeest's embassy's was bankrolled by the VOC (whose name after 
all is right in the title). He opens the dedication with a swooping circumlocution describing 
the Chinese as “the most ancient peoples which now inhabits this globe, and which owes 
its long existence to the system [emphasis mine]” kindly superintended by the “Father of 
the National Family,” the emperor. I find it significant that Houckgeest frames his very first 
description of China as the consequence of a brilliant “system” (v) – not the flowering of a 
particular nature, but rather, of the adherence to a rational organization of government – 
which he then approvingly compares to that of his own adopted country, the US.60 At a 
time when essentialised notions of racial difference were becoming widespread, 
Houckgeest's attribution of the success of the Chinese empire to an ingenious social 
invention was perhaps more radical than it might today seem.61 Nor does this require 
asking more of Houckgeest than he intended: to liken the US at the optimistic beginning of
its independence with history's longest-reigning empire was more than the adulation of an 
idealistic new citizen, or fawning political fanboy. Equating the rationalistic, Enlightenment-
era principles that were given to undergird America's political foundation with the longevity,
stability, and wealth of the Chinese empire (vi), Houckgeest betrays, in his travelogue's 
literal first pages, an ideological orientation that we have seen before associated with 
scientism. One that will structure, across his journal, his observations of the late Qing 
empire, its environs, its conventions, and its peoples. And finally, I have mentioned that 
Houckgeest makes his dedication to the head of his adopted nation, despite his having 
travelled in a Dutch embassy: this international gesture positions his travelogue not only 
as a gift from one Western nation to another, but a gift comprised specifically of knowledge
of China. It offers up China as a specimen for Western study; a trope we have already 
seen in Nieuhof and Macartney's encyclopedic approaches to especially the latter sections
of their own journals.  
Following Houckgeest's dedication is the “Advertisement of the Editor” – a 
60. Duyvendak speaks at length of Houckgeest's association with the Washingtons; he obtained permission 
from George to make his book's dedication to him, and seems to have gifted Martha a porcelain set on his 
return from diplomatic duties in Canton (101).
61. Blue: “By the nineteenth century, ideas about differences in the genetically determined capacities of 
different peoples was taking on widespread theoretical importance in European intellectual culture...” and it 
had begun to become a common place that the cultural inferiority of the non-white races, as this was 
variously construed, could be traced back to differences “at the natural, biological level, in human racial 
distinctions which could be attested scientifically” (78).
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fascinating work of marketing-qua-biography produced by the controversial pen of 
Houckgeest's French language translator and original editor, M.L.E. Moreau de Saint-
Méry. Saint-Méry, for reasons that will presently become clear, deserves some review in 
his own right. A French scholar and statesman of uneven fortune, Saint-Méry is best 
known today for helping found the Museum of Paris, ardently defending the institutions of 
segregation and slavery, and for several flights to and from France as he fell out of favour 
with various governments.62 But perhaps his most enduring textual legacy is a French 
treatise he wrote, the notorious Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et 
historique de la partie française de l’isle Saint-Domingue. This work, which intended to 
encyclopedize the island of Saint Domingue (later Haiti), prominently featured, as a series 
of strict categories, the differentiation between Saint-Domingue's black islanders and white
colonialists to the most minute fraction of miscegenation. Tracing back heritage seven 
generations, his system encompassed an astonishing 128 different combinations in all. 
Doris Garraway's (2005) research on his “systematic classification of human variety in the 
colonies,” describes it as “unprecedented in its scope and detail” (1). And while 
Garraway's specific interest is in Saint-Méry's text as a projection of white colonial sexual 
desire and reproductive ideology in a time of rapidly shifting island demographics, she 
usefully delineates the scientistic aspects of the work: 
The publication in 1797 of... Saint-Méry’s Description topographique... 
represented a milestone in Enlightenment racial theory... Expanding on previous 
taxonomies of De Pauw and Hilliard d’Auberteuil, and borrowing from eighteenth-
century innovations in algebra and statistics, Moreau devised an exhaustive 
tabular, arithmetic and narrative typology of 'nuances of the skin' along a 
continuum between white and black. Comprising nearly twenty pages, this 
attempt to delineate and classify human color variation in the colony of Saint-
Domingue represented much more than an experiment in Enlightenment 
rationality or the science of amalgamation. By meticulously theorising the 
genealogical progression between black and white, Moreau de Saint-Méry 
fixated on the one difference that carried political consequences in Saint-
Domingue—that between white and non-white, or “sang-mêlé” (mixed-blood).” 
(1) 
There is no evidence of Saint-Méry being a direct influence upon Houckgeest's thinking or 
travelogue; Duyvendak, in fact, finds his French translation remarkably faithful to 
Houckgeest's manuscript (5). Nonetheless, Saint-Méry's obsession with the quantification 
62. Doris Garraway describes how Saint-Méry “took a leading role in the pre-revolutionary assemblies in 
Paris as a spokesperson for the colonial elite, arguing polemically against mulatto rights and the proposals of
the Société des Amis des noirs” (228).
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of racial purity does, even if incidentally, and despite the commonplaceness of such 
concerns during his day, provide a notable example of the various ways in which 
(purportedly) scientific methodology can be twisted to suit the aims of wholly unrelated 
ideologies. And demonstrating the superiority of the white race was common among these
– notably in the 19th century, but beginning much earlier. 
Saint-Méry, that is, and unfortunately, was not extraordinary in his biases. For 
instance, describing 18th century writers Edward Long and Charles White, Adas notes that 
both authors “sought to give scientific respectability to their discourses on African or 
“Negro' inferiority” by appropriating scientific language and methods (e.g. dubious 
exercizes in comparative anatomy), explaining, “Long and White demonstrated what 
potent weapons allegedly scientific investigations and findings might be in arguing the 
case for white superiority” (77). Although he doesn't originate them in scientism, Blue too 
notes the Enlightenment-era roots of those “notions of despotism, paganism, and the 
'unnatural' [that] came to be commonly applied to China in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century,” alongside “the emerging idea of innate racial character that would come into 
greater prominence in the following century” (75-78). Pseudo-scientific works of blatant 
racism like Saint-Méry's help put the lie to any idea of a truly impartial scientific endeavour,
untainted by the prejudices, consciously held or not, of the scientist. A point that Saint-
Méry illustrates too well to leave unmentioned, given my focus on scientism's capacity to 
both accommodate political goals, and obscure them behind the halo of its own presumed 
nobility of intent. 
Saint-Méry's personal shortcomings aside, his painstaking “Advertisement” 
performs an important rhetorical function in framing Houckgeest's text by introducing the 
man himself and providing what is effectively his curriculum vitae. It is essential to the 
paratextual framework of Houckgeest's travelogue, and it begins, significantly, with an 
homage to the importance of integrity in travel writers: 
The more distant the Regions which the Traveller describes, the more they 
differ in their moral and physical nature from the nations for whose instruction 
and gratification he destines his observations, the more important it is to the 
reader to know in what degree his confidence is due to the man that speaks to 
him. (vol. I, vii)
We will not be surprised at Saint-Méry's casual assumption of a profound “moral and 
physical” difference between the earth's peoples. But beyond this, Saint-Méry makes clear
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that travelogues – the one he prefaces, certainly – are not meant as mere entertainment, 
but for the “instruction” of their readers. There is something of the flavour of Nieuhof here, 
and the grand company of history's perambulating scholars with which that diplomat opens
his own travelogue. But what is implicit in Nieuhof, Saint-Méry makes very plain: the 
character of the travelling author is of the utmost importance, for if he is to inhabit the role 
of a teacher, he must show that he is up to the task. And this is especially true regarding 
China; as Saint-Méry goes on to explain: 
It is particularly in respect to China that the Fear of receiving productions of an 
imagination more or less fertile for a true recital is easily awakened. That 
immense Empire is so little known; the prejudices of its inhabitants, or rather the
wisdom of its government, has thrown so many obstacles in the way of those 
Europeans who might feel a desire to penetrate into the country in order to 
satisfy their curiosity and to examine what imperfect and hasty sketches have 
given them a faint idea of, that if it is easy to give imaginary details for certain 
facts, it is at the same time difficult to secure a true relation, from the existing 
distrust, which puts the Reader upon his guard against the Narrator.
Accordingly, to expect always extraordinary things from a Traveller who speaks 
of China, and to doubt his veracity merely because he relates things which 
seem extraordinary – is the disposition of mind of those, who read any thing 
written concerning that astonishing country. (vol I., viii)  
This meta-commentary on the state of European knowledge of China deserves close 
attention, given as it is in a text that has just been designated for public, and not merely 
academic, consumption. A number of things stand out immediately: for instance, that at the
time of Saint-Méry's writing, circa 1798, it was commonly presumed that China was vastly 
different from any European nation. But China was paradoxically also, owing to its 
infamous reluctance to permit outsiders within its borders – which policy Saint-Méry 
sarcastically deems “the wisdom of its government” – a largely speculative construct. The 
entire passage resounds with the implied hunger of a broad audience for “certain facts” of 
the East's great “astonishing country.” 
I am reminded here of Rubiés and Ollé's assertion that “despite... diversity and 
complexity, what makes it possible” by the premodern period to discern a coherent 
European travel writing genre, is not merely these texts' common basis in “the personal 
experience and observations of one or more travellers,” but also an underlying “claim to 
scientific authority through experience” (5-6). A claim that Rubiés and Ollé argue “made it 
possible for the genre to function as a central element in the development of a European 
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Republic of Letters” (5-6). Rubiés and Ollé do not mean that only men of science were 
trusted as observers of exotic places and peoples, but rather, that empiricism, as a 
cornerstone of Western science, was essential to the European travel writer's role as a 
reporter of, in Saint-Méry's words, “certain facts.” Saint-Méry's “Advertisement” echoes 
and corroborates this view: by Houckgeest's writing in the late 18th century, the importance
of the travel writer's observations being based on first-hand experience was well-
established enough to deserve, and even apparently require, direct acknowledgement. 
The travelogue was not a mere memoir, it was, at least in theory, a valid tool by which to 
add to the pool of knowledge on a place, a people. It was a tool for “instruction.” A fact 
which ought always to be kept in mind when reading State-sanctioned journals like 
Houckgeest's (and Nieuhof's and Macartney's); from the outset, such texts were framed as
works of reconnaissance – records simultaneously of and for the imperial gaze. 
Saint-Méry's “Advertisement” is also useful as a barometer of European familiarity 
with, if not China itself, then rumours of China – an indication of how large China loomed 
in the European imagination. Indeed, his claim that suspicion is the natural “disposition of 
mind” of any reader of travel accounts of China can't help but impress the modern reader 
with its casual cynicism. As Rubiés and Ollé, and Odell too, constantly stress, textual 
claims to veracity were a travel writing trope from the genre's inception – empty stylistic 
formality rather than trustworthy commentary in a medium rife with plagiarism and fiction 
(Rubiés and Ollé, 5; Odell, Soul of Transactions). But after all, and as I must continue to 
stress, the actual truthfulness of Houckgeest's text is immaterial here; my focus is on its 
ideological foundations. And Saint-Méry's preface, whatever its factuality, is aimed 
squarely at establishing Houckgeest's reliability as a narrator: a quality Saint-Méry gives in
scientistic terms. He goes to great pains to do so, specifying Houckgeest's “rational 
curiosity which seeks to penetrate into mysteries under which it imagines useful truths to 
lie concealed”; and attributing to him possession of “that sentiment so natural to a 
European, of wishing to acquire further knowledge of a nation of which the little already 
known furnishes matter of so much well-founded astonishment” (x). The scientistic 
inflection of “rational curiosity,” and of “penetrating... mysteries” to arrive at “useful truths” 
is blatant enough – but given my interest in what Houckgeest's travelogue might reveal 
about premodern European mindsets, I will also note that Saint-Méry rather helpfully 
identifies the desire to penetrate China's mysteries as a pan-European trait. With the 
breezy hyperbole that characterises his “Advertisement” as a whole, he avers of 
Houckgeest: “Never, I will venture to assert, did a foreigner leave China... with so many 
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testamonies to his veracity” (vol I., xii). Houckgeest's text, if we are to take Saint-Méry at 
his sterling word, is pure; as honest and impartial as a scientific work.63 
But besides being merely a work of “rational curiosity,” Houckgeest's text was also 
openly a work of imperialism. Saint-Méry explains: 
The narrative of his journey can even be considered, in some degree, as an 
official account of the Dutch Embassy, since having been submitted to the 
persons belonging to that Embassy, it did not afford them the least room for 
criticism, and since the Ambassador himself took copies of it, with a view of 
sending them to the Regency in Batavia, and to the Prince Stadtholder. (vol. I, 
xii)
It would not be outrageous to hear echoes here of Drayton's research on the cosy 
relationship between British science and empire, transposed into a Dutch key. Passed 
through ambassador Isaac Titsingh's hands for inspection, and given his stamp of 
approval as the official record of the embassy's doings in China, Saint-Méry positions 
Houckgeest's travelogue as a sanctioned imperialist gesture before the author's own 
account even begins. It is a scientific survey of a foreign land and people, conducted by 
and for not just the VOC, but the Dutch generally (as the reference to the Prince 
Stadtholder makes clear) – if not, in fact, for the West tout court. And though Duyvendak 
reminds us that “The Dutch assumed that they merely represented a trading-company, 
and could not be regarded as representatives of a foreign monarch, as was the case of 
Macartney and Amherst” (1), he explains that this made no difference anyway to the 
Chinese, who so little understood Dutch government that embassies as early as Nieuhof's 
had to reference an imaginary “King of Holland” to be permitted to function as emissaries 
at all (1-2). Additionally, it seems strange that, if Houckgeest did not want to be compared 
directly to Macartney's literally imperialistic embassy, he should have included mention of 
it in his title, which in full includes that it was “Subsequent to that of the Earl of Macartney,”
(though this may have been the decision of the publisher). Regardless, even were we to 
allow that Houckgeest's work was not commissioned by the Dutch Republic so much as 
the VOC specifically, it is still true that his dedication to George Washington openly posits 
his text as a work at the very least for a Western nation. 
63. Kent, too, if much less effusively than Saint-Méry (a designation which, to be fair, applies to most), is 
careful to note in his “Van Braam Houckgeest, Early American Collector” (1930) that Houckgeest was of a 
constitutionally curious and scholastic nature, writing of Houckgeest's time working in Canton that “[b]esides 
his work, Van Braam devoted himself systematically to the study of the country and its people in all their 
aspects” (163).
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Saint-Méry then explains of the companion drawings to Houckgeest's text, that “a 
collection... [was] exposed for several months at Philadelphia to the view of all amateurs of
the sciences” (vol. I, xiii). Saint-Méry's “amateur” is unrelated to the well-meaning but 
bumbling novice conjured by modern utterances of the word. Saint-Méry, rather, hearkens 
back to the word's Latin origin, which denotes merely a “lover” of something – in this case, 
science. Science here employed to translate China and its endemic cultures into a neat 
set of quantifiable variables – and this despite Saint-Méry's later claim that Houckgeest's 
journal was not “undertaken with a view to reason upon China in a systematic manner, but
to give an account of what [Houckgeest] met with and perceived... It is simple facts that he
relates” (vol. I, xv). And in fact, Houckgeest's is the least systematic of the travelogues 
included in our current study. Nevertheless, Saint-Méry's disavowal of Houckgeest's text 
as a studied assessment of China is not to be taken at face value. Rhetorically, it is a 
cleverly roundabout way to vouch for the author's impartial purity of observation: because 
Houckgeest “cannot be supposed or expected to reduce facts to an agreement with any 
particular opinions,” (vol. I, xv) he can be relied upon for unbiased and “simple facts” – that
is, truth.
Houckgeest claims as much for himself in his formal introduction. Therein, he 
describes his own journal, frankly, confidently, and redundantly, as a “constant depository 
of truths, represented with the most strict regard to truth” (vol. I, xix). Over a century after 
Nieuhof, and longer still since the establishment of its first European-seeded Christian 
communities, China-the-vast yet contained areas which, Houckgeest explains with 
something near surprise, “never yet were marked with the footstep of a European, and 
where his inquisitive eye never yet had an opportunity of making the smallest observation” 
(xvii). Houckgeest's superlative – “the smallest observation” – is tangy with presumption. 
There is something ethnocentric in his jealousy to describe China with “scrupulous 
precision” (vol. I, xix) for Western eyes. “I made a point with myself,” he declares, “of 
committing to paper, with the least possible delay, every thing I should see and observe, in
order that I might give a faithful description of it to my countrymen” ( vol. I, xvii).64 
64. The visual emphasis of Houckgeest's phrasing is intense: “see and observe.” In the second volume of 
his journal, after finally reaching the imperial palace, he invokes the purity of his gaze once again, to assure 
his readers of the truthfulness of a comparison he has just made between an imperial chamber in which his 
company was dined and “a guard house in our own country” (vol. I,192). The shade-throwing is exquisite: 
“The picture will perhaps accord ill the brilliant accounts that the Missionaries have sent to Europe of this 
capital... but I paint what I see, and what (I repeat it again) I so little expected to see, that nothing but my 
own eyes could have convinced me of its reality” (vol.I, 192). In his effort to prove the empirical honesty of 
his observations, Houckgeest does not hesitate to call missionary honesty into question. His remark here 
also recalls Macartney's invocation of painting as a metaphor for his own observations (An Embassy to 
China, 250).
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Houckgeest's scientistic gaze is tied to imperialism by a sense of obligation – but to 
whom? Who are his countrymen? He has by now name-checked both Europe and the 
United States ( vol. I, xvii), and owes allegiances to both; a broad swath in an age 
swarming with empires large and small, and especially notable coming from a globe-
hopping Dutchman called once again to work in the employ of his motherland. His 
paratextual ambiguity seems to hint that his ultimate loyalty is to a “West” apparently more 
distinguishable for its being not-China, than for any positive characteristics of its own. And 
indeed, much later, in his journal itself, he eventually settles the matter. Having boasted of 
the particular esteem in which Qianlong held the Dutch above all other Europeans, 
Houckgeest enthuses that this special favour will provide his embassy the “opportunity of 
seeing things that no foreigner as yet [has] ever beheld. Our desire to enlighten Europe by
our observations on what is most remarkable in China made this information highly 
agreeable” (vol. I, 203).65 Intended to “enlighten Europe,” but dedicated to the American 
president, what the paratexts suggest, then, Houckgeest's journal confirms: that his 
observations were an act of fact-finding; the pivoting of a great generic Western eye 
towards China.
Houckgeest of course was hardly the first Dutchman with such pretensions – we 
have seen the considerable lengths to which Nieuhof went to not only contextualise his 
journal as a scholastic endeavour, but in his “General Description” to present his findings 
in the style of an encyclopedia. Nieuhof's strategy – embellished by van Meur's 
illustrations – paid off, and his travelogue became an institution in its own right; one whose
long shadow fell directly upon Houckgeest. The younger Dutchman was naturally sensible 
of this, and as a consequence is quite tactical about how he positions himself versus his 
forebear. Favourably comparing his work to Nieuhof's, Houckgeest boasts: 
[M]y work will moreover have the merit of being entirely new, since there is not 
a single line borrowed from any traveller or writer whatever... It is with the sole 
view therefore of doing further homage to the truth, that I declare that for twenty
years I had read nothing on the subject of China. Although we had with us the 
work of Nieuhof... I did not chuse to consult it, because I did not wish to enter 
into a refutation of its contents, a thing by no means impossible, and because it 
seemed indubitable that a century and a half must have occasioned some 
change in the aspect of the towns and establishments, and in the face of the 
country. (xx)
65. See also vol. II, where Houckgeest mentions the even more particular esteem that he himself was held 
in by the emperor (246-247).
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Houckeest accomplishes a number of things with this pass at Nieuhof: both 
acknowledging the widespread esteem in which Nieuhof's text has traditionally been held, 
and, without directly contradicting it, implying its obsolescence. Houckgeest carefully 
continues to build his image as an impartial and trustworthy observer, even making the 
surprising move of pleading unfamiliarity with the details of Nieuhof's text so as to 
establish himself as untainted by the former author's influence (which, of course, only 
proves the opposite). To take him at his word, Houckgeest is the perfect candidate to write 
the travelogue with whose creation he had been tasked: a cosmopolitan, disciplined writer,
of scientific disposition, unbiased by devotion to the accounts of any former explorers. The
very man, it would seem, that Saint-Méry claimed he was. In light of our previous 
discussions of Nieuhof and Macartney, it hardly seems necessary to point out the irony in 
Houckgeest's attempting to establish his own objectivity by stressing the originality and 
purity of his observations – i.e. by invoking perhaps the single most exhausted trope in all 
travel literature. By avowing the unprecedented honesty, and therefore originality, of his 
text, Houckgeest only succeeds in proving himself a textbook example of the literary 
lineage from which he is so concerned to separate himself; an act which superficially 
stands in opposition to Nieuhof's brash auto-nomination into the company of history's great
traveller-scholars, but in fact relies upon the same idealization of empirical observation.     
Houckgeest ends his introduction with a de rigueur list of assurances and proofs of 
the veracity of his maps, and some notes on his choice of name translations. Most 
interestingly, he boasts of improving upon a Chinese map of Peking, famed for its 
exactness, which nevertheless did not well indicate the city's suburbs or the precincts of 
Yuen-ming-yuen. The latter of these imperfections, Houckgeest tells us, he “remedied, as 
far as my own judgment authorized me to do it, and after having seen and gone through 
more than three-fourths of the palace” ( vol. I, xxi). The former he amends with help from a
map of Du Halde's ( vol. I, xxi). “Thus it was that I was able to render my topography of 
Pe-king more exact than in the Chinese original” ( vol. I, xxi). These perhaps 
unexceptional seeming passages, on inspection, vividly illustrate scientism's ability to 
handmaiden imperialist conceits: by recourse to both his own and the faculties of another 
great European, Houckgeest, that gracious angel of Western learning, is able to save 
China from the defects of a tradition-bound and outdated cartography. His gesture was 
meant to, and would have resonated with barely concealed symbolism – it still does. To 
place his mapmaking (or rather map-improving) in its proper context, we will recall from 
Adas that:
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European writers frequently linked weaknesses in temporal and spatial 
perception to a general disregard on the part of Africans and Asians for the 
accuracy and precision that had come to be valued so highly in Western 
culture. The emphasis on experiment and empirical validation, central to the 
scientific approach to the material world, had resulted in the imposition of ever 
stricter standards of observation, measurement, testing, and recording from the
seventeenth century onward. (Adas, 263)
Houckgeest's map of Peking was not the passion project of a cartographic hobbyist, but a 
distinctly scientistic, imperialistic act of containment. Precision was, and is, key to scientific
methodology, its hallmark. So, perhaps ironically, whatever the actual exactness of 
Houckgeest's map, his inclusion of several name-dropping paragraphs detailing its 
creation and attesting its precision in an otherwise brief introduction speaks, firstly, to the 
incident's rhetorical importance in establishing his scientific credentials. I refer here, again,
to Odell's work on the visual components of Nieuhof's text; specifically their vital role in 
establishing the truthfulness of the accounts to which they were connected. They literally 
added a new dimension to the information presented by the author, shoring up the proof of
his observations, and giving them an empirical glow. Speaking of Nieuhof's great map of 
China, Odell could as easily be explaining Houckgeest's of Peking: “Because it is specific, 
particular, and related to an individual experience of travel in China, the map appears to 
affirm the author, Nieuhof, as an authentic traveller and to insist on the credibility of the 
text as the relation of an actual experience” (Soul of Transactions, 231). But moreover, 
and as specifically regards the entanglement of scientism with imperialism, it is also 
important to understand that such maps, besides acting as proofs of credible first-hand 
experience and scientific (e.g. cartographic) know-how, were also, as triumphs of the 
Western gaze, ideological victories. By translating Peking into familiar quantities, familiar 
measures, for a Western audience, Houckgeest's map visually and conceptually invades a
foreign city, subjecting it to Western conceptual terms. If we follow Adorno and 
Horkheimer's thought, we know where this leads. This is the vital ideological first step 
towards imperial expansion – not by any means sufficient to provoke such expansion, but 
prerequisite for it to occur. And therefore important enough that drafting it alone was not, 
apparently, sufficient to exhaust its usefulness, but its creation could also be recorded in 
text and trumpeted as proof of the author's European ingenuity – if not, indeed, European 
ingenuity generally. In its way, Houckgeest's map summarizes the scientistic aims of his 
mission overall by demonstrating the very scientific mastery – and its potential utility to the 
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Chinese – that only a couple years earlier Macartney had assumed would effortlessly 
persuade the Chinese into freer trade with Britain. This scientism in Houckgeest is more 
implicit and less aggressive, but just as discernible.   
Perhaps the most interesting of Houckgeest's paratexts is his “Notes” section, in 
which Saint-Méry helps him to clarify a miscellaneous (and quite diverse) set of names 
and concepts that figure in the travelogue.66 We have seen the kin of such notes before in 
Nieuhof and Macartney, who (or whose publishers') placed theirs at or towards the ends of
their travelogues, giving these sections the feeling of a summation – a turning out of the 
personal account to encompass more general observations. This movement parallels the 
empirical process of beginning with personal experience and inducing from it general laws.
Houckgeest's notes, too, his English publisher implies, were originally intended to follow 
his journal. But as Mr. Phillips puts it in his “Advertisement,” since “nearly the whole of the 
words” explained in the “Notes,” “occur in the First Volume, this arrangement is judged to 
be more convenient to the Reader” (vol. I, iv). Houckgeest's notes, like Nieuhof's and 
Macartney's, performs a number of interesting functions. Less systematic than the other 
diplomats, Houckgeest arranges his notes simply in alphabetical order, a rather naive 
organizational method which prevents the academic feel of Nieuhof or Macartney's topical 
chaptering, but which perhaps makes the “Notes” less intimidating. In any case, it prevents
Houckgeest's notes from competing with his journal for precedence. But it also, as 
discussed previously, allows Saint-Méry to make the interesting claim that the very 
unstudied, improvised nature of Houckgeest's composition is a testament to its truth – a 
sign that he is unburdened by the influence of previous writers from whom he might have 
otherwise been tempted to poach. His “Notes” give him an opportunity to address issues 
as varied as agricultural goods (e.g. “Beans”), units of measurement (“Cobido”), literary 
figures (“Confucius”), the presence of other Europeans in China (“Portuguese”), and even 
religion.67
This latter category in fact makes for a good case study of the limitations of 
66. George R. Loehr: “There is a section of Notes, which explain names and terms that appear in the text. It 
is especially here that one realises the great contribution of Moreau de Saint-Méry, who was far more than a 
mere translator...” and whose efforts were “able definitely to place a scholar's stamp on the work” (184).
67. Houckgeest, surprisingly, makes no particular critique of the fact that “Cobido” referred to three different 
measures: the Mandarin's, the merchant's, and the carpenter's, as he gives it. Adas notes that the plasticity 
of the li was a bugbear to many European commentators (262-263). In fact, it was a widespread 19th 
century complaint that the Chinese' pitiable scientific deficiency was a result of a “disregard... for accuracy in 
any form,” a sentiment that underscores just how important precise quantification was to the European as a 
proof of scientific mastery (Adas, 265). Note also, for comparison, Macartney: “The Chinese could not 
venture to depend on the calculations of their own people, as they are known to be never quite accurate, and
to be often, indeed generally, very erroneous” (232).
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Houckgeest's analysis. According to the diplomat:
The primitive religion of China is that of the ancient patriarchs, such as 
Abraham, Melchisedeck, etc... The second sort of religion, adopted long after 
the first, and consequently when the Chinese were already embodied into a 
regular nation, is Idolatry, and Idolatry carried to such a length, that every one is
free to make Gods according to his fancy, so that every head of a family has 
some of his own creation. ( vol. I, xxxvii)
Gregory Blue claims that as early as the 14th and 15th centuries, popular travelogues such 
as Marco Polo's, or Sir John Mandeville's fictitious Travels, had circulated among 
European literati the notion that the Chinese knew and honoured Christian scripture (58). 
And while the Nestorian Stele, known to the West for some 150 years by Houckgeest's 
time, proves that in fact Christianity did have an early presence of some kind in China68, 
the idea that it was ever widespread – much less China's original, “primitive” religion – is 
absurd. And certainly, casting the ancestor worship of Chinese households as expressions
of mere “fancy” shows just how limited understandings of endemic Chinese traditions were
to Houckgeest at least, and the West in general. There is nothing sensational about 
Houckgeest's misunderstanding; it was not likely an intentional misrepresentation. But his 
verdict is delivered with the conviction of certainty, and underwritten by the great pains he 
(and Saint-Méry) have taken to establish his unerring credibility as an observer of Chinese
culture. No qualifications of his impartiality are ever made in the paratexts accompanying 
his journal; no mention of the possibility that, as a Westerner, his understanding of the 
Chinese might be biased. 
It would be wrong, of course, to push upon Houckgeest modern worries about the 
fallout of ethnocentricity. But we will remember that the diplomat oddly celebrates how little
he has read previously on China. Granted, he had lived and, as an agent of the VOC, 
worked in China for years in Canton previously, and so clearly would have been familiar 
with many aspects of Chinese culture. But given that he has made the state of his 
familiarity (i.e. lack thereof) with popular literary works on China a talking point, we might 
expect him to address the reasonable complaint that this gap in study might handicap his 
interpretive ability, especially regarding the various fine details of Chinese ritual (and other)
practice. Houckgeest, however, never hedges the accuracy of his observations; as we 
have seen, he even boasts in his “Introduction” of the “scrupulous precision” to be found in
68. As Kircher relates in Part I, Chapter I of the abridged China Illustrata appended to Nieuhof's travelogue 
as “An Appendix: or Special Remarks taken at large out of Athanasius Kircher's Antiquities of China” (319).
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“the details” – not otherwise qualified – that he “present[s] to the Public” (vol. I, xix). So 
when we find, subsequently, that his assessments are distorted by Western presumption –
and this, again, despite prior experience living in Canton – it is worthwhile to consider how 
these distortions may have originated. 
The scientism underlying Houckgeest's observations, although not directly 
responsible for his insistence on, in this case, the Abrahamic origins of Chinese religion, 
did not prevent him from making that false attribution either. And while it may go without 
saying that no European record of China could possibly be expected to be correct in every
particular, it nonetheless seems appropriate, given the vehemence of Houckgeest and 
Saint-Méry's insistence on Houckgeest's purity of analysis, to point out that the facts do 
not actually support his being any less beholden to the conceits of his time and culture 
than any other Western observer. Were this not the case, then we would have to credit 
Houckgeest with the transcendent objectivity that he and his translator boast of him – and 
would need, as well, to rethink our critique of his scientism. But even before his journal 
proper commences, he has already proven a fallible enough interpreter of Chinese culture 
that inspection of the ideological lens through which he views China seems necessary. 
And though it is possible that charitable modern readers might charitably draw a line 
between the accuracy of Houckgeest's account of his travels as he experienced them, and
any more objective assay of Chinese culture per se, that is certainly not a line that the 
diplomat himself draws. For Houckgeest, it is the “precision” of his recollection of “even the
most minute particulars” (vol. I, xix) of his journey that legitimises his commentary. But as it
turns out, fallible conclusions can be wrought even from the most precisely recollected of 
particulars. And it is for that reason that one not only can, but must examine Houckgeest's 
travelogue, like all travelogues, for its hidden biases.
And respecting these biases, I will content myself to consider one last, brief 
example from Houckgeest's “Notes” to shore up our exegesis of this lengthy paratext. In 
the “Temperature” section, Houckgeest makes an extended comparison of the climates in 
Peking and, located at almost the same latitude, his adopted city of Philadelphia: “39 
degrees 55 minutes north, and 39 degrees 56 minutes north,” respectively. “The winter is 
exceedingly cold and severe” in both cities, but “[t]he winter begins earlier in Pe-king” and 
the harshest winds come from the north rather than northwest in Philadelphia. And though 
water in both cities freezes at the same temperature – “before Reaumur's thermometer 
has fallen to the freezing point” – there is “less intensity, and still less duration in the cold 
at Philadelphia, than at Pe-king; since at the former city there are pretty frequently partial 
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thaws” (vol. I, xxxix). Houckgeest then gives some examples of particularly hot summers in
both locations, before surmising that “Pe-king is at once colder and hotter than 
Philadelphia,” and theorising that, contrary to popular opinion, this couldn't be an effect of 
land clearance alone. This almost pedantic discussion of atmospheric phenomena in 
China and the US is yet another proof of the thoroughness and pointedly scientific 
precision of Houckgeest's commentary; one whose rhetorical success depends upon prior 
association between scientific methodology and truth. Like many of the examples we have
considered so far, it amounts to little on its own – but considered in aggregate, such 
examples demonstrate incontrovertibly just how ideologically fundamental scientism was 
to Houckgeest's thought. 
The last paratext of volume one of Houckgeest's travelogue, directly preceding his 
journal itself, is the “Itinerary.” It is an interesting addition to the travelogue's paratextual 
framework, the key to whose significance can be found in its subtitle, which ends 
“...serving to explain the Map inserted at the beginning of the first Volume.” Pinpointing the
embassy's exact location each day of the trip, it adds a temporal specificity to 
Houckgeest's text intended to complement and complete the spatial specificity of his map 
(and other visuals). Like them, it insists upon the empirical nature of his observations by 
foregrounding that his account is indeed “the relation of an actual experience” (Odell, Soul 
of Transactions, 231). Pulled from Houckgeest's journal, its cascade of dates and places 
streamlines the embassy's journey into a reference guide to help prevent readers from 
losing imaginative track of his location amidst the swimming details of Houckgeest's prose.
And so, at its most literal, it is simply a tool for ease of reading. But considered rhetorically,
it is yet another buttress to Houckgeest's credibility, which performs the conceptual work of
demystifying China by translating it into graspable scientific units – not sufficient proof on 
its own of the ideological basis of Houckgeest's travelogue, but, considered within the 
context of its paratextual fellows, and indeed Houckgeest's main text, an undeniable 
variation on an overriding theme. 
Taken as a group, the habitual need to demonstrate the author's credibility is the 
most defining feature of Houckgeest's first volume paratexts. And everywhere within them 
are examples of his (and Saint-Méry's) reliance upon both semantic scientism 
(quantification, comparison), and thematic scientism (referencing Reamur's thermometer; 
theorising about causes of climate difference between Philadelphia and Peking) as the 
means by which this credibility can be demonstrated to his audience. In Houckgeest's as 
in our previously examined travelogues, scientific references both implicit and overt are 
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given as the vocabulary of honesty; an association that attests the romanticization of 
science's presumably privileged access to indisputable, factual truths. And an association 
that, as Adas has argued, Europeans (and their American cultural progeny) had come to 
see as essential to social progress (203-205).
This would certainly explain the most unusual of Houckgeest's paratexts, and the 
only one included in An Authentic Account's second volume: the “Notice of a Collection of 
Chinese Drawings, in the Possession of M. Van Braam, Author of this Work.” Provided by 
Saint-Méry, the “Notice” is a scrupulous accounting of the various drawings made under 
Houckgeest's direction during the embassy's travels (which at the time of his English 
language publication were, as noted earlier, on show in Houckgeest's adopted home, 
Philadelphia). According to Saint-Méry, Houckgeest also had a hand in writing these notes,
although the comparative levels of contribution are not clear. Regardless, as a support to 
Houckgeest's main text, which explains in detail the apparently large number and variety 
of illustrations produced by the embassy, the “Notice” functions similarly to the visuals 
themselves. It ensures the factuality of the travelogue as a whole, and, even in the 
absence of these visuals, provides the categorical system by which Houckgeest seems to 
have organized them. This is an interesting substitution, but one that make sense in light 
of Odell's assertion of the importance of visual media in establishing Nieuhof's – and by 
extension any travelogue's – authenticity. To this end, Henry Kent, adulatory to a fault in 
his 1930 article for the American Antiquarian Society, writes:
Today, the traveler in strange countries carries with him, as an essential part of 
his equipment, a camera or a moving picture machine, with which he records 
what he sees, and, what is more important, verifies what he says... Our author, 
however, conceived a method of work which, so far as I know, was unique in the
history of books. He employed two native Chinese artists, whom he kept 
employed for five years, to make a series of drawings of what he saw and 
intended to talk about, artists who, judging from what we know of other similar 
work, were remarkably proficient in their art. The collection consisted of thirty-
eight volumes, containing about eighteen hundred drawings, with maps, charts, 
and plans and other drawings not included in the volumes. (172)
Kent's declaration is astounding, if not exactly for its factuality. Houckgeest was certainly 
not the first diplomat to employ draughtsman, nor to make the visual records of his journey
– whose veracity was inevitably passionately attested to – central to his subsequent 
publications. Schmidt's work has made this fact abundantly clear; indeed, as it has also 
made clear that many of the images that did feature in published travelogues throughout 
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the 17th and 18th centuries were either recycled or had been ornamented by atelier editors, 
however they might have been marketed as the works of the author's own travelling party. 
But Kent's zeal here is most important in its own regard, as it encapsulates just the 
enthusiasm for “drawings, maps, charts, and plans” that Odell speaks of, and for just the 
reasons she gives of their importance to premodern travel writing generally. Kent's striking 
comparison of Houckgeest's visual media with the apparently more objective camera 
hinges upon the camera's vaunted ability to “verify” what the photographer sees. Aside 
from underscoring the continued importance in the early 20th century of the scientistic 
objectivity and accuracy of the traveller's account, Kent's testimony also pointedly 
identifies Houckgeest's visual media as essential evidence to his credibility as an 
observer. Indeed, the title of Kent's work, “Van Braam Houckgeest, An Early American 
Collector,” figures Houckgeest's travelogue as not a series of personal observations, but a 
“collection” of specimens – an array of exotic butterflies, pinned to cardboard and encased
in glass. As evidence, that is, of a China that, by virtue of Houckgeest's enlightened 
disinterest, could only have existed as he described it. Moreover, it portrays Houckgeest's 
travelogue as a great service performed for the United States – a humanitarian feat which 
“had no small part in fixing the American public's mental picture of that strange land” 
(174).69
But there is another way in which the “Notice” establishes the scientism of 
Houckgeest's travelogue. Beside what it indicates about the need for visuals at all as 
evidence of their author's objectivity of observation, it also highlights just how important 
taxonomical categorical systems per se of Chinese phenomena were, both to 
Houckgeest's descriptive process, and apparently to the reading public generally as a 
means of making sense of China. How else do we explain that the “Notice” – a custom 
taxonomy of Chinese phenomena designed to organize a specific collection of drawings – 
was published finally, and with little sense of irony, in the absence of the drawings 
themselves? Such a cheeky manoeuvre is only comprehensible if we allow that the 
taxonomy in question had value in itself. And it did: as an expression of the centrality of 
quantification and taxonomization to Western cultural apprehension.
Houckgeest's habitual insistence upon using scientific conceptual strategies to 
measure, assess, and explicate China and its people, supports my overarching 
theorisation that scientific methodology was often used as an instrument of imperial power:
69. Interestingly, in context Kent's quote refers to both Houckgeest and Saint-Méry, who Kent seems to 
place on nearly the same plane as Houckgeest as creator of An Authentic Account.
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most literally, albeit not only, as a means of imperial reconnaissance. Witness, for 
example, sections of the “Notice” such as “IX. Natural History: Fishes and Crustaceous 
Animals,” in which stock is taken of the “Two volumes containing eighty drawings, a foot 
long by about nine inches high, in which are drawn and coloured after nature fresh and 
salt-water fish, sea-snakes and eels, lobsters, and shrimps...” (vol. II, 315). It is rather 
unlikely that Houckgeest's interest in Chinese crustaceans was indicative of any direct 
VOC mandate. Rather, what we find here is that obsessive need to quantify China in terms
of both human and natural resources that unites all three of our travelogues. A need, at 
base, to reduce China to a set of explicable, finite, and predictable factors that can only 
remind us of Adorno and Horkheimer's description of scientific understanding as a 
predicate to control. And without accusing Houckgeest of fully conscious designs upon 
fomenting conquest, we can still note both the amenability of his scientism – the searching
thoroughness of which, if not scope, is exemplified in the “Notice's” pedantic attention to 
M.I.A. drawings of crabs – to imperialist reconnaissance. Not to mention the gravity with 
which the author undertook his literary endeavour. Houckgeest was quite aware of the at 
least latent imperial import of his project. He ends his introduction with the Latin, “In 
magnis voluisse sat est”: To once have wanted, is enough in great deeds. And what was 
his great deed? The subtext is as clear as it is familiar: to attempt, to a greater extent than 
perhaps any Westerner before him, to lay China bare to Western eyes. Down, even, to its 
shrimps and crabs.
The Journal
And it seems particularly appropriate, on that note, to finally crack open 
Houckgeest's journal itself. Like the two travelogues I have already examined, An 
Authentic Account is undoubtedly a scientistically influenced work – but it strikes a very 
different chord than Nieuhof's or Macartney's efforts. Its scientism, although shaped by the
Dutch imperial70 desire to maintain cordial trade relations with China, lacks the urgency 
and martial aggression of Macartney; military assessments in Houckgeest's text are more 
general than tactical, and do not give way to imagined conquest scenarios like they do in 
the work of his British contemporary. This, I think, reflects the Dutch Republic's less 
70 Again, I shall continue to refer to Dutch “imperialism,” in recognition of the republic's colonial holdings and
mercantilism; and more particularly in this case, the general similarities between the economic goals of 
Houckgeest's and Macartney's embassies (if not, as we shall see, how these goals were pursued).   
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fraught relationship with the Chinese.71 It is certainly not that Houckgeest's work doesn't 
evince scientistic concerns with “unveiling” the Chinese (and therefore with knowledge as 
power in the Adornan sense) – we have heard him claim this “great deed” as a goal for 
himself in his introduction – but Houckgeest's aggression remains largely in this abstract, 
conceptual sphere. 
Like Macartney, Houckgeest begins his narrative simply: at the beginning, without 
any Nieuhoffian grandstanding. But for all its subtlety, his approach is just as calculated. 
He gives the background for the embassy: while working in the Dutch Canton factory in 
1794, Houckgeest was informed by a Chinese official that “his Majesty [Emperor Qianlong]
was going to celebrate for the sixtieth time” his accession to the throne, and that “as the 
Dutch nation was one of the first established in China [as traders], the Tsong-tou [Viceroy] 
would feel a real satisfaction at seeing a representative of the Company attend” (2) the 
celebrations. Houckgeest's insistence upon Chinese titles and names establishes him 
immediately as familiar with the language and people; a helpful footnote at the bottom of 
the page refers readers to the “Notes” section earlier in the text with its glossary of these 
terms. The footnote was English-language publisher Phillips', not Houckgeest's; but it 
nonetheless underscores the importance of his paratexts, with their heavy emphasis on 
his credibility as an observer of Chinese culture, to his text as a whole, and in fact 
continues their work. But this introduction to Houckgeest's journal is also worth noting for 
the way it immediately portrays Houckgeest as imbricated within a larger institutional 
network. He is a VOC man, of implicitly established authority and ranking (as the 
mandarin's visit to him indicates), and his subsequent text can and should be taken as 
coming from the mouthpiece of Dutch economic interests. He is no missionary, nor some 
wide-eyed merchant ingénue experiencing the Orient for the first time. And for all that his 
paratexts stress to us his impartiality, we readers know, from the first pages of 
Houckgeest's journal, that we are dealing with a distinctly Western subjectivity, beholden 
to and representative of the Western, officially Dutch, ideological status quo. 
Houckgeest vs. Macartney; the return of the “Lou-wa” birds
Like Nieuhof and Macartney, Houckgeest's descriptions of China and the Chinese 
71. For instance, on the 21st of February he notes that “it seldom happened” that groups of above “three or 
four soldiers” ever emerged from the roadside guard houses in “the province of which the Emperor makes 
his residence” (89). Houckgeest expresses surprise that other parts of the country seem better guarded than
this, but makes no further comment.
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are shaped by both scientism and imperialism. But Dutch imperialism in the late 18 th 
century was not equivalent to the British imperialism of the time; the British had eclipsed 
the Dutch as colonial holders and traders.72 However, there was one quarry in particular 
that the British had long coveted that continued to elude them – a favourable trade 
balance with the Chinese. It was ultimately to rectify this situation that Macartney had 
sought Qianlong's audience just a year before Houckgeest's embassy. The Dutch were 
more modest in their goals; and enjoying, as Houckgeest's text makes clear, good 
standing with the Chinese to begin with, were not inclined to the ambitious but fraught 
designs that motivated Macartney's mission. Subsequently, Houckgeest's narrative often 
strikes a quite different tone than Macartney's: 
 
We also passed by several brick kilns situated upon the banks of the river, and 
perceived in the interior several pretty villages, shaded by bamboos and other 
trees. I prolonged my little excursion till I came opposite the city of In-te-chen, 
where, upon the eastern side, I found a handsome tower of nine stories, in 
good preservation, although it appeared very ancient, according, at least, to the
indication of the trees growing out of the crevices of its walls, and even upon 
the very top of it. (48)
It is by sheer force of numbers that such throw-away bits of description accumulate to any 
significance in Houckgeest, who here describes his “little excursion” on Nov 26th as if he 
were making casual tea-time chatter in a gossipy parlour room. Houckgeest's China, as he
paints it in one of the first descriptions in An Authentic Account, is a patch-quilt of “pretty 
villages,” “handsome rivers,” and delightfully decrepit buildings with greenery in their 
crevices – a chinoiserie room-screen. Continuing in this vein, a paragraph later he is 
tickled by the sight of a mountain “in the form of a sugar loaf when seen from the 
westward” (48). The serious-minded and scholastic observer promised to us in the 
travelogue's preceding paratexts seems missing in action, and in his place one of the 
duller Bennet sisters has been substituted. In a similar tone, he later notes “at the 
extremity of a high mountain, a tower which looks very heavy, and appears constructed 
without taste. It is octagonal and only three stories high” (57). Although the general 
dimensions of the tower are given, the only real description here is the vague and 
subjective assertion that it was constructed “without taste.” In the town of “Pak-eng-tsauy-
thong,” however, “The houses stand detached from one another, and are constructed with 
72. See again O'Brien, “Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise and Decline of the Dutch and British 
Economies, 1585-1815” for a detailed comparison. Also, Leonard Blusse, “No Boats to China: The Dutch 
East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690.”
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a good deal of taste” (63). After all the scientistic sound and fury of the paratexts, how do 
we account for this unexpectedly hazy, equivocal – even flippant commentary? 
Houckgeest's obsession with the “tastefulness” of Chinese architecture seems to lack 
Macartney's sense of vehement disapproval, because Houckgeest, quite unlike the Lord 
George, fails ever to explain what, exactly, constitutes either good or bad architectural 
taste – a topic that Macartney rarely passes an opportunity to lecture upon. Where 
Macartney takes pains to justify his critiques of, say, Chinese architecture or garden 
design, Houckgeest simply takes for granted that his readers will understand what he 
refers to as their tastefulness (or lack thereof). Allowing for the possibility that Saint-Méry's
translation may be partly to blame for Houckgeest's equivocality, Houckgeest seems to 
have considerable faith that “taste” refers to a widely understood and apparently pan-
European standard. This betrays a significant ethnocentric bias to his thinking, and one 
that must be weighed against his often warmer disposition towards the Chinese than 
Macartney.
Following his “little excursion” past In-te-chen, Houckgeest and his company 
chance across one of the cormorant fisherman that had once so enchanted Nieuhof:
We have this day seen one of those fisherman who neither makes use of net 
nor line, but employs birds trained and accustomed to pursue the fish under 
water. These birds seize their prey and bring it to their master. Whenever it 
happens that they swallow a small fish or two, the fisherman obliges them to 
restitution by pressing their crop, and only gives them a few small pieces for 
their nourishment. This singular mode of fishing is no small proof of the industry 
of the Chinese, especially when it is known that the invention of it belongs to 
one of the lower classes of the nation. (vol. I, 50)
Here are Nieuhof's “Lou-wa” birds (and their masters), as industrious as ever a century 
after the elder Dutchman's visit. Indeed, time seems not to have impacted the strategy of 
these fishermen in the slightest – which makes the comparison of Nieuhof's and 
Houckgeest's treatments of the phenomena especially enlightening in our given context. 
The authors could hardly differ more: where Nieuhof is astonished at Chinese ingenuity 
and immediately desirous of appropriating it, elitist Houckgeest is most impressed that “the
lower classes” were able to invent such a “singular mode of fishing” to begin with. He 
shows no other interest in the fishermen or birds, and does not mention them again. Given
that changes in Dutch fishing technology might well have, in the century between the 
ambassadors, progressed to the point that the novelty of fishing with cormorants could no 
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longer be considered clever, but merely novel; still, it is striking how nonchalant 
Houckgeest's description is compared to his forebear. 
The Dutch touch, and much ado about kowtowing
And perhaps there is reason for this lack of aggression. My decision to analyse 
Houckgeest subsequent to Macartney is not just a matter of keeping to chronological order
– or rather, not for the sake of chronology alone. Houckgeest was quite aware of his 
embassy's following so closely upon Macartney's heels, and he references the British 
ambassador regularly. Although he does not make comparisons in any systematic way, his
mentions of the British diplomat seem to indicate a strong need to differentiate his 
embassy from the former's. Early in his account, for instance, Houckgeest details the 
Viceroy of Canton's excuse for not entertaining Dutch ambassador Titsingh: 
[The Viceroy] observed to his Excellency [Titsingh], that he was not permitted 
by the usages of China to receive him in his palace, nor with as much respect 
as he deserved, or as he (the Tsong-tou) should be happy to shew him; and that
he therefore trusted, as this could not be done without infringing on the laws 
and customs of the country, that the Ambassador would not take it ill if he sent 
an excuse by one of his Mandarins to the gate of the palace, especially as the 
year before he had treated the English Ambassador, (Lord Macartney) in the 
same way (26).
This fantastic little insight into the workings of Chinese social nicety sets Houckgeest's 
embassy, and by way of the Viceroy of Canton's own words, on an equal footing with the 
British in Qing eyes. Indeed, he earlier mentions, almost offhandedly, how despite “the 
jealousy and hatred of certain Europeans” who had conspired to besmirch Dutch 
reputation amongst the Chinese, that “the Regency of Canton entertained such an opinion
of the Dutch national character, and of the peaceful and sedate conduct of the individuals 
of our nation, as insured the success of an Embassy which had been so industriously 
traduced” (vol. I, 18). Ever circumspect, Houckgeest doesn't name names here, but he 
also pointedly refuses to clear any of the other nations with factories at Canton, 
suggestively leaving his allusions open-ended. But as Loehr indicates, he was in fact well 
aware of the shortcomings of the Macartney embassy, and determined not to repeat them:
Grammont, a Jesuit who had been in China for twenty-six years, wrote to Agoté 
from Peking, giving as one of the five reasons why the Macartney embassy had 
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failed, the refusal to kowtow. A copy of this letter was given Van Braam, who 
informed Titsingh of this fact. So the two of them determined scrupulously to 
comply with the request of the Chinese officials on each and every occasion. 
(192)
Houckgeest and Titsingh's scrupulous determination apparently paid off, with Houckgeest 
boasting that “I was told besides that we [the Dutch] stood very much above the English in 
the opinion of the sovereign,” and then immediately justifying himself, “I trust the reader 
will excuse [the particulars] I just related, and which my veracity forbade me to sacrifice to 
a false sense of shame, because I am in reality no more here than the Historian of the 
Embassy” (vol. I, 202). These boasts, both indirect and direct, of the esteem in which the 
Dutch were held helps Houckgeest to clearly establish the similarities between his own 
and Macartney's embassies – and, much more importantly, their differences. Given the 
notorious failure of Macartney's mission, this is not surprising, but it is nonetheless worth 
noting that Houckgeest felt the need to distance himself from his British counterpart both in
the face of the Chinese, and again in a journal intended for general Western readership.
The differences between the embassies, and their goals, were after all numerous. 
Leonard Blussé states plainly: “The VOC court voyages had a clearly defined mercantile 
goal and had little to do with the propagation of national honour – a position that is in 
notable contrast with... the British embassy of Earl Macartney in 1793” (Peeking into the 
Empires, 18).73 I disagree with Blussé inasmuch as I believe that the British felt that 
propagating their national honour was, in the final instance, necessary to the pursuit of 
their own clearly defined mercantile goal. We have considered this topic already, in our 
review of Macartney's cargo of painstakingly chosen tribute gifts. But regardless, 
undoubtedly the most notorious difference between Macartney's and Houckgeest's 
embassies was their very different attitudes towards the kowtow. Houckgeest describes it 
several times without a trace of Macartneyan anxiety. Read in mind of his immediate 
predecessor's faux pas (which, granted, it is almost impossible today not to do), 
Houckgeest's deadpanned first mention of the kowtow rings like a punchline: “We 
performed this ceremony according to the Chinese custom” (22). The undercurrent of 
humour here is not entirely a modern projection. Houckgeest continues the description:
73. Blussé: “For instance, Titsingh, the Dutch envoy to the court of the Qianlong emperor who humbly 
knocked his head on the cold pavement of the imperial palace in Peking in the winter of 1795, had 
previously, in his capacity of chief merchant of Deshima, kowtowed on the tatami of Edo castle in front of a 
an all but invisible shogun. In sharp contrast to the attitudes of late eighteenth-century British and Russian 
emissaries, the Dutch had no qualms about subjecting themselves to Asian court ritual” (18). 
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It consists in kneeling down three times; in saluting at each prostration, by 
bowing the head three times to the ground; and in rising up after each third 
inclination of the head, in order to kneel anew. All these motions are directed by
the voice of a Mandarin, who measures the time by regular intervals, in like 
manner as an officer exercising troops. (vol. I, 22)
In this passage, with its unexpected tonal transition from the strained courtesy of “to kneel 
anew,” to its caricaturization of the supervising Mandarin as a cartoonish boot camp 
officer, Dutchman Houckgeest more closely approaches dry British humour than just about
anything in Macartney's journal.74 And while this irony of our writers' differing treatment of 
the subject may be beside the point, the difference itself is not. Houckgeest here gives a 
semantically scientistic, imperialistic description of a culturally vital Chinese custom: we 
can identify the passage's scientism in its ethnographic detail; its imperialist tinge by its, 
albeit gentle, satire of the “officer” Mandarin. Nonetheless, Houckgeest's description is 
characterised by a passive acquiescence to Chinese superintendence that never once 
appears in Macartney. When, months later, the embassy finally meets Qianlong for the first
time, they again kowtow without hesitation or fuss (190). Given the Dutch Republic's 
unaggressive imperial stance towards China, Houckgeest's relatively unaggressive 
treatment of even its more peculiar social rites should not be surprising. 
I say “relatively unaggressive,” of course, in acknowledgement of a certain inherent 
aggression in scientism itself – and that is an important distinction. Scientism's amenability
to imperialism lies in its need, and power, to conceptually reduce things, including peoples,
to formulae; to soulless categorical types predictably replicating patterns. Such 
stereotypization is dehumanizing, and can easily pave the way for the ethnocentric 
presumptions of superiority that imperialism, at its most aggressive, requires to justify its 
violent subjection of the Other. But in and of itself, scientism does not equate to 
imperialism, and in passages such as this one, Houckgeest demonstrates the tone of a 
scientism inflected by the outwardly flattering, but inwardly wary, almost courtesanal 
stance of a Dutch empire quite aware of the power differential between itself and its 
patron. This is imperialism, all right – but not Macartney's imperialism. Not British 
imperialism. Blussé touches on this himself when he notes that: 
The fact that the Dutch chiefs were merchants on the payroll of the VOC gave 
74. With a couple notable exceptions, to be fair, as discussed in our chapter on Macartney. Macartney's 
humour is a distinctly elitist one, and reaches its highest expression when he is sneering at the Chinese. 
Houckgeest here is also being satirical, but, significantly, he includes himself and his company in the comic 
tableau, in a position of deference. The diplomats' tones could not be more different.
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them considerable latitude to accommodate themselves to the rituals of the 
oriental courts and to serve as bearers of letters, rather than having to act as 
representatives of royal masters, as was the case with the English and the 
Russians. They were told to accommodate themselves to local customs if 
circumstances required this, without forgetting of course their personal pride as 
free citizens of the Dutch Republic. (Peeking into the Empires, 18) 
I rather suspect the Dutch did not feel quite so free as Blussé indicates. Their willingness 
to conform to Asian court ritual smacks to me less of liberty than the caution of diplomats 
cognizant of just how much was at stake in dealing with a trade partner as wealthy and 
powerful as China. In any case, members of Nieuhof's embassy had performed the 
kowtow as well (Nieuhof, 123), so there certainly was Dutch precedent. Also, Portuguese 
missionaries had been accommodating themselves, with great and well-noted controversy 
– but also unprecedented access (for what little it impacted their prosyletisation goals) – to
Chinese court culture for centuries.
Examples of this dynamic – this, shall we say, low-cal Dutch imperialism – are as 
common in Houckgeest as mentions of the kowtow itself. For instance, in the entry for the 
20th of November, he describes receiving Qianlong's official invitation of the Dutch 
embassy to his winter palace. The invitation arrives with great pomp, transported “upon a 
kind of hand-barrow” by eight men, with a further twenty in attendance – and all swaddled 
in a cloud of incense that billowed from a portable altar conducted alongside (vol. I, 33-34).
Houckgeest's mandarin escorts immediately kneel before the procession. “We followed 
their example, and did not rise till they did” (vol. I, 34) writes Houckgeest. Qianlong's 
invitation is read aloud, Houckgeest and cohort kneeling the whole time, and “as soon as it
was over we performed the ceremony of adoration in honour of the emperor, after which 
we arose” (vol. I, 34). The embassy then receives much congratulation from the 
mandarins. As with every mention of the kowtow, Houckgeest in this passage is clear both 
to enunciate the situation in which the kowtow is required, and that his company performs 
it. But he does so without any need to justify the gesture, which he evidently takes as 
rational and respectful to Chinese custom without reflecting poorly upon the dignity of the 
Dutch. 
This gracious amenability to Chinese custom would serve Houckgeest's embassy 
well during its travels. It would prove, in fact, one of the keys to the embassy's social 
success: the warmth with which they were received by the Emperor and his mandarins 
seems, in large part, to have been directly related to the Dutch willingness to conform to 
Chinese ceremony without resistance. For example, Houckgeest mentions that the day the
147
embassy met with Qianlong for the first time, after kowtowing and trading a few courtesies 
with the emperor, the party was unceremoniously ushered into a nearby garden: 
[W]hither we were conducted on foot... with such rapidity, that it was the next 
thing to running. Each of us was taken under the arm by a Mandarin, and 
dragged along in a manner which, in our country, would be considered as 
characteristic of the greatest incivility and rudeness, though here it would only be
regarded as a testimony of zeal and attention. (vol. I, 190-191)
Given that Houckgeest follows this passage with a relatively scathing critique of the room 
in which his company is served breakfast, it is probably wise not to overemphasize his 
admiration of the Chinese; the Dutchman did not romanticise his Eastern hosts.75 Still, 
Houckgeest's embassy clearly made a point of being courteous, generally swallowing their
complaints; and, as in the passage above, Houckgeest's attempts to understand unfamiliar
Chinese habits seem genuine. Following the embassy's disappointing breakfast, the Dutch
were nevertheless keen to mingle with their host for extended pleasantries afterwards in 
the garden. During this interval, a couple of them (including Houckgeest himself) 
entertained the Chinese with some ice-skating in the “European mode” (vol. I, 193) upon a 
frozen central pond. Scenes of such easiness between Europeans and mandarins do not 
figure often in Macartney. And this, I believe, points to the difference in that imperial stance
between Houckgeest's and Macartney's embassies; one that strongly tints their respective 
journals, despite the scientism that underlies both. It would be wrong to call Houckgeest's 
text unbiased, of course, but he, to my mind, far better approximates Clingham's adulatory 
reading of Macartney than Macartney does – and this, not because he is incapable of 
criticizing and even scorning the Chinese with Macartneyan vehemence, but because he is
far more often capable of unqualified praise. Indeed, Clingham characterises Macartney's 
text by an “openness to the particularities of Chinese culture” (8) that is in fact present far 
more often in Houckgeest. Kowtows speak louder than words.
Houckgeest's Ambivalence
As an example of this openness, in his entry for December 15th, Houckgeest 
describes a series of “triumphal or honorary aches” in the vicinity of “Tsien-chan-chen”: “I 
made more particular enquiries about the signification of these monuments; and was told, 
75. “It was so wretched a place, that if a similar one had been proposed to us during our journey [to Peking], 
we should scarcely have deigned to accept it” (191). 
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that they are architectural works intended to perpetuate the memories of persons of both 
sexes, whose virtues have deserved celebration and the homage of the public” (vol. I, 
112). Houckgeest relates five types of monuments: 1) those who have lived a century or 
more, “the Chinese thinking, that without a sober and virtuous life it is impossible to attain 
so great an age”; 2) Children of great filial piety; 3) “Women remarkable for their chastity”; 
4) Especially beloved and capable Mandarins; and 5) Great servants of the state, 
including those “who have made or invented any thing conducive to the advantage of the 
public” (vol. I, 113-114). That Houckgeest has gone to such trouble to explain the 
“signification” of these arches, spending several pages doing so, indicates that he 
considered them a striking enough production of Chinese culture that they were worth 
detailing. But this makes the plainness of his description, which includes no commentary 
as such, seem all the more unexpected. For the rest of his journal he comments on these 
arches wherever he finds them, noting light heartedly on December 28th: “Yesterday I saw 
only a single honorary arch, and this day no more than four, which seems to indicate that 
this part of the country has not abounded in persons whose virtues have been found 
worthy of commemoration” (vol. I, 144). Descriptions like these do not seem scientistic. 
The precision of the former does not seem intended to convey any particular kind of 
impression, it's a relatively straightforward depiction; while the latter reads as a bit of 
general banter rather than a stab at the Chinese. And proving this point, Houckgeest later 
reflects, “Whenever I saw these signs of public respect for virtuous beings, I felt a sort of 
confusion and secret pain, upon thinking that among us there exist no such marks of a just
homage paid to valuable qualities, and calculated to excite emulation” (vol. II, 203). Such 
passages, that either do not merit an East-West comparison, or that do and favour the 
East, are more common in Houckgeest than Nieuhof or Macartney. This fact, alongside his
comparative congeniality to the Chinese, gives the impression of Houckgeest's being not 
only less aggressively imperialist than Nieuhof or Macartney, but also rather less 
scientistic than they are.76 
Only the former of those assessments is true, however – and understanding this is 
key to understanding Houckgeest's travelogue as a whole, and its place beside his British 
contemporary especially. One of Houckgeest's most habitual scientistic ticks is reference 
to time. Any journal will of course be organized by date, but Houckgeest is perennially 
76. Compare this with Nieuhof's treatment of the same arches. The elder Dutchman devotes a short 
subsection of his “A General Description” to them, in Chapter X. His description is very minute, but almost 
entirely focused on visual description; being written in the dry, scholarly tone common to this section of his 
text, it does not occasion any of Houckgeest's reflection (197).
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concerned with marking his observations to the very moment. This treatment of exactness 
as the hallmark of truth cannot but remind us of the assertion in his introduction that his 
method of journaling had been to “[commit] to paper, with the least possible delay, every 
thing” (xvii) he found worthy of record. And the timestamp of his adventures was 
apparently always worthy of record. “At eight o'clock in the morning we passed the hamlet 
Tein-v'ong-tsauy-sau, where there is a military post” – about which military post he makes 
no other comment – “...We had also on each side of us a constant prospect of a chain of 
mountains... which presented them to us in a point of view truly picturesque, and not to be 
surpassed by any thing of the same kind in any part of the world” (vol. I, 51). It is the 
simultaneous casualness and consistency of Houckgeest's comments upon hours and 
times of day that betrays the habit's unconscious origin. But it is also interesting how, in 
the passage just quoted, the mention of time receives almost equal weight in his 
description as the hamlet itself, or the “singular” mountains that surround it. Without 
actually describing these mountains, aside from their position relative to the embassy's 
course, Houckgeest avers that they are superlative – placing the mountains within the 
greater context of the world's most picturesque scenes is more important, it seems, than 
actually conveying any of the details qualifying them for this distinction. Dry, clinical, and 
more concerned with categories than actual description, this is scientism attempting 
aesthetics, and faring as well as one might expect. The scene's label (“picturesque”) is a 
containment, that fixes the landscape's value in relation to the beauty of the known, 
European world; a point more important than the beauty itself. If that were not the case, a 
more detailed and effortful evocation would have been made. And the whole endeavour is 
marked, conscientiously, with a time-stamp: Houckgeest's prose here is not that of the 
poet, but the field scientist making notes. The possibility that one of the many illustrations 
Houckgeest commissioned during his travels was meant to bolster this passage – or, more
likely, vice versa – does not change the scientism of the text itself.
Later in Houckgeest's entry for this same day, the 27th of November, he continues 
both his close attention to marking time and his field note-like descriptions, in this case of 
the Chinese themselves. “Three times in the four and twenty hours they make a meal, 
which lasts little more than a quarter of an hour, and get but very little sleep,” Houckgeest 
observes, before admiring that, “No being on earth is fitter than the Chinese to endure 
fatigue, and to support a long continuance of labor.” Helpfully and authoritatively he 
explains to his audience that, so long as they are given “sufficient refection,” the Chinese 
will “always find new strength for whatever laborious task he may be required to 
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undertake” (vol. I, 51-52). These laborious tasks he then will perform “with vigour” and “a 
degree of gaiety which in other parts of the world is only to be met with upon parties of 
pleasure” (vol. I, 51). What begins as an observation of the Chinese sailors attending his 
party is quickly broadened into a generalization upon the nature of the Chinese. The 
nonchalance with which Houckgeest reduces an entire people to a feeding schedule and 
constitutional type is astounding – as also is the tone in which he does so, pitched exactly 
even between awe and condescension. Houckgeest's statement could be as easily 
applied to a beast of burden as a race of people; and that, perhaps, is not a coincidence. 
He here demonstrates Adorno and Horkheimer's theorisation of scientism as a method of 
control: describing a people not just in the terms of an animal, but specifically some variety
of workhorse, whose strength can be regulated and capitalized on for the benefit of their 
overseers. A little good husbandry – a little “refection” from their keepers – is all that's 
required. Houckgeest's word “fitter,” with its connotations of both general physical fitness, 
but in context also of hard physical labour as nature's intended mode for the Chinese, is 
exemplary of the description as a whole. This kind of characterization is not singular, but 
both the scientism and ethnocentricity of Houckgeest's passage seems particularly 
transparent, and when read against his more admiring comments upon the Chinese, 
indicates a striking ambivalence. 
A different approach to China's military strength
Like Nieuhof and Macartney before him, Houckgeest too makes careful note of 
Chinese military phenomena. Passing the city of “Chao-tcheou-fou,” he describes “about 
two hundred soldiers drawn up under arms in a single line,” come to pay tribute to the 
embassy. They were “in the following order: first, a body of archers, whose uniform was a 
white surtout turned up with red; second, fusileers with match-lock muskets, dressed in red
faced with white; third, gladiators carrying targets, wearing blue coats turned up with red” 
(vol. I, 54-55). Compared to Macartney's typically biting assessments of Chinese military, 
Houckgeest's description seems almost dandyish, as concerned with outfit colours as 
arms.77 But he is, nonetheless, concerned with arms: he specifically notes the fusileer's 
exact firearms. A few paragraphs later, he writes: “The city of Chao-tcheou-fou is a little 
smaller than Canton; but it may boast of an imperial custom-house, and of a garrison of 
considerable strength” (vol. I, 56). It is of “a very lively appearance” because it is located at
77. Compare Macartney (118-119).
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a point where upstream and downstream trade cross paths, and goods are moved to 
either larger or smaller boats depending on their final destination (i.e. the upstream-bound 
trade is moved into smaller, river-friendly boats, and the downstream-bound onto larger 
vessels fit for sea) (vol. I, 56). Houckgeest's attention to the details of Chinese trade flow, 
and its garrison size, verge on the Macartneyean, but do not in the end cross the line into 
open contemplation of the city's military vulnerability. Exemplary of his urban military 
measurements, on the 28th of January, he assesses Beijing itself: “I can affirm in all my 
walks though the city I never met with any thing military except a small guard house, 
occupied by ten soldiers,” whereas “[a]t the gates of the city there are, perhaps, thirty or 
forty men” and their commanding officer (vol. I, 264). He expresses his surprise at this, 
especially given that “one of the persons of the English Embassy (Captain Mackintosh)” 
had given that “the effective army of the Chinese empire amounted to eighteen hundred 
thousand men”; Houckgeest estimates the number to be closer to a mere “eight hundred 
thousand” (vol. I, 264-265). As scientistic as Houckgeest's measurements here are, he, 
again, does not speculate upon the city's invasion. 
He does, however, directly address this topic once:
We may suppose, with great reason, we may even go so far as to consider it 
almost certain, that the Chinese will remain a flourishing people to the utmost 
limits of time that thought can reach; because nature herself must henceforth 
protect their country against all enterprizes and all invasions, so that it is 
impossible to attack them with any hope of subjecting them to a foreign power, or 
of ruining their country. (vol. II, 40-41) 
Houckgeest then lists these natural protections: the “inhospitable deserts” to the north; to 
the south and east, rivers too shallow for sailing, gorges too narrow for marching, and 
rough paths “only fit for a single man on foot or horseback”; and to the west, “inaccessible 
mountains and impenetrable woods” (vol. II, 41). “Thus guarded on every side, the 
Chinese have no reason to fear... war... The only means then of disturbing them would be 
the keeping up of a secret understanding with a part of the nation” – but the complexity of 
their language prevents the enterprising European schemer from even this (vol. II, 41). 
Then Houckgeest comes to a remarkable conclusion: he does not mean, despite the 
hyperbole of his previous statements, to suggest that the Chinese might “jest with impunity
of any attempt by Europeans” – he is very careful not to specify which – to “compel” them 
to accept “such reforms as are necessary to put a stop to the scandalous exactions of the 
Mandarins of Canton” (vol. II, 42). In fact, even a “single nation” might do so with “but little 
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trouble and expence” (vol. II, 42). “But,” he abruptly concludes – as if Qianlong himself 
were peeking over his shoulder – “I think it prudent not to explain myself more fully upon 
the subject, and to pass over in silence both the project and the plan” (vol. II, 42).78 
What can we make of this? The extremity of Houckgeest's vacillation is startling. 
His China is at first “impossible to attack,” a nation-as-fortress, girt on all sides by natural 
defences; and then, two paragraphs later, a house of cards liable to fold with “but little 
trouble and expence.” But instead of describing how a European nation might “compel” 
China to reform its trade system, he leaves the weight of the sentence to hang upon the 
word itself – and “compel” is a far cry from “entice” or “persuade.” It is an ominous verb, 
that suggests military intervention by refusing to foreclose its possibility. The obliqueness 
of Houckgeest's statement, and his coy and somewhat anxious refusal to clarify it, finds no
parallel in his British contemporary. Can we connect this, at least in some part, to the 
differing positions of late-18th century Britain and the Dutch Republic towards China? In 
hindsight, it certainly seems that the bold military assessments in Macartney's travelogue 
could have been derived of Britain's power, confidence, and economic predominance at 
the end of the 18th century. Houckgeest's Dutch Republic, by contrast, was in a very 
different situation, and specifically, the East India Company, crippled by debt and still 
reeling from the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), was in a shambles leading up to its 
nationalization by the new Batavian Republic in 1796.79  These differing national moods 
seem to be reflected in the differing emphases of Macartney and Houckgeest as writers of 
Chinese culture, despite the scientism that informs both.
The return of the waterwheels; a capacity for admiration
An especially interesting example of this occurs in Houckgeest's entry for the 4th of 
December. On this day, on the banks of the “San-chan-tong” river, he encounters several 
of the same waterwheels that Macartney had found marvellous, and he too falls under 
their spell. Houckgeest's description here is unusually meticulous, and spans several 
paragraphs. He describes the contraption's size: “The whole machine... is from eighteen to
twenty-eight feet diameter.” It is built entirely of bamboo and timber: “[i]n no part is the 
smallest piece of iron or any other metal used.” He gives various details about the wheels, 
78. He also condemns the scandalous exactions of mandarins outside Canton, observing that the “ruinous 
condition” of the dikes in “Tang-yang-chen” are due to Mandarins who  “appropriate the money that ought to 
be employed in repairs to their own use” (156).
79. See Chris Nierstrasz (1-4); also, Duyvendak (4).
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their arrangement, and even the exact number of spokes in each wheel (vol. I, 72-73). And
he is equally enthralled by its ingenious mechanism of action. Partially submerged, the 
wheel is turned by the current, and:
To move the wheel some flat bamboos, so cut as to resemble a board, and from 
ten to twelve inches wide, are placed externally at every fourth spoke on each 
side of the wheel, and between the two parts of the double rim which confines the
spokes. It is against these bamboos that the current acts, while at te same points,
that is to say, at every fourth spoke, but upon the band or ring that unites the two 
wheels of which the great wheel is composed, are tied thick and hollow joints of 
bamboo, which fill with water when the motion of the wheel plunges them into the
stream. These joints of bamboo make, with the line described by the convexity or
periphery of the wheel, an angle, which, as well as the length of the joint itself, is 
so calculated, that when the rotation of the wheel that has first raised them gives 
them an inclination downwards, they pour into the vessel destined to receive it 
the water which they have taken up from the river, and which an aqueduct 
afterwards conveys to the place where it is wanted. 
Such a wheel, when once set up, work continuously night and day, until some 
accident obstructs its progress. (vol. I, 73)
Set against the slack generality of Houckgeest's descriptions of Chinese countryside and 
architecture, this is an impressively exact passage. It epitomizes both semantic and 
thematic scientism, measuring the machine exactly, explaining the principles behind its 
function, and directly comparing it to European techne.80 “[T]he mill answers the intended 
purpose as completely as the most complicated European machine could do” he notes 
with mild surprise; his superlative, “the most complicated European machine” emphasizing
to his Western audience just how efficient the Chinese waterwheel is. “[A]nd I will answer 
for it” he goes on, “that in China it does not occasion an expence of ten dollars. It seems to
me that the mere putting together of the pieces of which it is composed, is a new proof of 
the industry and intelligence of the Chinese” (vol. I, 74). Houckgeest “answers” for the cost
of the waterwheel, because, as both a Western merchant and man of learning he can 
vouch for its worth literally and figuratively. And while the implication here at first seems to 
be that Chinese manufacture cannot “speak” for itself – that its ingenuity and efficiency is 
not self-evident – in fact, Houckgeest is generally quite impressed with Chinese feats of 
water management, and several times compares them favourably to Holland's dikes and 
canals (vol. II, 117; 125). His need to relate all Chinese accomplishments back to 
80 As when he details the Chinese' answer to the wheels' lack of counterweights: they address this by 
artificially raising the velocity of the stream as it approaches the waterwheel by yet another sort of wheel.
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European standards is perhaps Eurocentric; but overall, he is conspicuously less loathe to 
concede Chinese technical superiority than his British counterpart.
This is especially true of his assessments of Chinese agriculture, which are 
overwhelmingly positive. On the 15th of December, he writes: 
During the greater part of this day we travelled over mountains where not the 
smallest fertile spot escapes cultivation. The eye of an European is delighted at 
beholding the industry of the Chinese, who, rating difficulties at nothing, convert 
mountains into fertile fields, and change the inclined surface into level ground, by
means of terraces of four or five feet elevation, which descend by steps from the 
top of the declivity to the bottom of the valley. But for their exertions it is evident 
that those regions must remain forever uncultivated. (vol. I, 110)
Houckgeest then continues to detail several other particulars: how each terrace is 
“secured with a parapet, and a little ditch to drain off the superfluous water” (vol. I, 111); 
how the highest mountains are fitted with “ample reservoirs” to insure against drought. He 
even finds great enthusiasm at the beauty of the scene: “the aspect was so disposed” to 
be “highly agreeable, although the ground was now entirely stripped and naked. How 
delightful it must be when wheat embellishes the surface, and covers it with a verdant 
carpet!” (vol. I, 111). But Houckgeest's aesthetic appreciation of the scene does not 
overwhelm his interest in Chinese efficiency; if anything, his awe at the scene's beauty 
seems to derive from his respect for Chinese agricultural ingenuity. And this is, in fact, a 
point of ongoing wonder for him. Much later, on April 1st, he admires the local “draught-
board” arrangement of planting, writing: “Thus do the Chinese prove, in every part of the 
Empire, that they are in no way inferior to the Europeans in the art of agriculture” (vol. II, 
266). Further, the Chinese are able “to boast that they carried that art to the perfection at 
which it is now arrived, whole centuries ago...” while European farmers even still resist 
innovations, being “slaves to habit” (vol. II, 266), an assertion Houckgeest defends with an 
anecdote relating to his management of the cows at his former Dutch estate in the 
province of Guelderland. Houckgeest claims that his cows “gave as much milk in the 
winter as the summer,” to the great acclaim of his neighbours – and yet, none of them 
could be persuaded to take up his husbandry suggestions (which he does not detail). 
Elsewhere, he paraphrases missionary M. Grammont that the Chinese, “at periods very 
remote” had “published learned books concerning this first of all arts” – agriculture – 
“books, of which the translation would enrich Europe, by the depth of their theory, and by 
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examples deduced from successful practice” (vol. II, 287).81 
In passages like these, Houckgeest's admiration of the Chinese is both plain, and 
indisputably based on an Adornan understanding of science as the mastery of the natural 
world; an achievement that he esteems so highly that he is willing to consistently defer to 
Chinese skill in this area. And not only defer, but also, and of course, appropriate. When 
he comes across a clever Chinese plough, he is direct: “I am resolved to buy one the first 
opportunity to carry out of the country with me, it being an excellent instrument for 
indifferent land” (vol. II, 114). As these various examples show, Houckgeest's most glowing
opinions of the Chinese tend to relate to their agriculture; a fact that almost certainly 
reflects Houckgeest's own background. Having farmed rice in North Carolina for years, he 
was familiar with the agricultural and milling technology of his day.82 The examples of his 
admiration for Chinese agricultural techne are innumerable: on the basis of the vigorous 
barley fields near the village of Fou-yang, he induces that “the farmers in this country know
how to manage every thing with intelligence and economy” (vol. II, 239). He spends 
several pages discussing the kinds of cotton grown in China, their qualities, and their trade
value (vol. II, 140-142). He carefully assesses the indigo cultivation in Tche'-kiang, and its 
suitability as a trade good, (vol. II, 199) – and etc. None of this is to imply that Houckgeest 
harboured no reservations about the Chinese – as we shall soon see – but of our three 
travelling diplomats, he is easily the least averse to openly giving the Chinese credit for 
their technological sophistication.83 
Houckgeest's admiration for Chinese technological savvy, and desire to appropriate
it, is not limited to the merely agricultural. “Among the carriages employed in this country is
a wheel-barrow, singularly constructed,” which Houckgeest then analyses with the same 
vigour that he had the water-wheels of the “San-chan-tong” river, detailing such particulars
as as the wheels' frames being “made of laths, and covered over with a think plank, four or
five inches wide” (96-97). Projections on either side of the barrow serve as room for 
baggage or passengers:  “[a] Chinese traveller sits on one side, and thus serves to 
counterbalance his baggage,” and if needed can balance his baggage between both 
projections and sit between, in the barrow, “on the board over the wheel” (96-97). “The 
81. Houckgeest, however, and to his dismay, is unable to acquire any of these books, because they are kept
as “sacred things” by the local officials, who cannot be tempted to sell them (288). 
82. For more information on Houckgeest's agricultural background, see Duyvendak (101); Loerh (180); An 
Authentic Account (vol. I, ix; vol. II, 284-286).
83. Loehr writes of An Authentic Account's illustrations of Chinese agricultural instruments: “The Chinese 
agricultural instruments represented, brought to this country as part of Van Braam's collection with the 
distinct purpose of serving as models, were no doubt drawn from life in Philadelphia, as they were displayed 
in Peale's Museum, then housed on the ground floor of the American Philosophical Society” (185).
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sight of this wheel-barrow thus loaded, was entirely new to me. I could not help remarking 
its singularity, at the same time that I admired the simplicity of the invention. I even think, 
that in many cases such a barrow would be found much superior to ours” (97). 
Houckgeest “cannot help” admiring the Chinese barrow, and “even thinks” that such a 
barrow “in many cases” would beat out its European analogue: Houckgeest's qualifications
betray something pained in his concession, on this occasion, of Chinese technological 
savvy. He is impressed, but not resigned to being impressed. Nonetheless, concede 
Chinese technological savvy he does, even as he appropriates it.
Of pigs, ladies, and the importance of “geographical knowledge”
And it is precisely Houckgeest's ambivalence – his ability to admire Chinese techne 
without finally relinquishing his ethnocentric worldview – that makes him such a fascinating
comparison to Nieuhof and, even more so, Macartney. In his entry for December 10 th, he 
compares the Chinese hogs of “Ta-ngan-chen” to those of “Quan-tong,” noting that 
Northern pigs are “quite black, and apparently of a wild breed. Their belly does not hang 
down, their snout is short and turned up; and their ears are long and pedant. Their hair is 
also both thicker and stiffer” (vol. I, 95-96) – and from there segues immediately into a 
critique of the Chinese people: “It is equally easy to see that there is a difference in the 
men, particularly the colour of the skin.” The men in this region are “much ruddier... than 
the inhabitants of the south of China”; but even more so the women, “whose cheeks are 
as red as those of European females, in the full bloom of youth and health” (vol. I, 97).84 I 
will not belabour the implications of taking a comparison between regional varieties of hog 
as the starting point for a comparison of human beings. What is less expected is that 
Houckgeest nevertheless ends up extending his comparison to include the flower of 
Europe's “females.” His description of the Northern Chinese bookends them between 
Chinese hogs and European women – some sort of missing link in the grand chain of 
Others. Whether his description was ultimately meant to be insulting or complimentary to 
any of the three parties involved is an open question. He seems unsure himself.85 
84. Houckgeest was apparently quite smitten with these hogs; he mentions them again on December 19th, 
before referring his readers back to his former entry. Incidentally, this self-conscious command of the 
contents of his own journal strikes me as an example of semantic scientism, implying precision, consistency, 
and thoroughness as proofs of the credibility of his observations.
85. It is only fair to note that Houckgeest seems overall quite sympathetic to China's womenfolk, lamenting 
that “[t]here is no country in the world in which the women live in a greater state of humiliation, or are less 
considered than in China,” explaining that the wealthy ones are confined to home, and the poor perform 
backbreaking labour with their children strapped to their backs (vol. II, 184).
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In a similarly demeaning vein, and comprising one of the most notable instances of 
thematic scientism in Houckgeest's journal, Houckgeest describes an altercation between 
his embassy and their Chinese chaperones on the 25th of December, only days prior to 
arriving in Peking. Ambassador Titsing has decided that the embassy should decamp for 
the night in “Lin-ouay-chen,” afraid that going any further will cause the company to 
outpace their accompanying cargo, so depriving them of various niceties and comforts 
(vol. I, 134). But the Chinese, afraid that the embassy was not making good time to 
Peking, “endeavoured to play us another trick, and carry us twenty or thirty li beyond the 
place,” writes Houckgeest (vol. I,135). “By way of doing so they begged us to set off at two
o'clock instead of three,” but Houckgeest realises that that is far earlier than necessary 
simply to get to Lon-ouay-chen. “It was evident that it would suffice to set off at five o'clock 
in order to go the ninety li... Perceiving that our opposition was systematic, and founded 
upon a geographical knowledge of the country, they changed their tone” and relented (vol. 
I, 135). These slight few sentences stand out amongst our three travelogues for how self-
consciously they portray European fluency in “geographical knowledge” as a hard counter 
to Chinese “tricks.” Houckgeest is here very literally depicting scientific skill as a means of 
redirecting Chinese behaviour to bring it into accord with European wishes; his self-
satisfaction oozes off the page as he recounts the experience. In light of the generally 
cordial, and even friendly, relations that he reports between his embassy and the imperial 
court, the passage stands out as a clear example of scientism as an ideology of control 
even in the absence of any pressing imperialist agenda.
“Master-pieces of art”: assessing Chinese manufacture 
I will conclude my reading of Houckgeest by demonstrating that, despite his 
enthusiasm for Chinese agricultural (and sometimes other) techne, his opinion of Chinese 
manufacturing techne overall is low, and his pronouncements on this front assertive, 
scientistic, and among the most Eurocentric to be found in his travelogue. On Jan 20 th he 
states tartly that the constant influx of European trade goods – “master-pieces of art” – 
should be enough to “convince [the Chinese] that industry [in Europe] is there carried 
farther than among themselves: but their vanity finds a remedy for this. All these wonders 
are included in the class of superfluities” (vol. I, 243). Houckgeest never specifies what he 
means by “master-pieces of art,” but it's just as well, since he is making a general 
comparison of European and Chinese wares; his vagueness emphasizes the conviction of
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his judgement, which he takes for granted as not requiring qualification. And so, ultimately,
despite being the freest of our travelling diplomats in paying compliments to the Chinese, 
and despite his embassy's being by all accounts more concerned to meet imperial 
etiquette than Macartney's, it would be wishful indeed to mistake Houckgeest's very real 
affection for the Chinese for a lack of Eurocentric bias. He is, after all, also the diplomat 
responsible for one of the most blatantly Eurocentric statements to be found amongst any 
of the travelogues under study. He praises the Cantonese that “by means of their continual
intercourse with Europeans... they are in general more civilized than the rest of the nation” 
– and then is quick to qualify even this backhanded compliment, explaining pointedly that 
“this effect is circumscribed even in Canton,” and characteristic only of those who had 
social access to Europeans (vol. I, 246). So Houckgeest was no cultural relativist. And for 
all that he admitted admiration for the Chinese when he considered it justified, he was in 
the end firmly convinced of Europe's sum superiority. In fact, his journal's vacillation 
between warm esteem and sharp criticism of the Chinese is one of the distinguishing 
features of his work. And that is perhaps the greatest value of Houckgeest's travelogue in 
comparison to the former diplomats: undergird by the deferential political stance of the 
late-18th century Dutch towards the Chinese, his travelogue helps to enunciate the 
inflections of a scientism that stands in contrast most pointedly to that of his immediate 
predecessor, Lord George Macartney. So doing, it helps to clarify how scientism can be 
accommodated to various political styles and agendas. 
Chapter Six: Benjamin Schmidt and the Curious Case of the Shrinking Author
Having examined now the scientistic inflections of three distinctly Western voices 
(as well as the rather more singular Sir Temple), it will be wise of me, before making 
conclusions, to evaluate an argument made by historian of the book, Benjamin Schmidt. I 
have mentioned Schmidt before: his Inventing Exoticism: Geography, Globalism, and 
Europe's Early Modern World has proven itself an invaluable mine of information about 
premodern Dutch travel literature, and Nieuhof specifically, and my own research has 
benefited immensely from his. But in his book, he makes one argument in particular that 
bears upon the premise of this thesis heavily enough that I feel it requires addressing 
directly. 
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In what soon becomes his refrain, Schmidt declares in the first chapter of his 
monograph that “early modern books were generally produced, not written – 
manufactured, not authored – and this process of production took place in well-organized 
ateliers, under the guidance of artisan-entrepreneurs” (47). Schmidt's central argument, 
derived largely from the works of Roger Chartier and historian Donald McKenzie, is that 
the bookmaking process, including all of its editorial and publishing facets – and especially
as regards premodern Dutch works of geography and travel, the generic standards of the 
age – deserves greater holistic consideration than it is often given in literary exegeses (46-
48). These latter, Schmidt argues, tend to prioritize a romanticized “text” as if it were 
overwhelmingly the product of the titular author. But in fact, he continues, the “artisan-
entrepreneurs” who curated the collection of paratexts and images that accompanied 
these texts, and frequently intervened in the texts themselves, were at least as important 
as the titular authors in shaping any such book's final form, therefore conditioning the 
terms of its popular reception. Enthusiastically borrowing Chartier's term, Schmidt refers to
this exegetical error as “the imperialism of close reading” (47).
The Importance of Being Attributed
Schmidt's argument is elegantly and engagingly reasoned, and his point that few – 
and indeed probably no – premodern books were the unfiltered expression of a single 
author is impossible to deny. But it is worth noting that if, as Schmidt paraphrases 
McKenzie, “forms effect meanings” (47), it is equally true that formal attributions affect 
meanings. It may or may not be that books like Nieuhof's An Embassy from the East India 
Company were seen as literary Athenae, sprung more or less fully-formed from the heads 
of their purported creators, rather than as works of expertly interwoven miscellanea 
“manufactured” by publishing ateliers. It is difficult to evaluate contemporary audience 
expectations on this point at this still early stage in the history of mass printing. It is likely 
that different readers would have had different expectations, depending on their 
educations, personal levels of familiarity with the book-making process, and any number of
other idiosyncrasies. This doesn't make Schmidt's point moot, but it is important to note 
that Nieuhof's travelogue, however heavy a stamp his publishers put upon it, and whatever
the actual provenance of its discrete parts, was still attributed to Nieuhof. To this end, 
Schmidt himself details the evolution of the terms by which Nieuhof's first publisher, the 
formidable Jacob van Meurs, describes, over the course of several editions, his own 
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involvement in the text:
On the title page of the first Dutch edition of Nieuhof's China book, van Meurs 
fashions himself a 'Boekverkooper en Plaatsnijder' (bookseller and engraver), 
while in the French edition (also 1665), he fills the role merely of 'Marchand 
Libraire' (bookseller), and by the German edition (1666), he reverts to a 'Buch-
und Kunst-handlern' (book and art dealer). (49)
I will leave it to those better versed in the languages mentioned to investigate how similar 
the native connotations of van Meurs' various titles are; but in the end, it would seem they 
all converge on the obfuscation of van Meurs as textual creator. And since presumably van
Meurs approved them all himself, we can safely surmise that he was not interested in 
actually usurping the position of author. His “dilution” (70) of Nieuhof's text with foreign 
material does not change this.86 Van Meurs may well have been, in Schmidt's term, an 
“impresario of print” (47), but it remains to be seen how his management of the production 
of Nieuhof's book would, at the time of publication, have lessened Nieuhof's claim to its 
authorship in the minds of Western Europe's reading public. Or if indeed it would have 
done so at all. Either way, if in the final instance it is more correct to consider An Embassy 
from the East India Company as the fruit of a partnership between Nieuhof and van 
Meurs, or even the output of an artisanal community, rather than the flowering of Nieuhof's
genius alone – then so be it. At risk of glibness, all the better then can we consider such a 
polyphonic text as reflecting the belief systems and discourses of the culture that 
commissioned it, and to which it was finally – by someone – addressed. Even if that 
someone was not, or not only, the titular author. That Nieuhof himself was not the one to 
ornament his journal with the paratexts, images, and interpolations that comprise the final 
form of his “China book” (51), does not make the inclusion of these aspects in that final 
form any less intentional, or representative of larger strains of local ideology. After all, a 
primary aim of close reading is to draw forward those rhetorical motifs in a book that 
86. “Digressive, meandering, often unspecific, and generally impersonal descriptions of exotic locales meant
that the consumer obtained a book about a place rather than by a person. It demonstrates, further, the 
demotion of the author in deference to the bookmaker- publisher, who would have had a hand in compiling 
the text, perhaps even providing the titular author with the raw materials needed to draft these volumes. 
Even the ample use of pictures contributed to this end: by diluting the place of the text in a volume, the 
bookmaker weakened the role of the putative author of that text. The author became decentered, one of 
several contributors to a printed product, and had to yield a portion of the title-page credit to the graphic 
artists, mapmakers, and so on” (70). How Schmidt comes to know that the addition of names besides the 
titular author's on a book's title page implies a total levelling of any conceptual hierarchy between these 
names in the minds of readers, he never explains. He is right that Dutch geographies were collectively 
created affairs, and often marketed as such, but that the reading public wouldn't have been able to 
distinguish between editor/publisher, graphic artist, and author, in the cases that these various roles were 
attributed, seems to me unlikely.
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suggest its underlying ideological frameworks and cultural narratives – phenomena which 
are discursive to begin with. 
My own analysis of the paratexts of Houckgeest's An Authentic Account exemplifies
just this. The various authors that contributed to the travelogue's paratextual material – 
Phillips; his unattributed French-to-English translator; Saint-Méry; and Houckgeest himself 
– all consistently invoke scientistic tropes to establish Houckgeest's credibility as an 
author. They insistently point to his scholarly nature, the empiricism of his observations, 
his commitment to describing China honestly even at risk of refuting others' descriptions, 
and etc. Marketing tactics alone cannot account for this; or rather, for such rhetorical 
gestures to be marketable they had to have already been meaningful, as referring to 
established cultural standards.
 
Are books only consumer objects?
None of this is meant to make light of Schmidt's concern for assignations of 
authorship. He is right to caution modern readers against taking works like Nieuhof's for 
direct transpositions of the titular author's views into typography. He is also right when he 
notes that “the fabulousness of the pictures, the framing of the narratives, the processing 
of the texts, and the assorted other clever mechanisms of Dutch-made geography... 
contributed significantly to their popularity,” and ultimately “shaped manners of reading and
consumption” (55). But Schmidt's critique focuses so tightly on books as consumer goods 
that he neglects to address the extent to which even the most chimaerical books reflect 
and engage with their ideological contexts, as if market forces alone were sufficient to 
account for both the popularity and significance of premodern travelogues. As he puts it: 
“Narrative presence was undoubtedly a selling point in volumes of exotic geography – it 
was underscored particularly in books that derived from individual travel journals. Yet it 
was not an especially important outcome in the illustration programs that rendered Dutch-
made books so popular” (105). Again, Schmidt makes an astute observation and then 
overemphasises it; as if texts such as Nieuhof's were reducible to a bullet list of selling 
points. In his attempt to free the premodern travelogue from the constraints of modern 
exegetical biases, it seems Schmidt has simply substituted a different set of modern 
exegetical biases. Regardless, the illustrations of such books of exotic geography, which 
habitually portray flora, fauna, and people like so many textbook specimens, are excellent 
examples of the deployment of scientific conventions to circumscribe by describing: to 
162
reduce the Other to terms of the knowable, measurable, and controllable. To types, rather 
than individuals. Is this not the implication of serially recycling images of “exotic” non-
human and human subjects in various unrelated books? 
Another example of Schmidt's resolutely economic focus: he says tellingly at one 
point, while explaining the tendency of Dutch premodern geographies to bear extravagant 
paratextual bumper crops, that “volumes were assembled to usher the reader – better, 
consumer – through their complex structure and to offer an appealing way to sample the 
morsels of 'exotica'... housed within” (56). The italics are mine, but the emphasis is 
Schmidt's. And it is habitual. There are apparently no ideas in Schmidt's geographies, only
“morsels” of pure entertainment. And that is the crux of my argument with his otherwise 
brilliant and deeply researched monograph. For Schmidt, it is not enough to reclaim 
premodern literature's consumerist dimensions – a worthy goal – but he must also force 
these dimensions so far forward that they dwarf all the rest. He does nod in the direction of
the non-economic forces with which texts like Nieuhof's engage, explaining of Dutch 
geographies that:
They were not entirely without an agenda – hardly feasible for the genre of 
geography – yet their angle and perspective was generically 'European,' and 
their scope and ideology were pan-colonial and hyper-imperial. Dutch 
geography pitched broadly, and, consequently, its influence was extensive. (64) 
This is a stunning and sweeping statement, but Schmidt doesn't pursue this “pan-colonial 
hyper-imperiality” much further, settling finally on the (rather ironic) assertion that “colonial 
or imperial ideologies” cannot well be “extracted” from these texts because they were 
“manufactured by much messier, less straightforward, and more 'printerly' processes than 
critics have generally recognized” (68). That is, these texts were, to use one of Schmidt's 
favourite words, “hodge-podges,” albeit beautiful ones. Framing them in this way checks 
the undue significance of the titular author, yes – but only by replacing him with his exact 
inverse, a nearly omnipotent editor/artisan/impresario, whose strictly economic motivations
then rise to take the place so recently inhabited by the airy-fairy concept of authorial intent.
But not even editor/artisan/impresarios live in ideological vacuums. It seems 
strange to me to think that the “messy, printerly processes” by which men like van Meurs 
manufactured books somehow took place in a magic bubble beyond the reach of any 
ideological influences whatsoever. It is the premise of this thesis that whatever forces 
shaped the production and distribution of travelogues as books should not be taken as 
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superseding in importance the forces (such as scientism, imperialism, etc.) that shaped 
these travelogues – to use Schmidt's and Chartier's distinction – as texts. Even if these 
texts are considered collective productions. To draw an impermeable line between the 
ideological contexts of books and texts seems as absurdly reductionist as conflating the 
two entirely. Markley, for instance, explains of an etching of Canton's ground plan 
reproduced in the 1669 English edition of Nieuhof's travelogue: 
This plate is neither a realistic representation of a cityscape nor a map: the plan 
employs its surrealistic geometry and weird perspective to model a demographic,
economic, and political ideal. In its size and regularity, the alien city is 'other' not 
because it fails to live up to European conceptions but because it projects an 
unvariegated commitment on the part of its inhabitants to live up to Confucian 
ideals of good government and social order.
Markley is right to note that the presentation of Canton, with its extreme and minute 
regularity of layout, was here an exaggeration and an exoticization: the translation into 
image of a barely understood Chinese worldview. One that more closely reflects European
expectations than Chinese realities. Is it also a literal spectacle of uncertain provenance, 
meant to enchant the Western gaze with its novelty, and so sell books? Yes, of course. But
its deployment as a literally spectacular consumerist fetish doesn't preclude its origins in 
European ideology. And it is that that Schmidt's analysis does not seem to reconcile: 
however geographies and travelogues may have been produced, they – at least those 
studied in this thesis – were still presented with due lip service to scientistic notions of 
impartial, first-hand observation. Foreign places were translated into cartographic terms, 
located longitudinally, and mapped where possible; the nonhuman environment was 
reduced to a list of its natural (especially agricultural) resources; human environments 
were often described as lists of military vulnerabilities; where they were not, they were 
most often described as lists of commodities; and both nonhuman and human specimens 
were stripped of individuality and reduced to representative types. That these portrayals, 
both textual and visual, were not consistently obtained by genuinely scientific methods of 
observation does not change the fact of their appropriation of scientific language and 
methods of display – that is, their scientism. If anything, it quite heavily underscores the 
superficial appeal of science to a lay audience. 
And finally, and to return to Schmidt's most general claim: I suggest that the 
collective and nebulous nature of premodern authorship in the geographic genre does not 
erase the titular author himself, and certainly does not nullify the resultant book as a vector
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of contemporary cultural discourse. Indeed, if Schmidt's assessment of the consumer-
oriented production of such literature is accurate, then, again, the publishing industry's 
regular utilization of the scientific rhetoric explored in this thesis indicates that exactly the 
opposite is true, and that the makers of exotic geographies – and their audiences – 
demonstrably engaged with at least one non-economic ideology.    
Conclusion
I have, over the course of this thesis, analysed the travelogues of Johan Nieuhof, 
Lord George Macartney, and A.E. van Braam Houckgeest respectively. Each is an 
invaluable record in its own right of a particular moment in the history of Sino-European 
relations; preserving in amber, as it were, the details of a first-hand inter-cultural 
encounter. But further, together these texts constitute three vital entries in a larger 
ideological fossil record of great importance to the history of ideas; one that, crucially, 
documents Western conceptions of China from a non-missionary point of view during an 
era when non-missionaries rarely had the opportunity to make such observations. This is 
not to say that the resulting texts are somehow “purer” or less ideologically laden than the 
works of the missionaries – on the contrary, their value lies in the contrasting ideological 
lenses through which they portray China, compared with missionary texts, consequent of 
their authors' differing aims and priorities. As the records of Western European diplomats 
in diplomatic situ, these travelogues offer modern readers as intimate a glimpse into the 
Western imperialist imagination of their days, as it encountered and attempted to reckon 
with China, as exists in the historical record. 
In particular, in these texts I have sought out examples of what Adorno and 
Horkheimer have called the “mythological function” of Western science: science as a 
means of understanding for the sake of controlling. It is this aspect of scientific ideology 
that seems most amenable to imperialist aims at accumulating wealth by, as Drayton has 
explained, both identifying new commodities, and helping to organize the manpower 
involved in the production and movement of these commodities. Such superficially 
economic goals – if I may paint a moment in broad strokes – led, in historical practice, to 
the European annexation of non-European lands and subjugation of non-European 
peoples; as for example in Dutch Java, or British India.87 China, of course, was never 
87. Nieuhof himself, in fact, as I mentioned during his chapter, gives a useful record of Dutch occupation of 
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annexed by any European power, but in the Opium Wars of the 19 th century, it fell to British
military might, and was forced thereafter to relinquish control of its borders and trading 
practices to a Western power for the first time in recorded history. Did Western science 
therefore cause the Opium Wars? No, not in any direct or uncomplicated way; nor does 
this thesis mean to suggest that the Opium Wars were some sort of inevitable ramification 
of the rise of Western science. But inasmuch as scientific ideology increasingly informed 
the worldviews and actions of premodern Westerners generally, then certainly it deserves 
to be scrutinized for its affects upon these ambassadors' behaviours, including their 
writings. And in Macartney case, it is difficult not to speculate upon how it may have 
impacted a diplomatic mission that ultimately only increased tension between Britain and 
China – a tension that would continue to mount over ensuing decades, before combusting 
in 1839 as the first Opium War.     
Moving beyond Drayton's argument of the practical utility of science and scientists 
to empire, I would also add that the scientific drive to explain the world – not just the so-
called natural world, but also the human world, the realm of culture – in terms of 
transcendent, universal principles and laws, has an innate tendency to treat individuals as 
types. A tendency which is fundamentally dehumanizing, burying the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual under the presumed traits of their class. Dawn Odell identifies this dynamic in 
the images of decontextualised Chinese figures in regional dress that pepper Nieuhof's 
travelogue. In these images, which she argues are representative of the visual depiction of
foreign peoples in premodern “European books about Asia” generally, the figure portrayed 
becomes “a metonymic notation, a static single image standing for a cultural whole, rather 
than playing a role within a narrative of lived activity” (Customs, Clothing, and 
Mercantilism, 144). I agree with Odell, but think that this phenomenon can be discerned in 
textual as well as visual depictions – and so have made the close reading of such textual 
depictions in Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest central to my thesis. Indeed, this is 
perhaps where my thesis most breaks new ground – by attempting a sustained inquiry into
the interrelation of scientism and imperialist ideology at the level of text.
To perform my analysis, I have foregrounded two aspects of these diplomats' texts 
in particular. Firstly, their thematic scientism, by which I refer to explicit discussions of 
Chinese science and techne – an obvious choice, given my subject, and one that requires 
little justification. And secondly, their semantic scientism, which refers to stylistic habits 
Java, wherein he details the commodities that first incentivized Dutch colonialization there, and describes 
their trials in maintaining control of the region, (26-29).
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that implicitly invoke scientific methodology. Regarding thematic scientism: all three 
diplomats enthusiastically survey China in terms of its natural resources, and also its 
technologies – especially manufacturing and agricultural – and all three, at different points,
attempt to appropriate Chinese technologies that they deem useful. All three make note of 
Chinese military strength, both how Chinese soldiers are outfitted, and in terms of 
numbers of soldiers and their allotment in various parts of the country. And, perhaps most 
significantly, all three diplomats make pointed observations on various aspects of Chinese 
scientific learning comparative to Europe that imply, as Adas has argued, the importance 
of scientific learning per se to their understanding of what constitutes a civilized people. 
(Nieuhof and Macartney, in fact, dedicate especial chapters of the final, encyclopedic 
portions of their texts to this topic; scientism at the formal level. Houckgeest's comments 
are more commonly interspersed into his narrative, but his journal too is heavily buttressed
by paratextual material whose common theme is to establish the, in Odell's terms, 
“seeming scientific objectivity” of his observations.) Regarding semantic scientism: all 
three diplomats repeatedly emphasize the objectivity and honesty of their observations, 
sometimes by avowing it directly, and oftentimes by employing precise quantifications to 
imply its credibility. As an example of the latter habit: each diplomat puts great effort into 
making his observations geographically specific – and in Houckgeest's case, references 
even to the exact hour of day that he passed a certain locale or had a certain experience 
are the norm. These examples are not exhaustive, but they encompass some of the most 
habitual expressions of scientism in our diplomats' travelogues. 
Despite their similarities, each diplomat's work is distinct, and though it would be 
reductive to attempt boiling down any of my close readings into a pithy sound-bite, a few 
generalizations can be drawn of each travelogue. Nieuhof begins his An Embassy from 
the East India Company with much ado about the importance of the travelling scholar to 
progressing the learning of humankind (i.e. Europe), by which he implies the importance of
science to the development of culture generally; an idea that will have become taken for 
granted by the time of Macartney and Houckgeest. That his travelogue represents 
scientism at an early stage of development is reflected in the fact that he tends to 
interchangeably refer to various scientific fields as either “Arts” or “Sciences,” which seems
to reflect the still emerging institutional status of science in the mid-17 th century.88 
88. Herbert Butterfield's 1954 discussion of the relationship between, as we would define them today, the 
arts and sciences in Renaissance Europe continues to be relevant here. Butterfield argues that the 
innovative spirit of Renaissance painting and sculpture – “the recapture of the spirit that lay behind the 
achievements of antiquity” in the sciences (26) – anticipated subsequent breakthroughs in geometry, maths, 
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Nonetheless, it is clear from his commentary on the Chinese that astronomy, medicine, 
and mathematics especially were important to him as barometers of civilization. It is also 
clear from his painstaking, taxonomical lists of Chinese provincial cities and garrisons, 
their bureaucratic hierarchies, and the potential commodities native to a given region, that 
approaching China systematically was a primary goal of his. This systematization of 
Chinese phenomena extends to and in fact finds its fullest expression in the “General 
Description” that ends his travelogue, wherein he details various aspects of China's 
natural environment alongside Chinese cultural practices and feats of engineering – a 
gesture that I have described as “encyclopedic” for reducing China to a series of textbook-
like chapters authored by a touring Westerner for other Westerners to study, and that I 
have also described as a mercantilist wish-list for its special attention to remarkable, 
potentially commodifiable plants.
Macartney's A Journal of the Embassy to China borrows from Nieuhof a tendency to
survey land in terms of its natural resources; like Nieuhof, smaller nations orbiting China 
are considered in these terms alone, whereas China is also frequently surveyed for its 
military vulnerabilities. But Macartney's military assessments are more blatant than 
Nieuhof's, and he shows less interest in the native cultural uses of potential commodities 
than those which would have obvious value to Britain (such as tea and silk). He is more 
interested in Chinese agricultural techne than Nieuhof, however, and mentions it 
frequently, even making detailed blueprints of an impressive waterwheel used by the 
Chinese for irrigation. But where Macartney perhaps most stands apart from Nieuhof and 
Houckgeest is his frequent criticism of Chinese culture: criticism which spans from garden 
design to architecture, general scientific learning to various technologies – and of the 
latter, especially those, like silk weaving and printing, which he feels have been 
overestimated in Europe. Overall, Macartney's travelogue is considerably more disposed 
to scorn than Nieuhof's, and considerably less disposed to admiration than Houckgeest's. 
It seems likely that this behaviour belies the frustration of a diplomat who's sense of 
superiority was not indulged by a court he was certain he could impress; for in the end, 
and despite his indignation, Macartney's thousand gilt knick-knacks did not convince the 
Qing court of the utility of British manufacture. But his frustration also seems to have 
reflected a larger British mood: an anxious, even competitive awareness of Britain's 
worrying trade balance with what was perhaps the one other empire in the world at that 
time that truly rivalled her splendour and influence. It is the blatantness of Macartney's 
and eventually the natural sciences more generally.
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scientism and imperialism both that have made his work invaluable to this study.  
The defining trait of Houckgeest's An Authentic Account of the Embassy of the 
Dutch East-India Company, at least when compared against his Dutch forebear and British
contemporary, is its tendency to dizzying vacillations between earnest admiration and 
scathing criticism. Of our three diplomats, Houckgeest was easily the most fascinated by 
and appreciative of Chinese agricultural techne – irrigation (the same waterwheels that 
entranced Macartney), milling, and plough design are just some of the technologies he 
both praises and attempts to appropriate. He also openly admires practices such as the 
building of honorary arches. But at his most critical, Houckgeest was capable of matching 
Macartney for biting condemnation, and his criticisms of Chinese insularity and its affects 
on Chinese manufacturing technology are quite pointed. He also, less directly, complains 
of the “scandalous exactions” (42) of the Cohong, and alludes to the fact that Europe 
could easily put a stop to it – but then checks himself, having only teased at the sort of 
indignant tirade that Macartney actually gives (and that Nieuhof never nears). On all of 
these counts, Houckgeest makes a valuable, nuanced case study, for he routinely both 
confirms and denies academe's current predominant narrative that by the late 18 th century,
general Western opinion of China had soured. 
The truth is less encompassing, and I think it likely that, as Nieuhof's broad 
canvassing of China seems to reflect the open-ended, optimistic mood of Dutch enterprise
in his day; and Macartney's bitter indignation reflected the unhappiness of the British over 
their trade with China during his; so Houckgeest's ambivalence seems to speak to the 
Dutch Republic's anxiety over the precarities of its position as a world trade power in the 
late 18th century. Of course, none of our diplomats' views of China can be boiled down to 
their national zeitgeists alone (and Houckgeest's loyalties anyway were not exclusively 
Dutch). Blue, for instance, makes a case for the general decline in Western European 
opinion of China over the 18th century being in part influenced by the ascendency of the 
bourgeoisie class in Britain and the Dutch Republic during this period. Having established 
hegemony, bourgeoisie needs were no longer “convergent with those of monarchs who 
were promoting the centralization of their realms and trade” (72), and so idealization of the
highly centralized Chinese empire “became increasingly redundant” (72). Consequently, 
“[t]he limits that the policies of the centralized dynastic state had placed on the growth of 
commercial profits were then increasingly resented” (72), with the result that former 
bourgeoisie romanticization of China slid into its inverse. Additionally, Blue argues, the 
decline of Jesuit presence in China during this period resulted in control over popular 
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discourse surrounding China shifting towards “social thinkers who were not specialists” 
(74) on the nation, which helped to fracture the Jesuits' more approving narratives. 
Houckgeest especially helps to complicate both of these assessments: for he was a 
bourgeoisie merchant and a specialist on China, and his travelogue presents a conception
of China that resists clean summation. A conception notable for juxtaposing stern 
condemnations with earnest admiration – particularly, a perennial interest in appropriating 
agricultural techne. A gesture whose significance, coming from an experienced farmer and
miller, cannot be dismissed as mere eccentricity. How Macartney and Nieuhof fit into 
Blue's schema is less clear – which underscores an important point; ironically, the same 
one suggested by Blue's own multipartite analysis: that the evolution of Western European
attitudes towards China in the 17th and 18th centuries was not a straightforward process, 
and continues to resist comprehensive, Needhamian explanations. Ongoing investigation 
of the disparate influences upon this evolution are still required. 
Besides Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest, I have also, for the sake of contrast, 
toured through several essays of one Sir William Temple, the greatest Sinophile never to 
travel to China. Temple's theorisation that nature was the impetus behind humankind's 
drive towards civilization folds human culture into the realm of the natural, striking a very 
different tone from scientistic conceits about civilization's being based on domination of the
natural world. Perhaps the most unexpected ramification of this idea is Temple's argument 
that the study of “natural philosophy,” where this does not lead directly to practical 
technological innovation or greater mathematical understanding, is a distraction from the 
more useful study of moral philosophy. Therefore, it is below prioritization – an idea that 
stands in direct opposition to Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest's shared obsession 
with the state of Chinese science, and how it compares to European standards. With 
Temple's non-scientistic conception of China and skepticism towards the value of natural 
philosophy as foil, such ideological convergences between Nieuhof, Macartney, and 
Houckgeest become that much clearer. And while a single thesis does not and cannot 
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the existence of anything as slippery as a direct line of 
ideological transmission between our diplomats, the current work's close readings – backlit
by Temple – most certainly suggest an ideological continuity running from Nieuhof's 
travelogue up through Houckgeest and Macartney's. 
Finally, following my close readings of Nieuhof, Temple, Macartney, and 
Houckgeest, I addressed Benjamin Schmidt's argument in Inventing Exoticism that 
traditional conceptions of authorship cannot be meaningfully applied to premodern Dutch 
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“books of exotic geography” (and by extension the later translations and republications of 
these that came to represent premodern travel literature more generally). Schmidt's 
analysis emphasizes the publisher's role in the creation of such books, taking Nieuhof's An
Embassy from the East India Company as a representative case study. He details 
publisher van Meurs' interventions in both the visual accompaniments to Nieuhof's text 
and the text itself. By spotlighting as he does the role of the “impresario” (47) publisher in 
the production of books like Nieuhof's, Schmidt means to free the premodern travelogue 
from the limitations of traditional literary exegeses. Specifically, he refers to an 
“imperialism of close reading” (47) that aggrandizes the inputs of the titular author, and 
disavows any others – a gesture which Schmidt is right to contest for its historical 
inaccuracy. 
But the extremity of Schmidt's analysis is problematic. For beyond merely 
recuperating the publisher as a vital contributor to the premodern travelogue, Schmidt's 
analysis essentially substitutes publisher for author, disappearing the contributions of the 
latter into the apparently purely economic motivations of the former. Besides how 
troublingly this act diminishes the travelogue's ideological context and content, I would 
also contend that this insistence on hierarchising its various co-creators is a missed 
opportunity to instead stress the discursive and culturally embedded nature of these 
books. And though my own research does not concentrate on the extent to which Nieuhof,
Macartney, and Houckgeest's travelogues may have been shaped by editors, publishers, 
and others involved in the book-making process, my focus on the scientistic undercurrents
of the books in question – including at the formal level, where the affects of the publisher's 
hand are often easiest to discern – in no way precludes the possibility of multiple 
authorship (if that is indeed the appropriate term to use). If anything, the existence of 
multiple actors making similarly scientistic, but otherwise distinct, inputs to these books 
(e.g. illustrations, paratexts, textual interpolations, translation choices, etc.) would only 
support my claim that scientism was indeed deeply entangled with imperialism in the 
premodern Western European imaginary. Rather than, say, some oddly coincidental quirk 
of the titular authors individually. And while this fact does not completely negate Schmidt's 
critique, it does point, I hope constructively, to some of its limitations. 
And after all, scientism's association with imperialism was not a mere oddly 
coincidental quirk of Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest alone – as several scholars, 
whose works have provided the groundwork for this thesis, have established. In particular, 
Adas' research on the growing significance, beginning in the early premodern period, of 
171
perceived scientific superiority to European self-image, and subsequent invocation of this 
superiority as a justification for European colonialization, has proven essential. Also vital 
has been Drayton's case study of Kew Gardens in its role as imperial administrative hub, 
and significant player in imperial agronomic policy. For a further accounting of the research
that has made this thesis possible, I will refer my readers to the third section of my 
introduction. Perhaps the greatest value of this distinctly literary approach to a topic that 
otherwise falls most squarely into the history of ideas, is that it allows for direct and 
thorough consideration of the relationship between scientific and imperialist ideology at its 
most accessible level – the recorded word. 
Avenues for future research 
But my research marks only a beginning, and as such, one of the greatest helps 
this thesis can make to existing scholarship is to suggest avenues for future research. 
Some of the questions this thesis begs include: how has scientism affected Western 
Europe's view of foreign environments and nonhuman species? I have demonstrated, for 
instance, a habitual tendency in our diplomats to judge China's nonhuman milieux, 
botanical and zoological both, in terms of trade commodities. Was this an effect of the 
economic objectives of the embassies themselves, or at least partially due to the 
inherently objectifying nature of scientism itself? The latter possibility seems likely, but 
further study would be enlightening. The writings of traders and naturalists as they 
encounter and describe the non-Western world's nonhumans could be instructive here. 
Even Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest could be further pursued specifically for their 
descriptions of the Chinese nonhuman, a topic which has often entered only tangentially 
into the current study.
Certainly further studies of the influence of scientism upon European conceptions of
China are also called for – this thesis has examined only British and (English translations 
of) Dutch travelogues, but a rich array of non-English texts exist. For instance, Chrétien-
Louis-Joseph de Guignes' 1808 Voyage a Pékin, Manille et l'Ile de France, which Guignes 
based on his experiences as interpretor for Houckgeest's embassy. A comparison of 
Guignes' and Houckgeest's treatments of the Chinese using the methodology of the 
current study could prove enlightening – but unfortunately falls rather outside the language
competence of the current author.  
The most obvious suggestion for future research, however, is for exegeses of 
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travelogues written by Western European diplomats to other parts of the world. India, 
Japan, the Americas, Africa – what will be important is continuing the investigation into 
scientism's influence upon Western European conceptions of foreign peoples and 
polities.89 After all, the romanticisation of science that can be found in the texts examined 
here represent only a few snapshots of a historical and ongoing process. One of the 
defining features of the modern Western mindset, I would argue, is the reification of 
science. What is meant to be a method of understanding the world – one premised on the 
fallibility of human observers that, therefore, seeks to constantly revise theories out of 
aggregate observations – has become magnified in popular discourse into a vaguely 
defined, incontestable source of “truth.” But how objective is this authority really, and how 
benign? I do not presume to answer those questions definitively here; but what study of 
Nieuhof, Macartney, and Houckgeest makes excruciatingly clear is just how entangled 
Western science and Western imperialism have been since at least the 17th century. The 
resulting framework, considered as an object of historical inquiry, cannot be 
underestimated for its influence upon the self-perceptions of both Europeans and those 
they subjugated. Indeed, it cannot be possible to fully understand the history of either of 
these without considering their historical relation to one another, ideologically and 
institutionally. And, granting that the travelogues studied here represent this relationship 
only in the very specific context of premodern diplomacy with China – still, from them it is 
possible to see that science in this period was essential to imperial functioning. Not only as
a means of appraising and appropriating Chinese technologies and commodities – to say 
nothing of making general reconnaissance – but as a crucial justification for pursuing 
these goals. But I will reiterate: there is surely much yet left to learn about the relationship 
between imperialism and scientism, the sceptre and the sextant. And so study must 
continue. Because, in a world still reverberating with the echoes of Western European 
imperialism, to leave unexamined the ideological supports that have helped enable its 
existence, and that continue to shape international relations, would be tantamount to a 
pardon. 
89. Which is not to say that no research on this topic has not yet been done. See Sujit Sivasunduram's “'A 
Christian Benares’: Orientalism, science and the Serampore Mission of Bengal,” a case study of the relation 
between Christianity and Western science in early 19th century India. Sivasundaram's research concerns 
Revs. William Carey, William Ward, and Joshua Marshman, who “sought to bring indigenous traditions into a
dialogue with European science, so that the former would eventually give way to the latter” (1), and is an 
excellent example of an approach to the history of Western science that recognizes its symbiotic relationship
with other Western ideologies.
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Epilogue
Newton, for example, "revolutionized" physics and the so-called natural 
sciences by reducing the physical universe to a linear mathematical 
equation. Descartes did the same thing with culture. John Locke did it with 
politics, and Adam Smith did it with economics. Each one of these "thinkers" 
took a piece of the spirituality of human existence and converted it into code,
an abstraction. They picked up where Christianity ended: they "secularized" 
Christian religion, as the "scholars" like to say – and in doing so they made 
Europe more able and ready to act as an expansionist culture. Each of these
intellectual revolutions served to abstract the European mentality even 
further, to remove the wonderful complexity and spirituality from the universe
and replace it with a logical sequence: one, two, three. Answer!
This is what has come to be termed "efficiency" in the European mind. 
Whatever is mechanical is perfect; whatever seems to work at the moment –
that is, proves the mechanical model to be the right one – is considered 
correct, even when it is clearly untrue. This is why "truth" changes so fast in 
the European mind; the answers which result from such a process are only 
stopgaps, only temporary, and must be continuously discarded in favor of 
new stopgaps which support the mechanical models and keep them (the 
models) alive. (Russell Means, Black Hills International Survival Gathering)
In July of 1980, Oglala Lakota activist Russell Means, standing before a gathering 
of protesters in Black Hills South Dakota, gave a speech about the value of Marxism (i.e. 
the lack thereof) to American Indians. In that speech, excerpted above, he offers one of 
the most concise, damning, and accurate histories of the evolution of European thought 
that I have yet encountered. Identifying Marxism as a continuation of European 
imperialism, Means observes that “The intellectual roots of a new Marxist form of 
European imperialism lie in Marx' – and his followers' – links to the tradition of Newton, 
Hegel and the others.” A tradition identifiable for its mechanical “despiritualization” of the 
world, and obsession with efficiency. Echoing Adorno and Horkheimer's description of 
Enlightment-spawned science as a mode of domination, he declares, “The European 
materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe is very similar to the mental process 
which goes into dehumanizing another person,” before asking, bitterly, “And who seems 
most expert at dehumanizing other people?” 
As Means' condemnation of the reactionary potential of Marxism for American 
Indians continues, gathering momentum, it leads him eventually to a stunning formulation:
There's a rule of thumb which can be applied here. You cannot judge the real
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nature of a European revolutionary doctrine on the basis of the changes it 
proposes to make within the European power structure and society. You can 
only judge it by the effects it will have on non-European peoples. This is 
because every revolution in European history has served to reinforce 
Europe's tendencies and abilities to export destruction to other peoples, 
other cultures and the environment itself. I defy anyone to point out an 
example where this is not true.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has yet been able to provide such an example.
I begin my epilogue with these quotations of Means' because they highlight, with 
deadly clarity, and over a century and a half after the period discussed in this thesis, what I
have tried unfailingly to underscore in my own research. Namely, that the history of 
Western European imperialism cannot be understood outside the context of the scientific 
ideology that supported it – in great part by helping Western imperialists to, as Means 
observes, dehumanize non-Western peoples.90 Means' assessment, coming from a 
member of America's perhaps most consistently oppressed racial minority, is especially 
telling for its, dare I say, empiricism. He speaks from under the boot of Western 
imperialism. And from that vantage, he too identifies continuities that I have, within the 
delimited compass of this work, traced through the travelogues of Nieuhof, Macartney, and
Houckgeest. What I have called their shared ideological lineage, a lineage of scientistically
inflected imperialism, Means refers to as the European “mechanical model.” 
But the point of this epilogue is not to reiterate examples I have already given. My 
argument has been made; what I want to do over the next few paragraphs is sketch one 
way that the ideological lineage I have traced amongst my authors continued on, past their
works, into the 19th century. Means has already shown us that this lineage continued even 
further, into the 20th; he is competent to be left the final say on that. But that leaves a gap 
unexamined.
So let us mind the gap. In a sentence, in the 19th century, and immediately prior to 
America's global ascension, Britain was the most powerful empire on earth. Consequently,
it influenced racial discourse across Europe – and the world. And Britain's trend of opinion 
towards the Chinese in the 19th century was unambiguous. Adas writes:
With the Opium War of 1839-1842, the full meaning of China's military 
90 We might here recall, for example, Odell's argument in “Customs, Clothing, and Mercantilism,” that 
images of Asians in early modern Dutch travel literature were of fungible, generic types, rather than 
individuals (144; and quoted in the present work, 166-167). Odell refers to these depictions as “metonymical 
notations” for their cultures; Means, I am certain, would describe them as despiritualized, dehumanized, and 
mechanized. They were proto-stereotypes.
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backwardness was brutally revealed. In a series of engagements on land 
and sea – rather modest confrontations by European standards – British 
ships and British-led Indian infantry routed the numerically superior Chinese 
forces... In what proved to be the most memorable clash of the war, [British 
warship Nemesis] single-handedly engaged a fleet of fifteen Chinese war 
junks. The British ship took the initiative by reducing the lead junk to a 
roaring ball of smoke and fire with a Congreve missile. As the remaining 
junks fled or were hastily abandoned by their demoralized crews, the 
Nemesis continued up the coast, forced the panic-stricken inhabitants of a 
small town to evacuate their homes, sank a second war junk and captured 
another. (186)
To recontextualise Adas' passage into the terms of this thesis: here we see Macartney's – 
and Napier's – roiling war fantasies come to life. Indeed, Houckgeest too hints at the 
power of European military techne to devastate China; and Nieuhof had been obsessed 
with the fall of the Han to the Manchu. Almost half a century before the Nemesis 
steamrolled an entire fleet of war junks, these notable European observers had, one might
be tempted to say, prophesied its carnage. But I would say that the word “prophesy” is 
incorrect, and that these men helped lay the foundations for that carnage by outlining it, by
validating it both technically and morally, in advance. Applying Russell Means' rule of 
thumb, what do we see here? The direct translation of a European “intellectual revolution” 
into an “exportation of destruction” upon non-Europeans. In this case, upon the Chinese, 
whose military vulnerabilities Macartney had assessed in the late eighteenth century – at 
one point, by way of an imagined scenario involving a single British warship terrorizing an 
entire coast.
But that line of thinking, too, only leads back to arguments I have already made. 
Adas goes on to write of the Nemesis' fiery victory, that:
These and later military setbacks convinced virtually all European observers 
that China was no match for Europe and reduced the Chinese in the eyes of 
the European public to the pitiful creatures ridiculed in an1859 Punch Jingle:
With their little pig-eyes and their large pig-tails
And their diet of rats, dogs, slugs, and snails,
All seems to be game in the frying pan
Of that nasty feeder, John Chinaman
Sing lie-tea, my sly John Chinaman
No fightee, my coward John Chinaman
John Bull has a chance – let him, if he can
Somewhat open the eyes of John Chinaman (186-187) 
Adas sees in China's defeat during the Opium Wars – a technological failure by any 
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account – the seeds of later British racism. He is right to; the ominous obsession with 
Chinese military strength that is discernible as far back as Nieuhof's An Embassy from the
East India Company, and that has progressed to open appraisal of China's defences in 
Macartney's An Embassy to China, has here reached its dubious culmination: the collapse
of an entire people, and the most magnificent single empire in human history, into the 
subhuman figure of “John Chinaman.” A technological deficit has been parlayed into a 
degrading stereotype. One characterized by verminous eating habits, cowardice, wilful 
ignorance – and a desperate need for John Bull's civilizing magnanimity. Attributions that 
would haunt Chinese people who found themselves living and working (in often deplorable
conditions) in Western societies throughout the 19th century. 
Adas continues: “Chinese ineptness at using up-to-date military technology 
provided the material for most of the anecdotes of bumbling 'natives' which European 
commanders and travelers... included in their memoirs to illustrate the great distance that 
separated the scientifically minded, industrializing Western peoples from all others.” I 
would only add to this that the logic of the literary trope in question was well-established 
even before China's military implosion during the Opium Wars. The entanglement of 
Western science and Western imperialism has given rise to a number of identifiable 
rhetorical figures and strategies since the 17th century – this thesis has considered many 
of them. During the 19th century, they only proliferated, and one way they did so was to 
coalesce into a distinct, distinctly racist image whose validity was upheld by centuries of 
cumulative scientistic denigration of Chinese learning and technology (and disavowed 
appropriation of the same). I have said before that Macartney did not, himself, cause the 
Opium Wars. Neither, himself, did Nieuhof. But these men contributed to, and in many 
ways exemplify, a Eurocentric, aggressively imperialistic strain of “study” of China that 
paraded as disinterested, scientific inquiry. But at risk of underscoring the obvious, this 
dynamic did not end with Macartney. It gathered steam in his wake. And eventually, it 
gathered oil and electricity as well. And its assumptions live on today, as Russell Means 
emphasizes when he, rightly, insists that no European intellectual revolution can be fully or
fairly assessed, except by way of its affects upon non-European peoples. 
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